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IN TR O D U CTIO N
On February twenty-fifth, 1675, Russia dispatched her first official ambassador, 
Nikolai Milescu Spafarii, to the distant Asian empire of China. The Russian government 
hoped to establish positive relations and develop a lucrative and immediate trade 
agreement with this distant power by creating a monopoly on Chinese goods traded in
Europe.  ^ To assist in achieving this objective, the Russian foreign office provided Spafarii 
with an extensive entourage, lavish gifts to present to the Emperor, and a set o f 
instructions that seemed to anticipate every contingency.
Lulled by the preparation and confidence of Russia’s leadership and his own 
preconceived ideas o f Chinese culture and sophistication, Spafarii believed that his mission 
would be rapidly and successfully concluded. He envisioned himself triumphantly 
returning to Moscow, extremely rich from Chinese gifts and trade, and presented with a 
lucrative appointment from the Tsar as a reward for his exceptional and loyal service.2
* Basil Dmytryshyn, E. A. P. Crownha. -Vaughan, and Thomas Vaughan, Russia’s Conquest of Siberia, 
1558-1700: A Documentary Record, vol. 1. To Siberia and Russian America (Portland: Oregon Historical 
Press, 1985), lx.
2 This was a common reward for loyal servants. Spafarii was eventually rewarded by Peter The Great 
nearly fifteen years after his mission. The political upheaval created by Alexis’s death coupled with 
complaints of Spafarii’s behavior in China brought by Spafarii’s men, resulted in Spafarii’s disgrace. 
Peter revived the translator’s career and in 1683 rewarded him with “one silver kovsh (dipper)” and “two 
grivens weight and ten arshins of lundish {London} cloth and damask kuthteriu.” John Baddeley,
Russia. Mongolia. China (London, MacMillian and Co., 1919; Reprint, 1964), 207.
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2But Spafarii’s assignment to China was more difficult than it appeared. Several other 
Russian envoys and messengers had been sent to the Chinese empire during the previous 
century. None had managed to engage the Emperor in a political discussion or establish 
any lasting relationship between the two nations. In fact, only one, a lowly messenger— 
Setkul Ablin—managed to depart China and maintain friendly relations with the Chinese 
government. 3
Although the failure o f Russia’s early contacts can be attributed to diverse causes, it 
is generally accepted that the primary obstacles were created by inter-cultural differences 
between the two empires. Russian traditions maintain that the Tsar received his authority 
to rule directly from God. This close link with the divine ensured the Tsar a regal position 
in the world’s hierarchy and instilled the belief that he owed obedience to no other earthly
power. 4 China, in contrast, could not conceive o f the concept o f divine authority. Her 
Emperor was not simply appointed by God, but was himself an omnipotent being. As the 
ruler o f the middle kingdom—the center of the civilized world—all earth’oound men owed
him veneration and tribute. ^  The natural incompatibility o f these two distinct cultures 
assured that conflict was inevitable and that Spafarii’s assignment would be extremely 
challenging. Additionally, more mundane problems caused by miscommunication, the 
language barrier, and strict guidelines for negotiation would further hamper his ability to 
successfully conclude his assignment. However, none of these obstacles can fully explain
3 See Chapter 2, pg. 48.
4 Basil Dmytryshin, A History of Russia (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977), 206.
 ^Owen Lattimore, Mongols ^  Manchuria (New York: H. Fcrtig, 1969), 15-16, 54-58.
3the reasons for the mission’s dismal defeat. Only one factor, Spafarii himself, bears the 
ultimate responsibility for the failure of the first ambassadorial mission to China.
Spafarii’s attitude toward the Chinese was arrogant. His position was hard and 
unyielding. He was argumentative, disrespectful, and insensitive toward Chinese customs. 
The natural result was an explosive and resounding repudiation, which resulted in 
Spafarii’s expulsion from Peking and the severance of all Russo-Chinese communications. 
Further, the Chinese emperor used Spafarii for the next fifty years as an example o f poor 
diplomacy and improper behavior. Spafarii’s inability to recognize a potentially disastrous 
confrontation and alter his negotiating approach to compensate for inter-cultural 
differences infuriated the Chinese and created distrust between the officials o f both 
countries. T hus, it is Spafarii as an individual, his mannerisms and depoitment, that 
aggravated the diplomatic situation to such a level that failure was inevitable.
As the leader of a mission that failed to accomplish its objectives, Spafarii would 
have significant impact on the future relationship between Russia and China. Although 
Russia would not immediately achieve her goal of a trade relationship, Spafarii did 
manage during the course of his protracted stay in Peking to establish extensive contacts 
with Chinese officials and developed a tentative relationship with the Chinese emperor. 
Through these contacts, Spafarii’s mission cleariy illustrated the communication problem 
that lay at the heart - ‘'the ongoing Russian-Chinese conflict. Thus his mission, although a 
failure in the short term, was a necessary part of the diplomatic process. Only such a 
spectacular failure could demonstrate to both sides their incompatible political ideals.
4Traditionally, examinations of Spafarii’s mission to China have centered on the 
problems caused by cultural differences or the personality conflict between Spafarii and 
the primary Chinese negotiator, Mala.^ Little or no blame for the mission’s failure has 
ever been attached to Spafarii for his actions in China. Nor have any speculations been 
made regarding the lasting impact of this poorly mannered Russian ambassador on the 
future o f Russo-Chinese relations beyond the successful negotiation o f the Treaty of
 ^ A large number of Siberian documents and records have been lost through the years by fire, careless 
keeping or simple destruction and deterioration. Thanks to G. F. Muller, a German historian who 
traveled extensively throughout Siberia for ten years ( 1733-1743) many documents have been preserved 
that would have otherwise been lost. Out of the many document collections in both the St. Petersburg and 
Moscow libraries, two well researched works chronicle Spafarii’s mission: Muller’s six volume Siberian 
History published in 1732-1764 and a two volume Siberian History published by his protdge J. E. Fischer 
(1768). Unfortunately, Muller’s work has disappeared. Baddelev’s Russia. Mongolia, China is the last 
known work to have utilized Muller’s work as a reference source and a number of the documents 
contained in its pages arc extrapolated from the six volume history. Finally, Spafarii’s own record, 
“Statenii spisok posolstva N. Spafariia v Kitai,” in Vestnik Arkheoloeii I Istorii. provides a personal 
accounting of the embassy.
There are very few modem works analyzing Spafarii’s mission. Perhaps the best known is Mark 
Mancall’s excellent book, Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728, Other source material 
providing interesting or contradictory views arc Vincent Chin, Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth 
Century. V. S. Missnikov, The Ch’ing Empire and the Russian State in the Seventeenth Century 
Translated by Vic Schneiersin, and Liu Hsuan-min’s excellent article, “Russo-Chinese Relations up to the 
Treaty of Nerchinsk,” from the Chinese Social and Political Science Review.
5Nerchinsk (1689). Through examination o f the events o f this ill-fated mission, as related 
by the words and feelings o f Spafarii, this paper will pursue the emotional conflict created 
by the Russian ambassador’s attitude and actions during his mission in China. The results 
o f this emotional aspect, both in its immediate impact on the Treaty o f Nerchinsk and the 
indelible impression which strongly influenced China’s perception o f Russian diplomacy, 
requires further examination and should be considered in the analysis o f early Russian- 
Chinese relations.
CHAPTER 1: THE AMUR RASIN DISPUTE-MANCHUS AND COSSACKS
From 1643 to 1675, Russia and China had been engaged in an armed conflict over 
the control of the rich resources of the Amur basin and competed for the suzerainty o f its 
peoples. For more than thirty years, Russian Cossacks had continuously ravaged the 
region, demanding furs and foodstuffs from the defenseless natives and killing 
indiscriminately when the required goods were withheld. The Chinese government, bound 
by their ties o f kinship and tribute, was compelled to assist the natives. But despite several 
large scale military operations in the region, the Chinese were incapable o f ridding the land 
o f the Russian invaders.
By 1670, China was no longer able to muster the troops needed to control the 
Amur basin. The young Ch’ing dynasty required every able-bodied man to suppress the 
Ming dissenters in the southern reaches of China. Unable to maintain military protection 
for the Amur, China was willing to negotiate with the Russians to peaceably split the 
Amur basin. She realized that without military support, she was helpless to protect the
Amur natives and the territory would be gradually torn away by the Russians. ^  Unwilling
7 V. S. Miasnikov, The Ch’inr Empire and the Russian State in the Seventeenth Century, translated by 
Vic Schneiersin (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), 405.
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7to completely relinquish her claims in the Amur basin and allow Russia full control over 
the northern Manchu tribes, China preferred the option of negotiating a treaty.
China maintained a strong negotiating position. The Amur basin, through adjacent 
borders and historical ownership, technically belonged to her. She claimed the Amur 
through ancient ties, asserting the Amur natives were members of the wild lurcher, tribes, 
kin to the Manchu and relr' ^d by blood. The Amur tribes also paid China tribute and had 
freely chosen to accept the leadership of the Manchu. The fact that China was incapable 
o f protecting the region from intruders was an irrelevant factor. The support o f the 
natives’ allegiance and their common ancestry was deemed sufficient by the Manchu to 
substantiate their claim.
Yet China’s strongest argument for her continued control over the Amur was the 
basin’s location. With Peking located just twelve hundred kilometers due south o f tne 
basin, the close physical contact encouraged interaction. Unfortunately for the Chinese, 
the Khingan mountain range provided an inconvenient barrier. It hindered travel and 
communication and limited Peking’s ability to maintain a close relationship. This range 
was small, however, with peaks rising just two hundred to three hundred meters above the 
surrounding territory. In comparison to the mighty barriers the Russians faced, the 
Khingan range was only a minor inconvenience.
Two great ranges, the Stanovoi range in the north and the Yablonovii to the west, 
effectively impeded Russian access to the Amur basin. Only one major river provided 
reasonable access to the Amur’s interior. The Olekma, a tributary of the mighty Lena,
8formed its headwaters on the east side of the Yablonovii range and offered a difficult but 
usable ingress for Russian explorers.** However, this mountainous barrier was only the end 
of a long and tedious journey for the Russians. Because the Amur was located in the 
extreme Southeastern corner of the Russian empire, supplies, troops and messages had to 
travel more than five thousand kilometers from Moscow over a wild and untamed steppe 
and marshland before reaching the forested foothills of the Yablonovii range.
Once inside the Amur’s protective ring of mountains, one massive river system 
provided easy access throughout the region. The Amur, a river which winds more than 
fifteen hundred miles from the Pacific ocean into the interior, is augmented by four major 
tributaries. The Shilka and Argun, the Amur’s source rivers, provide access deep into the 
mountainous western terrain. To the east, the lesser tributaries, the Sungari and Ussuri, 
provide watery highways south into Chinese territory. These five waterways, the Amur 
and her four tributaries, provided Russian access to the entire Amur Basin—an area
measuring more than 1,230,000 square kilometers.^
At first glance it is obvious why both Russia and China prized the Amur in the 
mid-seventeenth century. This massive enclosed basin was a haven o f diversity and wealth. 
The entire area was characterized by exceptionally rich soil, temperate climate and 
abundant wildlife Average temperatures, even in the upper region, ranged between 
sixteen and nineteen degrees Celsius. The resulting growing season, while short and cool,
8 Mclvyri G. Howe, The Soviet Union: A Gcoeranhical Study (Plymouth: MacDonald and Evans, 1983), 
379.
9 Ibid., 396.
was surprisingly productive and produced an amazing array of grains and vegetables. 
Numerous grains—including rye, spring wheat, oats, and barley--were cultivated by the 
local tribesmen. Cabbage and potatoes also grew exceptionally well in the rich Amur soil. 
At the higher elevations, pastoral activities were favored. Cattle arid hearty stout-legged 
hordes roamed the flat mountain piains in abundance. Even the river itself was rich in 
whitefish and sturgeon, while its delta, which opens on the Pacific Ocean, provided an
ideal launch for seafaring boats. ^
For the Russians, the Amur’s most prized aspect was its bountiful wildlife. An 
array o f fur-bearing animals, including the cherished sable, ennine, and several species of 
fox, (especially red and black Arctic), thrived and multiplied freely  in the thick Amur 
forests. The exceptional quality of Amur furs, thick and lush due to the cooler 
temperatures and rich diet, brought premium prices during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and were highly valued by the Russian trappers who flooded the region searching 
for pelts. * 1
The Manchu, on the other hand, were not interested in exploiting the materia! 
wealth o f the Amur. They were more concerned with the native population. To the 
Manchu, the people o f the Amur represented part of an ancient link with the cherished 
Chin dynasty (1115-1234). The Jurchen, from whom the Manchu descended, fostered the 
Chin dynasty and ruled the entire Manchurian-Amur region-an area stretching from
10 Ibid., 406-07.
11 Ibid., 405.
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northern Siberia, south through modern Irkutsk to the southern tip of Manchuria and
westward into the high mountain plateaus. However, despite defeating the Khitans^ and 
severely threatening the existence of the South Sung Dynasty (1127-1271?) o f Southern 
China, the Jurchen were doomed. The continuous threat o f the Mongol hordes was 
impossible to combat.13
In 1234, the powerful Chin dynasty fell, dissolving the cohesive bond yeloped by 
the Jurchen tribes. As the population scattered, the Jurchen divided into four 
geographically separate and distinct tribes. The Mao-Lien moved south o f the Ch’ang-Pai 
river. Just to their north and extending to the Yalu river lived the Chien-Chou—the tribe 
that evolved into the Manchu, the future rulers of China. The Hai-Hsi inhabited the areas 
near the Sungari and Arshih rivers, while in the land surrounding the Amur and the Ussuri,
the Wild Jurchen lived. ^  The Manchu believed that the Amur tribes were, in reality, the 
wild Jurchen tribes, isolated in the Amur basin and largely forgotten for four hundred 
years.
There is a grain of truth in the Manchu belief. During the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, members of the Jurchen tribes interacted with the existing Amur natives, mixing 
with the nati ve stock and altering the natives’ time-honored customs and way o f life. *13
The Khitans were a tribe of Asian nomadic people that created the Liao empire in the tenth century. It 
is commonly assumed that they were absorbed into the Mongol nation between the twelfth and fourteenth 
centuries. Denis Twitchett and John K Fairbanks, cds., Mina Dynasty 1368-1644. vol. 7, pt. 1,
Cambridge History of China. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 397.
13 M. G. Levin and L. P. Potapov, Peonies of Siberia. (London: University, o f Chicago Press, 1964), 97.
U Twitchett, 266.
11
Unfortunately, while their influence is clear throughout the basin, nowhere in the Amur 
does clear evidence exist confirming the arrival and settlement o f the Wild Jurchen 
tribes. * 5
A reasonable hypothesis suggests internal dissension combined with the continuous 
plague of Mongols in the region completely eliminated Jurchen autonomy and dissolved 
their tribal authority. The displaced tribal members were then absorbed into the 
independent Amur tribes. The Nanays of the Ussuri River, for example, seem to have 
retained much of the Wild Jurchen culture though, even here it is distorted by the ancient 
Amur culture o f the Niviki. While the evidence indicates the Amur natives are not direct 
descendants of the Wild Jurchen, the diversity of the Amur tribes, in language and culture 
confirms a separate heritage comprised o f Jurchen elements as well as Chinese, Mongol,
and Turkish. *6
For four hundred years following the disintegration o f the Chin dynasty, the Amur 
tribes were left in strict isolation. Not until 1616 was their solitude broken. Members o f 
the strong Manchu clan penetrated the Amur searching for remnants o f the Wild Jurchen 
tribes. They sought allies and support among their cld relations in their bid against the 
faltering Ming dynasty. Tribes throughout the lower and central Amur were contacted 16
^  Levin, 692.
16 Ibid., 696.
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and willingly offered their allegiance to the growing strength of the Manchu. By 1636, the 
upper Amur tribes also supported their distant relations.^
The natives’ decision to join the Manchu was not due to oppression, but was 
rather a decision to enhance their security and well-being. Unlike the traditional idea of 
tribute, The Manchu’s concept had few drawbacks. They pledged support and assistance 
to the natives and asked only that other invaders be made unwelcome. The standard notion 
that tribute involved subservience and subjugation was repugnant to the Manchu. They 
believed that tribute should be the confirmation of a contract between two willing and 
equal partners. Offerings presented by the weaker member implied that a gift o f equal or 
greater value must be given in exchange. This harmonious approach made the Amur 
natives willing to accept the Manchu’s leadership.
Suzerainty to the Manchu did not alter life in the Amur. With the exception of 
occasional trade caravans and Manchu officials sent to observe the continued security o f 
the basin, the natives continued their daily routines. Even the Manchus’ bid for the Ming 
throne failed to disturb the peaceful quiet of the region. The silence and isolation o f the 
Amur remained intact despite the major alteration of China’s ruling authority. This 
peaceful isolation was shattered by the invasion of Russian explorers in the mid sixteen- 
hundreds, who demanded tribute and challenged China’s authority over the region.
U  Information on the Manchu challenge to the Ming dynasty by Nurhaci can be located in Twitchctt, 
574-82 and Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China. American Geographical Society Research 
Series, (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940), 127-33. Regarding Abahai, Nurhaci’s son, 
and the conquest of the Chinese throne. Twitchctt. 616-18; 628-29.
13
Before this fateful confrontation in the Amur, Russia and China knew very little 
concrete information about each other’s existence. They had encountered each other only 
twice in the centuries preceding the sixteen-hundreds. These early contacts, while 
relatively insignificant to sixteenth-century politics, indicated awareness by both parties of 
the other’s existence. ^  A few brief notes in the Chinese record indicates that, a Russian 
Grand Duke, Yaroslav, visited the City of Karakorune in 1246 to attend the coronation of
the Grand Khan Kuyak. ^
The second event occurred nearly a century later, in 1329-32. The Chinese record 
recorded that a group of Russian prisoners were being held just north o f Peking by the 
Yuan Emperor, Wen-Tsung. These prisoners weie settled on Chinese land, and were given
clothing, oxen, tools and seed. 20 Whether they were imprisoned or remained o f their own 
free will is unknown. The Chinese record does indicate that they were a curiosity and 
primarily provided game and fish for the Emperor’s tabled 1 *21
During this period, both Russia and China were controlled by Mongols. Batu Khan, predecessor of 
Kublai, (d. 1294) established the Sung dynasty (960-1279) in China. Tien-fang Cheng, A History of Sino- 
Russian Relations, with an introduction by John Licghton Stuart (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 
1957), 5-6.
Yaroslav apparently did not make the long journey in an official capacity but purely for social and 
curiosity reasons. It is likely that Yaroslav would have completely escaped the notice of the Chinese, but 
he died during his visit. Mark Mancall, Russia arid China; Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971), 36. Baddclely, xxxiv.
29 Harry Schwartz, Tsars. Mandarins, and Commissars: a History of Chincse-Russian Relations 
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), 24. There are also scattered reports of Russians employed among 
Peking’s imperial guards. Cheng, 10.
21 Vincent Chin, Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth Century. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus 
Nighoff, 1966), 34. During this period, China knew little of the lands outside her own domain and h3d no 
desire to explore and understand neighboring countries. Without knowledge of the Russian people, it was 
extremely difficult for reclusive China to distinguish between the various peoples outside her borders. 
Every early reference to Russia in the Chinese record is a vague account of a distant people. The Chinese
14
Unsurprisingly, both of these instances are unconfirmed by Russian sources. Early 
Russian records are notoriously unreliable and incomplete, and little evidence of 
diplomatic contacts remains from these early periods. An excellent example o f the 
unreliability of early Russian documents is the first Russian-recorded visit to Ch.na. The 
Russian archives contain a document that was reportedly filed in 1567. The chronicle, 
entitled “Descriptions of Countries Beyond Siberia”, describes the conquest o f Siberia 
and the status of the large country to the east known as China. The expedition, lead by 
two men, Pertrov and Alishev, reportedly visited China and traveled extensively through 
the eastern region.22
Historians, however, seriously doubt that this mission ever took place. First, the 
normally meticulous Chinese records failed to report the visit o f a foreign entourage in
1567 and, in fact, did not mention any Russian visit during the 1500’s.23 Secondly, the 
document’s information seems improbable for this time period, in the 1560’s, the Siberian 
conquest had not yet begun and the segments regarding China seem to parallel events o f 
seventeenth-century China, not sixteenth-century.24 Vincent Chin, a Chinese political 
historian, speculates that this mission was misdocumented by Russian chroniclers in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He feels that the document is a misplaced copy o f 24
never indicated any working knowledge of Russia’s location nor have written any suggestive clues of 
culture and behavior that may assist in actually confirming the nationality of these two encounters. In all 
likelihood China attached little significance to these early encounters and were untroubled as to the 
nationality of these insignificant peoples.
Samual Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom, vol. 2 (New York: Paragon, 1966), 441.
22 “Journey of Petlin and Mundoff, 1618-1619,” in Baddeley, 69.
24 Chin, 35.
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the Petlin mission report from 1618. Chin explains that the document is nearly verbatim to 
the official report filed by Petlin upon his return to Moscow. Additionally, the data 
gleaned from the 1567 report is consistent with the early quarter o f the seventeenth 
century. Chin’s theory is strengthened by the realization that an individual named Pertrov
was a member of a 1616 mission to Mongolia.25
The inaccuracy in Russian records is understandable. The fifteenth century was 
extremely hectic and unsettling for the entire Russian population. Under the rule of Ivan 
Groznyi (commonly referred to as Ivan the Terrible), Russia endured sweeping political 
and ecclesiastical reforms and fought an ambitious military campaign against the southern 
Khanates. As Russia rapidly grew in power and importance, she also was included in the 
political affairs of Europe and began negotiating trade agreements with the more powerful 
nations. Amid this turbulent time period, ensuring the accuracy of historical documents 
was given only minor importance. Economics became the primary concern.
Victory over the Khanates required large amounts o f capital, weapons and 
manpower. Relations with Europe demanded large amounts o f monetary support for 
envoys and messengers and their traveling expenses. Initiating trade also required large 
amounts o f ready assets. Russia was, however, desperately short o f currency. The war 
had nearly emptied her coffers, and her traditional economic system was based primarily 25
25 Ibid.
16
on barter or trade-in-kind. The European nations demanded hard currency which was 
simply not available.26
Unlike other European nations, Russia lacked natural sources o f silver, gold, and 
other valuable ore metals and precious stones. Although Russia did have a reasonable 
amount o f copper available for coinage, copper was relatively cheap and the rubles Russia 
produced were worthless outside the country without the support of precious metals. To 
compound this lack of hard currency, Russia vvas hampereH by circumstance. A cool 
climate, short growing season, and long distances to European markets made trading 
agricultural produce impossible. Without a strong agricultural base, Russia was unable to 
develop cottage industries to produce trade goods for export. Instead, Russia’s European 
trade consisted o f Asian and Middle Eastern goods that were transported over Russian 
soil. But even these valuable goods failed to generate hard currency. Asian merchants 
demanded precious metals in exchange for spices and silks and European traders refused 
to pay gold or silver for these goods—they preferred to trade-in-kind. The result was a 
vicious economic circle that ensured Russia was indigent.27
During the mid fifteen hundreds, Russia discovered an item that solved this 
economic difficulty—fur. Animal pelts were the one item Russia had in abundance. 
Throughout. Russia a vast profusion of wild and wooded lands provided safe haven for 
numerous species of fur bearing mammals. Russia’s cold, bitter weather, considered a *2
26 Mancall, 11-12.
22 Hsuan-min, 392.
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detriment to agricultural growth, proved to be a blessing. It encouraged the growth of 
thick lush pelts unrivaled in quality anywhere in the world. The result o f these two factors 
provided Russia a natural monopoly of thick, high-quality animal pelts. Europe became 
ecstatic over Russia’s new export. The wealthy elite clamored for the precious and rare 
furs and willingly accepted them in lieu of gold and silver. Russian diplomats began to 
arrive routinely in Europe’s great cities carrying bales o f fine pelts. These furs were 
carefully doled out as payment for food, lodging and other travel expenditures incurred by 
their entourage. Sable and mink were offered as diplomatic “gifts” and used as payment
for political favors and subsidies.28
Russia’s increasing interest in European affairs during the late sixteenth century, 
combined with rapidly multiplying European trade, dramatically increased Russia’s fur 
requirements. From a modest 3.75 % of the state’s economic income in 1589, fur 
skyrocketed to an impressive 11 percent over a fifteen-year period. Ama/.ingly, this figure
remained steady for the next forty years, only dropping slightly to 10 percjnt in 1644.29 
Efforts to satisfy this huge governmental requirement rapidly depleted the areas 
surrounding the Volga and the Don rivers, forcing hunters to range great distances to 
locate the precious pelts. 29
2  ^Raymond H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade 1550-1700 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1943), 100.
29 Ibid., 102.
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East was the natural direction for Russian expansion and exploration. In all other 
directions, strong powers—Turkey to the south, Poland and Lithuania to the west and 
Sweden to the frigid north—possessively defended their borders from Russian 
encroachment. Only to the east was open land available. Although once controlled by the 
Mongol hordes, the steppe to the east of Russia had lain empty since the disintegration of 
their empire in 1480 and awaited an infusion of new people to settle and control the vast 
region. Eagerly, Russians began investigating the vast flat steppe, assisted by the land’s 
natural topography. The area was interlaced with a profusion o f river systems that made 
eastern travel quick and relatively simple. In under fifty years, the Russian exploring 
parties had spread across the steppe and began entering the treacherous Yablonovii 
mountain range o f S iberia.^
Russian merchants, led by Anika Stroganov in 1558, headed the eastern fur charge. 
The promise of bountiful furs and new trade opportunities enticed many merchants to fund 
large exploration parties. These efforts were encouraged by significant government 
incentives which included long-term relief from heavy government taxes and unconditional 
military and government assistance. These factors, when combined with the possibility o f 
huge profits from fur sales, encouraged hundreds of merchants to travel into the eastern 
wilderness.^ 1 By 1586 they had crossed the Ural mountain range and established many *3
^Dmytryshin, Russia’s Conquest of Siberia, xl.
3 * Normally, Russian exploration parties operated on a three step plan. First, they followed river systems 
deep into the wilderness, searching for game and evidence of fur-bearing predators. When a promising 
area was located, a strategic fort called an “ostrog” was constructed to act as a secure base of operations.
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forts, including Tiumen (1586), Surgut and Tara in 1594, and Tomsk in 1604. Relentless 
exploring resulted in expeditions eastward from these newly established forts in the 
mountains to the south and to the extreme far east. By 1619, the Russians reached the 
Enisei river system and founded the plains fort of Eniseisk. llimsk and Krasnoiarsk, two 
settlements in the Buryat territories to the west of lake Baikal, became brisk exchange 
points of fur for gold and silver in the late 1620’s. The last great northern flowing river
system, the Lena, received it first settlement, Irkutsk, in 1632.32
During this tremendous effort, Russia never forgot China, the legendary land to the 
far southeast. While trade and exploration continued on the plains, Russia continuously 
sent small dispatches further east to discover China’s exact location. Few o f these 
missions provided concrete information. The most credible account is from a 1608
mission dispatched by the Tomsk Voevoda, Vasili Vasilievich Volinski.33 Initially, this 
mission was instructed to travel southward through the territory o f the Atlin Khan in the 
guise of a trading caravan, but they aborted their mission when the Kalrnuks revolted 
against the Atlin Khan. Threatened by ambush and open hostility, the expedition hastily 32
Local natives, were then contacted and compelled to assist the Russian’s efforts. The natives were forced 
to provide an exorbitant number of furs in tribute and tithes to the Russian tsar. Finally, Russian hunters 
and trappers radiated outward from the ostrog in all directions subjugating natives and securing as many 
furs as they could carry for tanning and transport back to Moscow. George Vjatchcslau Lantzeff, Siberia 
in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Octagon Books, 1972) 87-90.
32 Dmytryshin, Russia’s Conquest of Siberia, xl.
Voevoda was the local authority on the Russian frontier. He was entnisted to regulate the gathering 
of tribute and ensure that it was receive in Moscow in a timely manner. In addition he was the dispenser 
of local justice and acted as the Tsar’s administrator.
retreated back to Russian territory. Upon their return they filed a report explaining all
they had heard about the lands tc the south.34
And to the Chinese kingdom, it is three month’s journey from the Atlin 
Tsar, and the Chinese Kingdom has a stone-built town and courtyards in 
that town, like the Russians; in those courtyards there are stone-built halls 
and he (evidently the Chinese Emperor) is stronger in people than the Atlin 
Tsar, and richer. And in his court there are stone-built halls. And in that 
town there are temples, and in them a great ringing of bells. There are no 
crosses in the temples, and what religion they have is unknown, but they 
live like the Russians. They use fire-arms, and people come from many 
lands to trade with them, and they wear golden robes, and to him they
bring all kinds of precious stones and other things out o f many countries.-^
This wealth o f information was enough to fund an official delegation to China to 
encourage relations. In 1618, the Russian government sent Ivan Shko Petlin and 
Ondruchka Mundov into Chinese territory. Although the pair and their entourage safely 
arrived in China, they were unaware of proper Chinese protocol. Peltin had not brought 
gifts to the Khan, and lacking them was refused an audience with the Emperor. The 
Chinese officials did welcome the visiting group warmly and encouraged them to return
with proper gifts.36 Before Petlin returned to Russian territory he was given an official 
document from the Khan that expressed China’s eagerness to establish trade.
The letter read as follows:
20
Van Li (Wan-li}Chinese Tsar, two men arrived out o f Russia and Van Li, 
Chinese Tsar said to those Russian people, come to trade, then go away *3
34 "The Petition of Prince Toyan, the Eyushta Chieftain,” in Baddcley, 34-35.
3- Ibid.
“The Statenii Spisok,” in Baddelcy, 82. Mancall, 43.
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and come again. In the whole Wwrld, thou, a great lord and I, am not a 
small one; let the road between us be clear up and down to go by and do 
you {Russians} bring the best you have and in return I will make you 
presents o f good silk-stuff, and you will journey back, and if you come 
again, and with you people from the great Lord, bringing a letter from him,
I will send him a letter in return. And then letters come from you, I will 
order that they will he received with greatest honour and the people with 
them; but I cannot end an ambassador to you. Great Lord, for the way is 
long and they know not the language; but I now address my homage to 
you. Great Lord, and beg him to believe that, were it possible I would send 
my ambassadors but by my custom, 0  Tsar, I neither leave my own
kingdom nor allow my ambassadors or merchants to do so.37
This letter clearly indicates the willingness of the Chinese to establish trade 
relations with the Russians but denotes that Russian traders must travel to China. Beyond 
this implicit message the letter explains little of the time period and serves only as a 
reference point to establish the Russians’ interest in trading relations with China.
AJthough this letter’s authenticity is highly debated by Chinese Scholars,38 the fact that 
the Russians felt that it was genuine is significant. For more than sixty years, the Russian 
government held and examined this letter, formulating political policy and ultimately 
seeking to capture the lucrative trade mentioned in the document. This document could 
very easily have been the single factor that prompted the Russians to seek friendship with 
the Chinese. 38
•^Chin, 37. Van-Li (Wan-Li is also known by his reign title Shcn-tsung and his personal name Chu I- 
Chun.
38 The authenticity argument stems from the fact that the letter was not recorded in the meticulous 
Chinese records. Any written response to a foreign countiy should have been significant enough to be 
included in the official records. Ibid.
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The Russians, having discovered that the Ming dynasty favored peaceful trade, 
declined to cement the relationship with further diplomatic missions. They were 
exceptionally wary of the Chinese’s openly friendly manner and completely suspended 
their attempts to trade and communicate. They reasoned that the immense distance to 
China was too far for merchants to trade profitably and there were other dangerous 
considerations as well. The currently used route through the territory o f the Atlin Khan 
was lined with hostile and warlike natives, and other tribes like the Buriats, Tungus, 
Kalmuks and Kirgiz harassed travelers and shipments east o f this region. Generally the 
ri^k o f successfully bringing a caravan unscathed through this wilderness was immense.
To overcome this difficulty Russ'a concocted a more ambitious plan. She planned 
to depend upon her friendship with the Atlin Khan and her subjugation o f the Sungars to 
establish a successful three-party trac This scheme allowed Russian nearly all o f the 
henefits o f direct trade with the Asian giant but provided less risk to participating 
merchants. In addition, by sending the men o f the Atlin Khan into Chinese territory, 
Russia completely eliminated the opportunity for the Chinese to take action against 
Russian trading parties.
Russia was able to initiate this plan in 1632, when the Atlin Khan required Russian 
aid to maintain his kingdom. In exchange for Russian assistance, the Khan gratefully 
agreed to the Russians proposal and granted Russian traders the right to trade and deal 
freely with his own merchants for Chinese goods. By 1638, this profitable business had 
grown amarkably and the Mongol traders honored Russian requests to travel to Russian
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frontier towns with their goods. Segra and Bayan were among the first settlements to be 
visited and became brisk trade centers for sliver, damask, cattle and cotton. This practice 
rapidly increased and became a regular occurrence. Tomsk, a major Russian trade center, 
eventually became the Mongols’ final destination and their regular caravans provided a 
steady and lucrative trade in Chinese goods.
In 1643, this profitable business was halted. The overthrow of the Ming dynasty 
earlier in the year resulted in turmoil and destroyed the delicate trade arrangement Russia 
had established. Deprived of the security of her regular shipments, Russia was forced to 
suspend trade operations until the political conflict in China quieted. But the ten years of 
trade with the Atlin Khan had altered Russia’s outlook. Her Siberian ostrogs w'ere no 
longer viewed as simple hunting or defensive stations but rather as frontier centers for 
trade.40 Irkutsk was the first frontier ostrog to demonstrate this change in policy.
Established in 1632, the settlement of Irkutsk marked a crucial turning point for 
Russia—the change from a policy of exploration to one of conscious colonization/1 
Although the settlement’s primary function, like earlier ostrogs, was to provide pelts for 
the Tsar’s coffers, Irkutsk was to become a true settlement from which Russia could 39*41
39Chin, 28-29.
Ostrogs consist of a walled compound containing two or more cabins or underground huts called 
Zimivies. The Irkust ostrog was the largest in the region. The 1684 ostrog (rebuilt after being destroyed 
by fire) had four walls measuring four thousand feet and eight watchtowers on the walls. It surrounded a 
powder house, two jails (one for the heretics and one for criminals), hostage quarters, and the voevoda’s 
house, Nearby, approximately five hundred feet away, stood the gorod (city), the married men’s quarter, 
and other religious buildings. Frank Alfred Colder, Russian Expansion on the Pacific 1641-1850. 
(Cleveland, Arthur H. Clark Co., 1914), 26.
41 Dmytryshin, Russia’s Conquest of Siberia, xl.
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spread across the remainder of Siberia. Advantageously situated within the Verkhoyansk 
mountain range, Irkutsk would perform the role of Russia’s first administrative center in 
Siberia. The Olekma river, a tributary of the Lena, provided easy access deep into the 
mountains and encouraged hunters and trappers to expand eastward. The Lena, in 
contrast, provided free movement to Irkutsk from the broad Russian steppe, greatly 
simplifying the flow of goods and people between Irkutsk and Moscow. Naturally, the 
settlement was hampered by the immense cost of shipping in supplies and the difficulty of 
communicating with the Russian capital, but these difficulties were easily overcome 
through the self-reliance and ingenuity of Irkutsk’s colonizing population.
Irkutsk was settled by three diverse yet similar groups. First, was a small 
contingent of government officials assigned to oversee the area’s development and the 
annual harvest o f fur. A slightly larger group consisted o f Russian hunters and trappers 
that were drawn to the wilderness for adventure, wealth, or freedom from harsh Russian
justice. The largest and most influential group was comprised of Russian Cossacks.^2
Rugged and ruthless, the hearty lifestyle the Cossacks developed made the nation 
particularly well suited to the rigors of exploration and extremely valuable as a naturally 42
42 The Cossacks, although primarily of Russian heritage, had developed a unique culture. Formed from 
social misfits; rebellious peasants, hardened criminals, deserting soldiers and even adventurous third and 
fourth sons of boyars; the Cossacks became a fierce nation of hardy, callused warriors and skilled hunters. 
They were hardened by the difficulties of steppe life and tempered by individual trials of determination 
and bravery. They survived the difficult steppe by raiding unsuspecting trade caravans and villages for 
women, iron goods, and tools, which instilled in the Cossack mentality the right of plunder. Yet within 
the Cossack society, equality was the primary factor. Every man held voting rights, the right to speak and 
to act in any fashion (as long as his actions did not infringe upon the rights of other Cossacks). John 
Foreman, Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway by Vladimer (pseud.) (London: S. Low, Marston 
and Company, limited, 1899), 47-50.
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trained fighting force. At the turn of the seventeenth century, the Russian Government 
reached an uneasy truce with these roving bands of warriors. They agreed to allow the 
Cossacks full autonomy in all tribal matters in exchange for rejoining the Russian empire 
as armed warriors and protectors of the throne. But utilizing these wild, rugged men was 
extremely difficult. Russian Cossacks could not be bound by Russian law and practiced 
their marauding lifestyle without restraint on both newly dis< tvered natives ar; d 
established Russian subjects.43
Irkutsk, like every frontier settlement, faced the same difficulties controlling the 
wild and dangerous Cossacks. Months from Moscow lav/s and retribution, Russian 
officials lacked the authority and the brute force required to restrain the lawless men. By 
their nature, the independent Cossacks categorically refused to be bound by laws and 
seldom accepted orders. Their resistance to the authorities prompted Russian hunters to 
also ignore traditional laws. As a result, a combination of Cossack lifestyle and group 
survival dictated local law and justice. The Voevoda, by authority from Moscow, 
presided as the sole administrator and decided both the verdict and the sentence to be 
administered. Normally penalties were lenient primarily due to the voevoda’s personal 
interest in maintaining pelt quotas. Men killed or seriously wounded decreased the 
profitability of Irkutsk and decreased the voevoda’s income. Flogging or minor mutilations 
were the most common punishments, although occasionally capital punishment was 43
43Ibid.
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required. Murder was commonplace in wild Siberia, but even the horrendous crime of 
killing a superior officer seldom resulted in capital punishment. Instead, these violent 
offenders petitioned the Voevoda for hazardous duty—generally exploring unknown 
wilderness areas and subduing resisting natives. Since this duty enhanced the productivity 
o f the ostrog, petitions of this nature were normally granted 44 45
Tribute gathering was particularly well suited to these violent men. By the Tsar’s 
order, any means necessary was authorized to ensure the natives accepted Russian 
suzerainty, including death. Every few years a tribute train departed Irkutsk. It consisted 
o f a large armed party and a Prikazchik, a petty official appointed as acting Voevoda.
This group would travel throughout the territory requesting tribute from the local natives. 
Consenting natives immediately surrendered hostages to the Cossacks and produced the 
required tribute. However, occasionally a native tribe would refuse. In these instances, 
the Cossacks would immediately attack without another word, never offering the natives a 
chance to reconsider. The offending natives were slaughtered to the last man, the village 
razed and all women and children captured and divided among the marauding Cossacks as
plunder.4^
By 1637, Irkutsk was well established. The ostrog was well supplied and fully 
operational. The local natives were subdued and a steady stream of fur shipments was 
dispatched to Moscow. The immense wealth of the area had enriched every inhabitant and
44 Goldcr, 23.
45 Ibid., 27
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gained Irkutsk an unparalleled reputation. Hundreds of Russians flooded toward the 
settlement seeking to make their fortune. Hunters, trappers, craftsmen, and a multitude of 
women and childien arrived in pursuit of their dreams, rapidly expanding Irkutsk’s 
population. In a few short months, the influx of people reached and then overwhelmed the 
area’s natural capacity. The surrounding area rapidly became depleted o f game and plant 
life. Food supplies became dangerously short and starvation threatened the existence of
the Russian se ttle rs .D esp e ra te ly , the Irkutsk Voevoda searched for a feasible solution.
An Irkutsk resident detected a promising solution. He had discovered three upper 
branches o f the Lena river, the Aldan, the Ucher and the Ludoma, in 1636. The wildlife 
located on these three rivers could provide only temporary relief to starving Irkutsk, but 
natives and traders who explored the area learned o f a promising water system further 
South across the Savoy mountains. That system could possibly provide supplies for 
Irkutsk. It was rumored that in this distant land, cattle and horses roamed in large herds. 
Grain grew in large fields on the banks of the river. Ermine, fox, sable and other rich fur 
bearing animals prospered in staggering numbers. The natives, called the Dahurs, were a 
quiet, peaceful people that welcomed traders and hunters that passed through their lands. 
The area was even rumored to be located close to China and participated in active trade 
with ihe Asian giant in silks, silver, gold and pearls.* 47
4^Liu Hsuan-min, “Russo-Chinesc Relations up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk,” Chinese Social and 
Political Science Review 23 (1939-1940), 393.
47Goldcr, 32.
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The minors grew gradually in the telling until even the Voevodas o f Irkutsk, Petr 
Golovin and Matvei Glebov, could not ignore the possibility o f the river basin’s existence. 
In 1641, they authorized a full investigation into the rumors. Three separate expeditions 
were dispatched. Each was instructed to either confirm or deny the reports o f silver, 
cattle and furs in the river basin across the mountains. The first, Perofiyev (1641) located 
a traveling band o f Tungus hunters that had traveled through the region and along the 
Shilka river. His questioning revealed that the natives owned silver and blue painted 
articles that were probably acquired from China. Unfortunately, Perofiyev returned to 
Irkutsk without personally confirming this information. Moskvitin (1642) was also able to 
confirm the Shilka’s existence. Tungus traders, traveling from the Shilka, confirmed the 
existence o f plentiful grain and silver to be gained from the region, and indicated they had 
personally witnessed the bounty of the area. Moskvitin, too, could not personally 
substantiate the facts he reported. The onset of harsh winter turned him back while he 
was attempting to cross the high mountains. The third expedition was led by 
Bachteyarov in 1643. Fully equipped for a laborious mountain crossing and assisted by a 
native guide, Bachteyarov and his men set forth for the Shilka. Unfortunately,
Bachteyarov was completely incompetent and jeopardized both the expedition and his men 
with his faulty decisions. His mission returned to Irkutsk a complete failure. 48
48 Ibid., 34.
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Golovin and Glebov were heartened by these inconclusive yet encouraging reports 
and decided a major expedition was required to decide the issue, but they were replaced 
by Vasilii Pushkin and Kiril Suponev before they could send another expedition. The two 
new voevodas, however, decided to follow their predecessor’s plans. Late in 1643, a large 
expedition was organized to claim the area for the Russian throne. This force consisted of 
133 men, including 112 Cossacks, fully armed and provisioned for an extensive journey. 
Pushkin even authorized the expedition to take several canon to ensure the expedition’s 
success. Vasili Poyarkov, the expedition’s leader, was given explicit instructions to 
proceed carefully and gather small amounts of tribute from the area’s natives as a sampling 
of the region’s bounty. In addition, Poyarkov was to discover if China maintained a 
presence in the area and determine if the basin was attached to the Chinese empire. 49 
Unfortunately, Poyarkov was uninterested in diplomacy. He viewed the expedition to the 
Shilka river as the means to develop his personal fortune rather than the opportunity to 
provide a favorable first perception of the Russian empire.
Poyarkov’s journey east was extremely difficult. Hampered by the heavy canon 
and cumbersome supplies, he became caught in the severe Siberian winter. The rugged 
Savoy mountain passes separated his forces and forced Poyarkov to abandon the majority 
o f his supplies to descend to safety. Nearly frozen and half starved, Poyarkov decided to 
set up camp in mid-December. Deep snow prevented foraging and it soon became
49 George Vjatchcslau Lantzeff, Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open 
Frontier to 1750 (Montreal: MeGill-Qneen’s University Press, 1973), 155-56.
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apparent that the expedition would starve long before spring without assistance.
Poyarkov, in desperation, approached the nearby Daur natives and requested sustenance. 
The natives charitably welcomed Poyarkov and his men and offered part o f their own 
winter cache to assist the visiting Russians through the hard winter. Poyarkov returned to 
the Daur regularly, requesting and finally demanding additional supplies from the natives 
to support the expedition. Finally, the Daurs were unable to fulfill the unreasonable 
Russian demands and sent the them back to their camp empty handed. Poyarkov, angered 
by their refusal, ordered his men to attack the Daurs and take the desired supplies by
force.50 Unused to the climate and exhausted by traveling through heavy snow, the 
Russians were easily defeated and repulsed bv the Amur natives.
In desperation, Poyarkov made a fatal decision. He ordered seventy men to 
attack a nearby Daur settlement. The weak and exhausted men were easily beaten, but 
returned to Poyarkov’s camp to find the gates barred and their entrance denied. Poyarkov 
had determined that the remaining supplies would allow only part o f the expedition to 
survive, and had sentenced the returning men to a slow death through exposure and 
starvation. By springtime, forty of the seventy exiled men had died. The remainder 
survived through cannibalism. 51
In the spring, Poyarkov reabsorbed these men into the main expedition and 
continued down river. He was preceded by stories of cannibalism and reports of his
50 Goldcr, 36.
LantzefT, Eastward to Empire. 157.
31
attacks against the Daurs. Natives along the entire length of the Shilka and Amur rivers 
had heard o f the “dirty cannibals” and were alert and defensive. Every tribe greeted the 
Russian aggressively, forcing Poyarkov and his men to quickly flee down river to the 
Amur mouth. Once there, Poyarkov forced a local Giliak tribe to provide his group with 
provisions for his return trip up the coast to the Ulja river. In comparison with his 
frightening journey down the Amur, Poyarkov’s return voyage was uneventful. He 
wintered at the mouth of the Ulja before continuing inland. Traveling along the Maja and 
the Aldan rivers, he finally returned to Irkutsk, on June ! 2th,- 1646, with his tale o f the 
Amur.
The Russians considered Povarkov’s expedition successful. Although not 
profitable, his eyewitness accounts of plentiful game and furs, caches o f oats, peas, barley 
and millet along the banks of the Amur showed promise and implied the possibility o f a 
reliable food source for Irkutsk. Poyarkov’s report that many natives in the basin claimed 
to be under Manchurian protection and the clear evidence of extensive Chinese trading in 
silver, copper and blue painted items indicated that China had a strong presence in the
area.53 Yet, Poyarkov reported, the Amur would be easy to conquer despite the 
allegiance to China. He estimated a force of three hundred men would easily subdue the 
natives. He concluded that three ostrogs with fifty men stationed at each could easily
52 Colder, 36.
53 Ibid., 35.
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hold the area while a roving band o f 150 could collect tribute and ensure that peace was
maintained. ^ 4
While Russia was satisfied with the results of Poyarkov’s expedition, Poyarkov 
had eliminated the possibility for a peaceful acquisition of the basin. Through his poor 
decisions and callous treatment of both his men and the Amur natives, Poyarkov ensured 
the animosity o f the Amur natives. The native population abhorred the barbaric actions of 
the Russians and were repulsed especially by their cannibalism. This antipathy of the 
natives coupled with the fact that Poyarkov’s seven-thousand-verst trek had gathered only 
480 sable pelts, and lost 80 men (two-thirds of his expedition) illustrates the failure o f 
Russia’s expedition.55
By the time Poyarkov returned to Irkutsk, the Voevoda, Pushkin had been 
replaced by Peter Golovin. Golovin was completely uninterested in pursuing the riches o f 
the Amur. He was devoted to rejuvenating Irkutsk and solving the food difficulty through 
hard work. He firmly believed that four separate expeditions into the area had been a 
waste o f time, resources and manpower that could be better utilized in the Irkutsk area. 
Golovin emphatically refused to consider further explorations and completely ignored the 
existence o f the Amur.
54 Scbcs, Joseph S. J., “The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689): Diary of Thomas 
Pereira, S. J.” (Rome: Institutum Historicum S. I., 1961), 18.
5- Foreman, 107.
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This brief respite lasted until 1649. During this year, Russia made two large 
strides toward establishing contact with the Chinese empire. First, Russia dispatched an 
ambassadorial mission to the Tsetsen Khan of the Khalkas. Although the Russian 
representatives were primarily interested in discussing silver mines in the Khan’s territory, 
they utilized the situation to supplement Russia’s limited knowledge of the Manchu 
dynasty. 56 Russia’s limited information regarding the Manchu dated to 1618. In this 
year, Petlin reported that he had experienced difficulties as he traveled to and from Peking 
because o f the ongoing battles between the Ming and the Manchu. Later, during the mid 
thirties, the Russians had filled a large Manchu goods order and provided weapons, 
primarily guns, to the Mongols for delivery into Manchu hands. At the time the request 
was considered routine, but it soon became obvious that these weapons were used in the 
collapse o f the Ming dynasty.
It was not until the members of the Tsetsen Khan mission returned to Russia that 
more concrete information became available. The messengers reported fully on the state 
o f affairs in the budding Manchu empire and brought physical evidence o f the Chinese 
desire to communicate. One of the Russian messengers, Zabolotsky, returned with a letter
-^Baddcley indicates that Baikov was illiterate and so the documents in the Russian record arc written by 
another individual. In addition, Baikov did not hand in a ledger of goods for his trip, and there is no 
indication that he kept an official book or documents of his trip. There is also no record that indicates 
that a clerk was attached to the mission to keep these documents for him. It seems plausible to conclude 
that Baikov’s official report was recreated after the mission, nearly a year after the original events 
occurred. Several versions of his trip have been recorded but since none can be traced as an ongoing 
journal all are suspect. Above is the most widely accepted of all versions recorded by historians and seems 
to agree with the historical records. “Baikoff s Embassy 1653-1657,” in Baddelcy, 130-32.
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meant for the Tsar. The document is recorded by Russian sources as the official 
correspondence of Djuhandi, the Son of Van-Li.5?
Unfortunately, Russian records are in error. Van-Li’s eldest son succeed : >.U 
father during 1620, but only ruled for one month.58 Since the Ming dynasty lo:”. complete 
control over the northern regions of China, it is extremely unlikely that the son of Van-Li 
drafted correspondence to the Russian tsar in 1649. Vincent Chin, a Chinese historian, 
believes the document is a letter from a Manchu border official or a regional ruler familiar 
with the Russians’ continuing efforts to establish trade. Since the name Djuhandi sounds
more Manchu than Chinese, his conclusions seems accurate. ^
The text of the letter reads:
In the time ot my father came merchants from the great Lord (Tsar) 
to trade; but now no merchants come to me. Now, when in my father’s 
time, the Great Lord’s people came, they saw the sun, but now in my time 
they do not come. If thy people should come to see me, they would be as 
bright as the moon in the sky, and if they come, I shall be very glad; and 
will be gracious to them. Thou hast brought me two elk horns, and I have 
given in return 700 pieces of silk and do thou bring me the best o f things 
and I will reward you in greater degree and I have sent to the Great Lord 
and Zahi (?) thirty-two cups made out of stone. And the envoys o f the 
Great Lord came to me, three men and I ordered those three men to be 
convoyed with honour out of my kingdom to the great river and sent to 
accompany them, 3000 men for one day’s journey. 60 *58960
57 Van-Li ruled China until his death in 1620. His eldest son, Chu Ch’ang-lo, succeed his father using
the reign title T ’ai-ch’ang. He ruled for one month before dying in 1620.
58 Chin, 38.
59 “Pctlin and MundolT,” in Baddclcy, 72-73.
60 Chin, 38.
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Russia’s second stride was the re-infusion of interest in the Amur basin. Peter 
Golovin was replaced by a new official, Dimitri Franzbekov. Franzbekov, in contrast with 
the previous Voevoda of Irkutsk, enthusiastically supported exploration in the Amur and 
insisted it be given top priority. Almost immediately, he accepted the petition o f an 
enterprising peasant, Yarka Pavlov Khabarov, to settle and explore the Amur basin.
Khabarov had been drawn to the Lena area by tales o f easy wealth. A born 
businessman, he quickly built a profitable enterprise trading furs for imported provisions. 
When Franzbekov’s interest in the Amur became clear, Khabarov quickly petitioned him 
for permission to explore the region. Khabarov insisted upon paying his own expenses, 
gathering his own men, and requested nothing but Franzbekov’s approval. This venture 
seemed risk-less from Franzbekov’s viewpoint and quite possibly could produce an
enormous amount o f wealth for both men. 61
Khabarov departed in March of 1649 with one hundred and fifty men. More 
Cossacks eager for wealth joined his expedition as he traveled east. He easily crossed the 
mountains on the Olekma river. However, upon Khabarov’s arrival into the Amur region, 
he found the countryside deserted. Khabarov and his men passed through three empty 
settlements each displaying evidence of recent population. Shortly after leaving the third, 
Khabarov was approached by three horsemen. When Khabarov indicated that they had 61
61 Goldcr, 38.
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come as peaceful traders, the native horsemen replied, “Why are you trying to deceive us,
we know you Cossacks.”^2
Memories of Poyarkov’s previous adventure were apparently very strong, and had 
been recently sparked by a small party, consisting of a Russian and three Tungus that had 
passed through the region. This group had recently visited the Daur and indicated five 
hundred Cossacks were coming with the intention of killing, plundering the villages and 
taking the children into slavery. Naturally the panicked villagers had fled to escape this
Russian h o rd e d
Despite Khabarov’s best efforts the horsemen escaped, avoiding further 
questioning. In his effort to capture the riders, Khabarov located two more villages. In 
one of these, he found an old woman too elderly and frail to flee with the remainder o f the 
population. Khabarov closely questioned her (she claimed to be the sister o f Lafkai, 
leader o f the local natives and o f the horsemen that had confronted Khabarov) about the 
entire basin. Khabarov asked questions regarding the surrounding rulers, the natives’ 
allegiance with China and the relative strength of Amur defenses. When the elderly 
woman refused to speak, Khabarov tortured her until she provided the requested 
information. Later, upon his return to Irkutsk on May 26, 1650, Khabarov discovered 
the information the woman provided was largely false. 62*
62 Scbcs, 19.
^Lantzcff, Eastward to Empire. 160-61.
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Despite his initial failure, Khabarov was still confident o f the Amur’s possibilities. 
He informed Franzbekov (who relayed to Moscow), that six thousand men would be 
required to completely subdue the native settlements. Since the native population was 
enormous, he anticipated a sizable force would be needed to ensure control. (In 1662, the 
entire population o f the Amur numbered about seventy thousand.) Meanwhile, he happily 
indicated that the region was rich enough to completely supply the Irkutsk area with all 
needed foodstuffs. He reported large cashes of grain stored in deep camouflaged pits and
vast numbers o f wildlife and fish available for harvesting.64 65Even the transport o f supplies 
was ideal. Two weeks o f easy travel on the Zena River were ail that was necessary to 
provision Irkutsk.
Khabarov departed upon his second journey into the Amur in 1650. Better 
prepared for the land and conditions, Khabarov resupplied his men and strengthened his 
company with cannon and horses. He engaged the Dahurs at Yaksa (Albazin), a fortified 
native town with triple ramparts and ditches, and ordered the natives to submit and pay 
tribute to the Russian tsar. The Dahurs calmly replied they were already bound to the
Bagdoi Khan (the Chinese emperor) and refused Khabarov’s demand.6- Immediately, 
Khabarov opened fire upon the unsuspecting natives. The resulting battle lasted from noon 
till dark, eventually resulting in a Russian victory. The natives battled valiantly but in the 
end bows and arrows were no match for Russian firearms and canon.
64 Foreman, 118.
65 Ibid., 116.
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Khabarov occupied AJbazin and refortified its walls, making it Russia’s fortified 
headquarters on the Amur. Khabarov then dispatched 135 men to pursue the fleeing 
natives. The soldiers followed the natives to their nearby homes, torched them and 
triumphantly returned with large amounts of booty, including 117 head o f captured 
cattle. 66
After the skirmish, several onlookers who recorded the incident approached 
Khabarov. The individuals were dressed in expensive silk and clearly were unrelats'-1 ‘o  
the Albazin natives. Unfortunately, Khabarov and his men had no knowledge o f the 
visitors’ language and were unable to effectively communicate. Khabarov offered gifts to 
the men as a gesture o f good will, but he was unable to determine more about them and
dismissed the unknown visitors without a second thought. ^
Using Albazin as a fortified base, Khabarov’s men quickly spread throughout the 
region, collecting tribute at gun point. The Russians’ methods were brutal. They killed the 
native population without hesitation, and for the least infraction. Khabarov seemed 
especially bloodthirsty. In his report regarding the subjugation o f the village o f Guigudar, 
population one thousand, Khabarov gleefully recorded, “with God’s help . . . .[sic] we 
burned them, we knocked them on the head. . . . [sic] and counting big and liitle we killed 6*
66 Golder, 43.
f'7 These men were undoubtedly Chinese officials, most likely there to collect tribute from the Amur 
natives. Foreman, 116.
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six hundred and sixty one.”68 Using these methods throughout the Amur. Khabarov’s 
men gathered sables, hostages and other booty for transport to Albazin. By fall, 
Khabarov’s report boasted that grain to support Irkutsk for more than five years had been 
gathered and indicated the Amur natives could easily supply enough grain to feed twenty 
thousand if needed.
The natives naturally protested such treatment to the Chinese and requested 
immediate assistance. The Chinese dispatched an armed military force to address the 
situation. A single line regarding the resulting battle was recorded in the official Chinese 
record: “in the ninth year of Emperor Shun Chill (1652), Hai Se the Defense Commander
at Ninguta, dispatched troops to attack them (the Locha)69 at the village of Ujala, but he 
suffered a minor defeat.” 70 No further record of the first battle between Russia and 
China was recorded. The Russians, however, described the battle in great detail.
The Russians’ report indicated that they were greatly outnumbered at Ujala and 
the Chinese clearly held the advantage. However, because the Chinese commander 
ordered his men to capture the Russians rather than shoot to kill, the Chineses’ 
effectiveness as a military force was destroyed. A rair. of deadly Russian fire demoralized 
the Chinese and forced them to retreat. The Russians claimed 676 Chinese casualties and 68970
68 Golder, 45.
69 This was the term the Amur natives attached to the invading Russians. It is unclear at this point that 
the Chinese understood that the invaders were Russian and not a wandering Northern tribe that had not 
yet been contacted.
70 Chen, Agnes Fang-Chih. “Chinese-Frontier Diplomacy: The Coming of the Russians and the Treaty of 
Nerchinsk.” Ycnching Journal of Social Studies 4 (February 1949), 1311.
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numerous war supplies, including muskets, cannon, provisions, powder, and 830 horses. 
Russian casualties, in contrast, were unbelievably light. The Russians claimed only ten 
killed and seventy- six wounded-an unbelievable victory. 71
Despite their military defeat, the Chinese accomplished their main objective, to halt 
the harassment of the natives by the Russian Cossacks. The natives, following China’s 
lead began a widespread revolt to drive out the Russian invaders. Threatened on all sides 
by discontented natives and undermanned for such an occurrence, Khabarov accepted the 
inevitable.72 in April 1652, Khabarov’s expedition began retreating up the Amur, and 
eventually crossed the mountains to Irkutsk. The Chinese instructed the Daurs and other 
local tribes to abandon their homelands and move further south into the Sungari region, to 
areas where the Russians had not penetrated.
As Khabarov returned to Irkutsk, other Russians prepared to enter the Amur 
region with big plans and ambitious dreams. Several expeditions entered tl. j  region and 
removed food and supplies for consumption at Irkutsk. In ten short years the Amur was 
stripped bare by the repetitive foraging expeditions of the Russians. Where natives had 712
71 E. G. Ravenstein, Russians on the Amur (London: Trubncr and Co., 1861), 21. This information is 
questionable. Cossacks have a tendency to exaggerate the size of the enemy to promote greater glory.
The Chinese force was most likely not quite as large as estimated. The total number undoubtedly included 
a sizable number of servants and bearers who did not participate in the battle. In addition, the Russians 
were better armed and positioned than Chinese.
72 John Armstrong Harrison, The Founding of the Russian Empire in Asia and America (Coral Gables. 
Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1971), 78.
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cultivated fields and raised cattle, the fields had become deserts, the cattle killed as food 
for the Russian fires. The natives were scattered throughout the forest.73 *
In 1654, the Russian government moved a significant military force into the region. 
Onufrii Stepanov, with a contingent of 370 strong fighting Cossacks, entered the Amur 
and rapidly traversed the region searching for obstinate natives. Three days travel down 
the Sunari river, Stepanov’s force engaged an enormous force of hostile Chinese soldiers 
numbering three thousand strong. Outnumbered and lacking sufficient am mnition, 
Stepanov retreated to a favorable location at the mouth of the Khamarch River and 
prepared to wait through the long winter months. He ordered the Khamarch osirog built 
and sent a raiding party of fifty men to seize grain and supplies from the nearby Gi'iak 
population. In a few months reinforcements led by Peter Beketov to assist >n fortifying the 
new ostrog.74
When Spring arrived so did the main Chinese army. Stepanov’s report states ten 
thousand Chinese arrived and forced a three-week siege at Nerchinsk. The four hundred 
Russians were badly outnumbered, but fought with such ferocity and bravery, that they 
managed to hold off the enormous Chinese force. The Chinese managed to destroy a few 
boats that were stored outside the fort, but did no lasting harm to the ostrog itself. 
Eventually, the Chinese ran short of provisions and were forced to r e t r e a t .T h e y
73 Chen, 1311.
7“* Edmund O. Clubb, China and Russia: the Great Game (London: Columbia University Press, 1971) 23.
73The number of ten thousand Chinese is certainly exaggerated. This was probably done to impress the
Tsar with the difficulty of Stepanov’s position. Stepanov also indicated that this army had fifteen canon
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instructed the nearby natives, the Ducheri who lived at the mouth of the Sungari, and the 
Giliack to burn their homes and relocate to a river out of the Russians’ reach.
With the advantage of stealing from the native population gone, Stepanov was 
hard pressed to provision his men. Over the next few years, he was attacked repeatedly by 
the persistent Chinese. Th< Chinese Record describes the altercation with Stepanov as 
follows:
In the twelfth year 1655 Lieutenant-General Mingandali set out with his 
forces from Peking. He attacked them (the Lochi) at Ku-mar (Khumarsk) 
and other places with some success, but soon retreated owing to lack of 
provisions. In the fourteenth year, Sarguda, defense Commissioner at 
Ninguta, defeated them at Shangienuhe. The next year he again defeated 
them between the Sungari and the Khulhan rivers. . . .  In the seventeenth 
year Bahai son of Sarguda, scored an overwhelming victory over them.
Although successful in the battles, our troops withdrew without 
subjugating the Locha, who continued to make their appearance
intermittently. 76
China finally defeated Stepanov on June 30, 1658. Russian records indicate that a 
Chinese force of 1400 soldiers attacked the Russians just below the mouth of the Sungari 
River. In a desperate and heroic battle, Stepanov was killed along with 270 of his finest 
Cossack troops. The remaining 220 men managed to escape the battle and flee 
northward. O f these survivors, 180 retreated into the surrounding mountains to become *76
and a large number of firearms. In addition, they were not official Chinese troops, but a mixture of men 
from many territories, including Duchcrs, Daurs, Nikans and several others. Mancall, 27.
76 Chen, 1312.
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outlaws. Once again, the Chinese succeeded in halting the Russians’ advance and had 
freed the entire lower Amur from the Russian invaders.77
Unfortunately for China, the defeat of Stepanov was not the end o f the Amur 
basin’s problem. The Russian’s military defeat was only a temporary measure. Because 
Russia still controlled the mountain valleys of the upper Amur, they maintained a solid 
foothold and were able to creep down the Amur’s rivers and re-infest the lower basin. 
China’s best hope for a lasting solution was a political agreement between the two 
empires. In 1670, The Chinese emperor sent a letter to Russia requesting that the 
atrocities committed by the Russian Cossacks be immediately halted and the native 
villagers be allowed to live in peace.
The Russians failed to honor this simple Chinese request. Nothing was done to 
suspend the Cossacks’ collection of tribute, nor did Russia respond to the Chinese 
Emperor’s letter. Instead, Russia misunderstood the Chinese concern, and assumed that 
the Emperor’s letter was an invitation to begin trading negotiations. This 7
77 There is a large amount of disagreement in the records. Two stories exist for this encounter. The first 
is the Chinese account and is generally considered to be the most accurate of the two. The second, taken 
from Russian source material indicates that a tiny Russian force of roughly four hundred faced an 
incredibly large army of three thousand. Two hundred seventy were killed and forty-seven escaped alive to 
flee up river. One hundred eighty men deserted before the battle began. Ravenstein, 32-33. Historians 
assume that the outlaws remained in the region and eventually joined forces with Tchemigofski in 1665 
but little evidence supports this conclusion.
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miscommunication, however, was not unusual for Russia. Her entire political history with 
the Manchu dynasty is filled with miscommunications, misunderstandings and incorrect 
assumptions.
CHAPTER 2: THE FIRST MISSIONS
The confision and misinterpretation began with the Baikov mission o f 1654. The 
Tsar, Aleksei Mikhailovich, selected Fedor Isakovich Baikov in February 1654, to initiate 
friendly relations with the young Manchu dynasty and organize the foundation for future 
large scale trade. To accomplish this mission, Baikov was charged with a number of 
smaller tasks to promote good will and continuing relations. The first o f these congenial 
tasks was to personally hand the Emperor a letter from the Tsar welcoming Chinese 
traders to Moscow. Many lavish and expensive gifts were to accompany this document to 
bolster friendship between the two nations. Once Baikov had delivered these important 
offerings, he was to discover if Russian merchants, envoys and ambassadors were 
welcome in the Chinese capital of Peking. Finally, Baikov was to learn Chinese 
ceremonial rites and customs, especially when they pertained to ambassadors and political 
envoys, to insure future meetings between the nations would facilitate peaceful
relations.78
Baikov was also given a second, more covert mission—to discover sensitive 
military information about China. To enhance Russia’s understanding of the distant and 
remote country' and better prepare her for the possibility of hostile action, Baikov was 78
78 Chin, 49.
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instructed to take particular note of China’s military, the type and size o f weaponry, 
population size, economic stability, and numerous other issues used to determine the 
military strength. Baikov’s instructions even included noting all possible entry routes into
the country that could be used for either military or commercial means.79
While Baikov accomplished these tasks, he was required to follow a rigid protocol. 
To insure that his position and authority were not demeaned, the Tsar instructed Baikov 
to refrain from bowing, groveling or kissing the feet of the Chinese emperor. Baikov was 
forbidden to perform any act that indicated that the Tsar was inferior or subordinate in any
way.^0 The only exception to this stringent instruction was if the Emperor’s hand was 
proffered. In such an instance Baikov could kiss the hand in the traditional European 
fashion. Unfortunately this ridged charge gave Baikov little latitude to adapt to the 
unusual and unanticipated Chinese customs.
Baikov began his mission in typical European fashion. He instructed an intelligent 
and savvy messenger, Setkul Ablin to proceed him into China. Ablin’s task was to inform 
the Chinese that the Russian emissary was en route and ensure that adequate supplies and 7980*
79 “1654 Instructions From the Prikaz of the Bolshaia Kazan to Fedor Baikof concerning his embassy to 
the Chinese Empire,” in Dmytryshyn, Russia’s Conquest of Siberia. 254.
80 Chin, 49.
8 'Baikov was instructed that he could, as in European courts, kiss the Emperor’s hand but was strictly 
instructed that under no circumstances was he to kiss his feet or act in any other demeaning manner. 
“1654 Instructions From the Prikaz of the Bolshaia Kazan to Fedor Baikof concerning his embassy to the 
Chinese Empire,” in Dmytryshyn, 288.
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transportation were provided inside China’s borders. Ablin departed Moscow with a small 
group of men and a few furs and gifts that they hoped to trade with in China. ^
Upon his arrival in China in 1655, Ablin was treated exceptionally well—too well 
for a simple messenger. China had misunderstood his purpose and had assumed that he 
was Russia’s representative. The Chinese Record recorded that Ablin arrived to provide
tribute and inquire of the Emperor’s health and well being. 83 However because Ablin did 
not provide an official letter from the Tsar, he was dismissed. However, the Chinese were 
pleased with the Russians’ effort to become civilized and honored Ablin as the first tribute 
embassy to reach China from Russia. They gladly accepted Ablin’s meager gifts of furs 
and encouraged the Russians by sending gifts in return and entertaining Ablin throughout 
his stay. Ablin was given verbal instructions that the Tsar should send tribute every year. 
Ablin himself was given personal permission to return and trade freely with Chinese 
merchants as long as his merchandise v/as offered for trade to the Emperor first. ^ 4 His 
mission completed, Ablin departed Peking several months prior to Baikov’s arrival. 
Although he hoped to meet the Russian envoy en route, he returned to Russian territory 
along a different route. Ablin completely missed Baikov’s entourage and was unable to 
warn him about the peculiarities of the Chinese court.82 345
82 Chin, 50.
83 Chin, 55.
84 Chen, 1321
85 Chin, 54.
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Baikov approached the Chinese border and arrived at Kuku-sui, the firs: Chinese 
city in Mongol territory. At this location, he was refused transportation, food, and other 
supplies because the Chinese officials had no knowledge of his arrival. The Chinese 
repeatedly indicated that they could not follow the customary procedure without first 
receiving authorization from the Emperor. The Kuku-sui officials did suggest that the 
Russian group travel onward to Kapka (Kalgan), a Chinese town on the frontier. At this 
location, Baikov and his men again requested food and transportation, but they received 
the same answer. They could not assist him without written authorization. Kapka officials 
did, however, dispatch a message to Peking requesting permission to supply Baikov’s 
entourage and assist him on his journey to the Chinese capital city. In a few weeks Baikov 
was completely supplied and allowed to continue toward Peking.
On March 3rd, Baikov finally arrived at the capital city and was immediately
greeted by the Li Fan Yuan, the Chinese Privy Council. ^ 8 Immediately, Baikov’s 
difficulties began. When members of the Li Fan Yuan escorted Baikov and his entourage 
to the city gate, they instructed him to kneel before entering. Baikov refused explaining
86 Chin, 50.
87 Ibid.
88 The Li Fan Yuan was a special ministry set up to ensure China maintained superiority' over their inner 
Asian allies. Acting primarily as a court of Colonial affairs, the Li Fan Yuan was responsible for ensuring 
that China’s allies obeyed the proper protocol and provided suitable tribute. There is some dispute as to 
where and when he met the Privy' Council. In later contacts the Privy Council met foreign groups near the 
border and prevented their approach to Peking if the proper protocol was not followed. However, none of 
the records indicate that this occurred. All versions recorded in Russian archives indicate that this first 
meeting occurred at the city of Peking. Perhaps the difficulties encountered by the Chinese in dealing 
with Baikov prompted the Chinese to alter their original procedures. Chen, 1322.
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that these customs were not the Russian way and he and his men could not perform this 
ritual. The council members accepted his explanation and allowed the Russians to 
continue to their quarters without requiring further prostrations. ^ 9
Once Baikov was settled, the Emperor sent Baikov a special delicacy o f tea boiled 
with butter and mare’s milk as a special goodwill gift. Baikov refused to accept this gift 
claiming the Russians were observing a religious period of fasting. Eventually, he was 
persuaded to accept the expensive delicacy and satisfy Chinese custom even though he
returned the cup’s contents untouched.90
The next controversy arose as the Li Fan Yuan began the preparations to present 
Baikov to the Emperor. Chinese custom dictated that both Baikov’s letter o f introduction 
and his official gifts be examined to insure their suitability for presentation to the Emperor. 
After this ritual, Baikov wou! 1 be escorted to the Emperor. Baikov, however, insisted that 
this was unacceptable. Proper European custom dictated that an envoy be received 
immediately. He was entrusted to personally deliver his documentation to the ruler and 
allow no one else to view it before this task was completed. Gifts were only exchanged
after official greeting and discussions had taken place.91
The Li Fan Yuan were unable to reason with Baikov. He stubbornly refused to 
follow Chinese traditions. Unwilling to argue the point, the council used force to relieve
89 Chen, 51.
90 Ibid.
91 Chen, 132?..
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Baikov of his official gifts. Two days after this event the council returned, indicating 
Baikov’s gifts had been received by the Emperor. Now the Li Fan Yuan requested that 
Baikov relinquish the Tsar’s letter for review. Again, Baikov refused claiming his 
instructions required him to personally deliver the document. Dismayed, the officials 
relented and returned to Emperor empty handed. Five months passed without further 
contact with the Chinese officials. 92
Finally on the 12th o f August, the Li Fan Yuan again visited Baikov. It had been 
decided, they informed him, that he could personally carry his letter to the Ministry. In 
preparati on for this event, Baikov would be schooled in the complexities o f the kowtow 
and court procedures. However, Baikov emphatically refused to perform the kowtow.
The kowtow, he explained, was a gesture of subservience. His Tsar had expressly forbade 
him to perform such an action. The council threatened the envoy with death if he 
continued to refuse, but even this threat failed to sway Baikov’s resolve. He steadfastly 
declared, "though the Emperor should order that I be tom limb from limb, yet will I not go 
to the Ministry . . . .  nor give up to you the Tsar's gracious letter.” The Chinese were
92 Between March 5th and August 12th, Baikov and his men were interred in a small courtyard and 
denied visitors and opportunities to trade. The only contacts outside of this compound were with court 
dignitaries who had received special permission to approach the Russian visitors. The Chinese 
maintained this was for two reasons. First, it ensured that the Russians would not be insulted or han.ied 
during their stay in Peking, and second since Baikov was unwilling to provide documentation to prove his 
claim of a diplomatic mission, it ensured that Baikov could not trade. (China did not allow diplomatic 
missions to engage in wide-scale trading.) Ibid.
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completely disgusted with Baikov’s behavior. They unceremoniously returned the Russian
gifts and ordered the envoy to depart immediately. 93
One day outside the capital city, Baikov realized that his mission was a complete 
failure. Quickly he sent a messenger, a lowly cook from his envoy, back to Peking to 
plead his case. Claiming it was his official instructions that caused him to refuse to 
relinquish his letter and kowtow, Baikov requested forgiveness and pleaded to be allowed 
to readdress this misunderstanding. He asked that the Emperor order him back to Peking, 
and assured the ruler that he would obey all commands in every respect. Once he had 
dispatched the cook with this message, Baikov continued on to the next sizable town, 
Kapka, to await, a respcnse.94
The next day a courtier arrived to confirm the content o f Baikov’s message. Seven 
days later, he returned with the Chinese response. He explained that it was disgraceful 
for Baikov to continue onward to the next town. Instead, he should have waited for a
response at the same location that he dispatched the cook.95 The message he carried was 
similar in content. “He who behaves in such a manner cannot be in his right mind. He 
professes to have been sent from the great lord, from the orthodox Tsar but has not the
slightest inkling how to show respect to a sovcreign”96
93 Ibid.
94 Chin, 53.
95 Chin, 53-54.
96 “The Statcnii Spisok,” in Baddelcly, 152.
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Baikov’s actions, however, are not as benign as he wanted the Tsar to believe. A 
Dutch ambassador was in Peking during both the Ablin and Baikov missions and made a 
detailed report on the actions of both in his record. Nieuhoff, the Dutch representative, 
recorded the positive influence and reputation of Ablin, but could not do the same for 
Baikov. He indicated that Baikov was at fault for the negative Chinese response. Upon 
the Russian envoy’s arrival, he and his delegation were allowed to travel freely, buying 
and selling whatever they wished. However after one month, the Russians’ actions were 
so repulsive ard reprehensible that the Chinese were forced to restrain them. Nieuhcfif 
reports they repeatedly forced their way into brothels, were noisy, drunken, and 
disrespectful and were the focus of numerous scandals and disputes.
Even Baikov’s heartfelt report of his attempt to appeal to the Chinese takes on a 
new light when retold by Nieuhoff. Nieuhoff recorded that the Russians were detained 
just outside the city walls because they had no passport from the Emperor allowing them 
exit. Baikov wus forced to send people back to humbly apologize for the arrogant and 
disrespectful actions both he and his men committed during their visit. He was then 
required to beg to make amends so they could depart. These humble apologies were thus 
accepted by the Emperor.98
Baikov’s mission was a complete failure. Russia had learned little o f Chinese 
customs and had failed to gain trading rights to solve their economic crisis. The mission
97 Chin, 54.
98 Ibid.
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succeeded only in demonstrating the atrocious manners of the Russians and ensuring 
Manchu negativity toward a Russian trade alliance.09
In 1558, shortly after this disastrous mission, a second envoy was dispatched to 
repair the damage caused by Baikov’s ill-fated mission. Periliev and Setkul Ablin were 
tasked to reestablish positive relations and negotiate a lucrative trade agreement. To 
avoid the difficulties experienced by Baikov, Russia sent Ablin and Periliev as simple 
messengers, not envoys or ambassadors. This way, the messengers avoided the custom 
arguments Baikov encountered. As messengers, the two could kowtow and prostrate 
themselves, since they did not directly represent the persona o f the Tsar. Russia also 
declared that if delivering the Tsar’s letter directly to the Emperor was prohibited, Ablin 
and Periliev were authorized to relinquish it the proper Chinese authorities.
The team arrived in Peking in 1660, and immediately kowtowed and relinquished
the Tsar’s letter to the Li Fan Yuan. 100 Because Ablin and Periliev v/ere polite, 
agreeable, willing to accept Chinese customs, they were well accepted and treated with 
deference and respect. Quietly, they dispensed their own personal gifts to influential 
Chinese officials to facilitate their right to trade for Chinese goods. The pair’s trading 
rights were quickly approved, and they established a friendly and very profitable trade.
99 At this time, Stepanov had entered the Amur region and was actively battling the Chinese. This 
certainly influenced the Chinese attitude toward the Russian ambassador and was a factor in his failure.
500 Mancall, 57.
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Unfortunately for Russia, this amounted only to private trade, authorized only to Ablin 
and his men as a gesture of benevolence. 1 ® *
The Chinese were much less satisfied with the Russian government. The letter 
Ablin delivered was disrespectful, insulting and lacked humility and courtesy. The 
document’s presumptuous air infuriated the Chinese and they lectured Ablin and Periliev 
on the letter’s shortcomings to ensure that in the future such insulting practices would be
avoided. ^ 2  The official Chinese response was recorded in the Chinese record as “the 
Emperor reciprocated the Tsar’s friendship with the reply that “ the tribute thou didst send
we have accepted, and in return we send thee our gifts and favours.” ^
Ablin maintained good relations with China in the following years and profited 
greatly from his Chinese trading operation. He made one mere trips in 1668 and left a 
lasting favorable impression with the Chinese traders. Unfortunately, Ablin’s trips to 
Peking were strictly private ventures, and he made little progress establishing trading 
rights for Russia. China absolutely refused to allow state-sponsored expeditions to enter 
the empire and steadfastly forbade Chinese traders to make the trek to Moscow. ’04
101 Albin’s second mission which, occurred in 1668, was immensely profitable. In addition to acquiring 
a large amount of silk velvet tea and spice, Albin’s mission made a favorable impression upon the 
Manchu. Albin dined three times in the Emperor’s garden, was granted personal use of an interpreter to 
assist in the trading process, and was explicitly told that all Russian merchants were welcome in China 
and w'culd receive “sustenance and all kinds of considerations.” Mancall, 58.
102 The letter used the Russian calendar instead of the Chinese and the Emperor’s titles were incorrectly 
listed. Naturally, both of these faults were unavoidable. Even in the mid 1660’s, Russia lacked a working 
knowledge of the Chinese calendar and official contacts had not returned with the proper list of the 
Emperor’s official titles. Chin, 57.
1°3 Chin, 58.
1°4 Chin, 60.
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The failure of these early envoys can be primarily attributed to China’s world view. 
Unlike European nations, China’s isolation caused them to believe that the world was 
divided into two distinct parts, the civilized and the barbaric. The civilized world 
encompassed all of the enlightened Chinese empire and extended beyond territorial 
boundaries to all people accepting the suzerainty of the Chinese Emperor. The rest, 
regardless o f achievement, were viewed as lowly barbarians. The Russian tsar, as a 
northern prince, naturally was an uncivilized barbarian. The Chinese were willing to 
accept these barbarians into the civilized world. They demanded only a reasonable tribute, 
T tlutc acceptance of the Emperor’s autiioiily, and performance o f all Chinese traditionai 
customs and rituals. The Chinese fervently believed that the barbarians beyond China’s 
walls needed only to be shown the proper path and they would join the ranks o f the 
enlightened. 1^5
For the Chinese, enlightenment meant accepting the authority o f the emperor.
More than simply the country’s ruler, the emperor was an integral part o f Chinese life and 
religion. They believed that the emperor was the single contact point between heaven and 
earth. As the bridge between the mundane and the divine, he played a dual role, one as 
Tien-tzu, the son of heaven, and the other as the man-Luang-ti. As Tien-tzu, the emperor 
must ensure the virtue o f the son of heaven in order to ensure the harmony o f the marriage
105 Williams, 194-95.
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between heaven and earth. As Luang-ti, he must minimize the fallibility o f human nature
in order to protect the universe from dissonance.
To assist the emperor in balancing the delicate nature of these two roles, the 
Chinese had organized a exceptionally rigid ard complex series o f rituals. These rituals, 
the Chinese believed, protected both earth and heaven and were necessary to ensure 
harmony. The rituals surrounding an imperial audience, for example, were designed to 
ensure the persona of Tien-tzu was present rather than the fallible Luang-ti. This would 
ensure a positive outcome. To the Chinese, the centuries-old rituals were more firmly 
ingrained that any Christian belief. They firmly maintained that to alter the procedures 
would risk the destruction of both earth and heaven. The Russians, in contrast, examined 
the missions with European eyes. They aw very little difference between the missions of 
Ablin and Baikov. Both carried similar messages and performed similar roles. Only one 
major difference separated the two officials, rank.
In European politics, the fact that Baikov was an official envoy and Ablin was 
simply a humble messenger, is a significant difference. Baikov, as an official envoy, 
represented the government of Russia and wielded authoritative powers to establish policy 
and represent the Russian government in political discussions. Ablin however, was a 
lowly messenger. He, representing only himself, lacked the authority to do more than 
deliver an official letter and carry back a response. Considering this, the enthusiastic 
welcome the Chinese gave to Ablin was a shocking and unusual response. The fact that
106Ibid.
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Ablin willingly kowtowed while Baikov refused was viewed as insignificant. The Russians 
deduced the Chinese must be responding to the distinct difference o f status between the 
two officials.
There were very few reasons for a country to respond emphatically to a lowly 
messenger. Russia concluded that China was utilizing Ablin to proffer an apology for past 
actions. If the Chinese had dismissed Baikov without fully realizing his status and mission 
of establishing trade, they quite easily could utilize Ablin to proffer an apology. By 
welcoming Ablin whole-heartedly, they could compensate for their earlier mistake.
While this conclusion explained China’s unusual actions, it assumed several facts 
about Chinese political procedure. First, it assumed that the Chinese fully understood the 
nuances of status and official positions and the subtleties o f their use. Second, it believed 
that Ablin’s enthusiastic welcome signified China’s desire to establish relations and 
establish trade. Third and finally, it meant that China’s actions revealed that she had an 
excellent idea of Russia’s rank, position, and power. With these basic assumption about 
China’s understanding of foreign relations, Russia prepared her foreign policy. While 
contemplating relations with China, Russia ignored the Amur. With Stepanov defeated 
and the prospect of creating a lasting relationship with China in the air, Russia decided to 
stop authorizing official missions into the Amur.
Although no more official missions entered the Amur, Russia was unable to stop 
refugees and criminals from fleeing into the region. In 1665, Nikiphor Romanov 
Tchemigofski, a Polish exile wanted for the murder o f the Voevoda of Ilimsk, had fled
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into the Amur to escape punishment. Traveling with him was a band of eighty-four 
fugitives. This bold group braved battle with the Chinese forces to reinhabit Albazin, 
Khabarov’s primary fort, and reestablish Russian dominance in the region. Tchernigofski 
and his followers mercilessly exacted tribute and established a chain o f fortresses along the 
Amur. Once they were well established, the group petitioned the Tsar for full pardons and 
in 1669 indicated they would submit to the Tsar’s authority. Because o f their outstanding 
progress in the basin, the Tsar decided to grant the fugitives complete pardons and sent
government officials to oversee the area. ^  jn a short period o f time, Albazin had grown 
to a strong force of three hundred men.
From Tchemigofski’s fortress, the Russians crept downstream. They 
gradually became braver and more self-assured when it became apparent that the Chinese 
military force that had protected the southern basin had withdrawn. In a short period, 
Russia was again extracting tribute from the Amur natives with impunity. In fact, the 
Russians became so self-assured they openly attacked a Chinese tribute delegation sent by 
the Chinese emperor, Shan Chin, proclaiming their authority in the region.
China had difficulties of her own during this period. China was left with only one 
option to protect the basin from this persistent invader. Since her military was engaged in 
battling an open revolt to the south and could nut be spared to settle the thirty-year-old 
territorial dispute, K'and Hsi, the new Chinese emperor, resorted to diplomacy to resolve
107 Hsuan-min, 396-97.
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the issue. He instructed the Military-Governor of Ninguta to send a letter to Nerchinsk in 
early 1670. The Chinese letter was simple. It complained of Russian encroachments on the 
Amur natives and the reprehensible behavior of the Russian traders who extorted them. 
Finally, the emperor indicated his displeasure at the Russian protection o f a Chinese traitor 
by the name of Gantimer. 108
The letter was received by Daniel Archunski the Voevoda of Nerchinsk later that 
same year. The Chinese detachment assigred to deliver the message carefully translated
the document and explained in great detail the Emperor’s concerns. Archunski 
apparently misunderstood the importance of this document. He probably felt that this 
letter was from a lesser prince, a Mongol tribesman, perhaps, complaining o f the Cossack 
activities near his homeland.
Archunski had been instructed by Moscow that when contacting the lesser tribal 
groups, he was to request that they submit to the Tsar, impressing on them the 
overwhelming strength and greatness of the Russian empire. Following these instructions,
Gantimer was a Tunguse prince who ruled in the region of Nercha (Nerchinsk). He became 
dissatisfied with Russian demands in 1650 and moved his people to the right bank of Argun where he 
proclaimed his support of the Chinese rule. Throughout the Khabarov and Stepanov invasions, he 
steadfastly supported China and even assisted them in the battle at Kamarsk. But in 1666-1667, Gantimer 
abandoned the Chinese and joined the Russians. China labeled him a traitor and demanded his 
extradition. Russia, however, refused. Gantimer was a prominent chief and leader and greatly influenced 
the surrounding tribal loaders. His friendship and support of Russia not only smoothed the path for 
Russian control, but greatly degraded the allegiance of surrounding Tungus chieftains toward China. 
Baddeley, 428-429. China also desired the return of Gantimur’s nephew, Tokultci. He had lived with the 
Targachuns, steadfast loyal subjects of China, and killed three Targachin men. To escape punishment, 
Tokultei fled to his uncle and Russian protection. Chen, 132.
109 No indication of the explicit translation is made evident in his report to Moscow. Furthermore, no 
documentation exists to support the claim that Moscow had received a translation of the important 
document.
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Archunski drafted a letter and entrusted it to Ignashka Miiovanov, an illiterate Cossack,
for delivery to the Chinese emperor. The letter read in part:
There are Tsars and Kings who own allegiance to the Great Lord 
Tsar and Grand Prince, Alexei Mikhailovich, Autocrat o f all the Russias,
Great, Little and White and the Great Lord graciously designs to extend 
them to his royal gifts and favour.
The Bogdoi Tsar (Chinese Emperor) would do well to seek 
likewise the favour and presents of the Grand Prince, Alexei Mikhailovich. 
Autocrat o f all the Russias, Great, Little and White, and place himself 
under His Tsarial Majesty's protection.
And the Grand Prince, Alexei Mikhailovich, Autocrat o f all the 
Russias, Great, Little and White, and lord and possessor of many 
kingdoms, will in that case send the Bogdikhan gifts and keep him in his 
gracious royal care, and protect him from his enemies.
At the same time the Bogdikhan would come under the Tsarial 
Majesty's, the Great Lord’s, high hand for ever [sic] without fail, and 
present to him . the Great Lord, tribute and allow the Great Lord's people 
and his own, on either side, to trade freely.
And what the Bogdikhan decides let him forward to His Tsarial
Majesty, the Great Lord, by those same envoys. * ^
The letter continues and informs the Emperor that Gantimer is too ill and elderly to 
be returned without the express permission o f the Tsar, but does promise to restrain 
Cossack activities in the region. 11 *
Surprisingly, this haughty and disrespectful letter was extremely well received in 
Peking. * ^  K'ang Hsi was encouraged by the prompt Russian response and the
110 Chen, 1324.
111 Chin, 60.
1 ^Because Kang Hsi accepted Archunski’s disrespectful document without even a hint of anger suggests 
that the Emperor was unaware of the letter’s true contents. Baddclcy speculates that the Emperor never 
understood that the document demanded his fidelity. He believes the letter was translated by a clerk or 
Jesuit priest unwilling to raise the ire of the Emperor and who suppressed its more offensive passages. 
“MilovanoiTs Mission to Peking, 1670,” in Baddcley, 195.
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willingness of the Russian messenger to kowtow and follow Chi nese customs. He allowed
Milovanov a personal audience, the first Russian so honored, and immediately began
writing his own response to inform the Russians of his restraint and benevolence. * ^
...Long since, our hunters sent a humble address declaring that those who 
dwell on the Black River are lovchi, petty robbers, in no great strength, but 
that those lovchi maltreat our Djurdji and Takori {Dahurs}, and catch their 
sables, and , withal, they humbly report of Gantimur that, relying on those 
lovchi, he has fled to them and trusts them. They petitioned therefor that 
those lovchi should be punished. But I, Ruler of the World, hearing that 
those lovchi were thy subjects sent a man to find out what was true and 
what false. And that Danilo sent ten messangers with Ignatii, and when 
they announced that they had thy authority and were subjects o f thine, I 
beleived them. But now, if thou desirest to dwell in peace, send us the 
refugee Gantimer. Also, in future, let none make any trouble on our 
frontiers, if this is done there will be peace; that is why I send this 
letter.J
The Emperor’s presentation of the situation is a polite, political threat. In his 
correspondence, he indicated that Russia had violated the territorial rights o f China in the 
Amur basin, and that China was fully capable and willing to retaliate against this Russian 
invasion. However, because political considerations have restrained his hand, the Emperor 
decided to allow Russia the opportunity to correct their transgression. As a result, the 
Chinese Emperor did not order retribution but instead informed the Russian tsar o f the 
situation in order to provide him with the opportunity to correct the situation. Yet the
’ I-* Ablin and Pcrlief were apparently denied this honor because of the disrespcctfi' tone of the Tsar's 
letter. Yuri Nikolaevich Semenov, Siberia. Its Conquest and Development, translatcu by J. R. Foster 
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1954), 110.
1 There arc several translations to this letter. This one was done by the Jesuit priest, Vcrbicst. 
“MilovanofTs Mission to Peking (1670),” in Baddclcy, 373.
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Emperor’s warning is very clear. 'I he letter unequivocally states that the Amur is a 
Chinese holding and that the conditions that Russia must meet to remain within the Amur 
is a peaceful and harmonious relationship with the Amur natives.
Since this plainly worded note was the most recent communication between the 
Russian and Chinese empires, it is obvious that China assumed the next communication 
from Russia would deal at least peripherally with the Amur basin topic. Such a bold and 
authoritative declaration should be featured in the next communication, especially since 
every communication from China had concentrated on the Amur topic and highlighted 
their discontent with the Russian occupation.
The Russian viewpoint on the Amur basin subject was noticeably different. To 
them it was not a primary concern. Russian Cossacks had dominated most o f the region 
for several decades and the few military skirmishes, while costly, were insubstantial in 
comparison with the vast quantities of expensive pelts shipped from the region each year 
China’s feeble efforts to remove the Cossacks were not especially threatening and unless a 
massive military operation was organized, it was unlikely that Russia would be forced out
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of the Amur. US It was into this difficult and conflicting political atmosphere that Russia 
would send their representative. *
* ^  Russian officials would claim that they were unable to read the communications from China. 
Although this point may have some validity, especially in the case of the earlier documents from 1618 and 
1649, (These early documents were received during a time when there was very little communication with 
Chinese-speaking peoples.) numerous individuals from Siberia and the Amur basin could translate these 
late, documents with little difficulty. In addition, the great effort China underwent to ensure that the 
Milovanov letter was understood shc-.’d h v ~  w!!evir.red most of Russia’s difficulties and ensured that 
Russia could develop at least a rudimentary foreign policy.
CHAPTER 3: THE MAKING OF A DIPLOMATIC MISSION
Russia’s decision in 1674 to send an ambassadorial mission to China was 
prompted by economic factors and a belief in the ease o f widespread trade with the 
Chinese. The vision of heavily loaded caravans filled with expensive Chinese silks, gems, 
and spices prompted excited officials to immediately begin preparations for the mission.
In addition to the selection and organization of supplies and suitable gifts, and the 
rounding up the best qualified men in numerous fields—such as medicine, warfare, farming, 
etc.—to observe and record information, two vitally important tasks needed to be 
accomplished. First, a suitable ambassador had to be selected to present the proper image 
to the Chinese. And second, a set of instructions tailored to the fallibility o f the selected 
ambassador and providing detailed explanations of the complexities o f the mission needed 
to be created.
The choice of the ambassador was vital. The chosen individual would be the first 
official representative o f Russia in the distant Chinese empire. The task o f establishing a 
positive political relationship and negotiating trade was crucial to Russia’s political 
stability. The tremendous importance of this mission for Russia demanded a unique and 
unusual individual-a person gifted with exceptional intelligence, education, and political 
experience to properly represent the throne in this important endeavor. Additionally, the
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selected individual, as the official representative o f the Tsar abroad, must present the
proper bearing, appearance, and attitude to impress upon the Chinese the grandeur o f the
Russian throne. For this particular task, A. A. Matveev,! *6 the Tsar’s close confidant, 
presented a young Moldavian diplomat, Nikolai Gavrilovich Milescu Spafarii,! 17 for 
consideration to the post.
Spafarii was an extremely controversial choice to become the Russian ambassador 
to China. Numerous Russian officials complained that Spafarii was too young. At only 
forty years o f age, Spafarii lacked the distinction to be taken seriously as a political 
negotiator. 118 In addition, Spafarii was extremely inexperienced in Russian politics. 
Because Spafarii had arrived in Moscow in 1671, only four years earlier, without even the 
basic rudiments o f the Russian language, Spafarii had not had the opportunity to 
distinguish himself through his negotiation skills. His position in the foreign office had 
been gained on the strength of his Greek and Latin abilities and the strong 
recommendations from Nikusi Panagiot, a Greek interpreter at the Porte, and from the
1 16 Artemon A. Matveev was the head of the Polosolskii Prikaz, the Russian foreign office that managed 
foreign affairs including the assignment of translators.
117 One well-known comprehensive biography had been written on Spafarii, P. P. Panaitescu, Nicolas 
Snathat Milescu. Melanges de l ’ecole roumanine en France, Pt. I (Paris, np. 1925). Mark MancalFs 
Russia and China liberally uses this work in its preparation of Spafarii’s biography. Nicholi Milescu is 
usually referred to as Spafarii. Mancall explains that this is a misuse of his title, spatar or spatharios, by 
previous historians. However, since ail Russian documents and Spafarii himself in his letters and journal 
use Spafarii, it seems appropriate to continue the practice. Mancall, 324.
118 There is a dispute regarding Spafarii’s age. In 1676, Spafarii stated that he was forty years old (thus 
born in 1636). But all known recards including those by the Romanian chronicler Ncculcea indicated his 
date of birth was about 1625. Due to the fact that their is no concrete proof of Spafarii’s age, historians 
have generally accepted the 163!) date. This is primarily because Ncculcca’s early works arc often 
inaccurate. This would make Spafarii seventeen when he completed his education in 1653. Ibid., 324.
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Patriarch o f Jerusalem (residing in Constantinople), Dositheos.' ^  Spafarii’s short 
residency and lack of practical experience in Russian diplomacy brought his ability to 
successfully navigate the complexities of political negotiation into question.
Practical considerations were, however, only part of the controversy. Spafarii’s 
nationality (born in Moldavia) and low birth challenged his suitability. His family’s Greek 
origins created a mild debate. It was his family’s humble origins that caused the most 
concern. Sp'.farii’s family was originally without a name, title or wealth. To obtain a more 
prosperous life, Spafarii’s parents migrated to Moldavia and married into two wealthy and 
influential households, the Ghika and Duka families. After achieving noble rank through 
their newly acquired in-laws, Spafarii’s family adopted a family name, Milescu, from an
estate they procured in Basluisk. 120 Spafarii presented the appearance o f wealthy and 
influential origins but he was stili a member of the lower class and unsuitable for such an 
important position.
The arguments accumulated against Spafarii were for the most part simply political 
excuses. A non-Russian representative of the throne, while unusual, was certainly 
acceptable by Russian standards in the late seventeenth century. His inexperience could be 
overcome by assigning numerous advisors to the mission to assist him with the 
complexities of Russian politics. Youth, far from being a deterrent, was often considered 
an asset on long and difficult treks through the untamed wilderness. Yet despite these
l l 9 Baddeley, 206.
120 Ibid., 205.
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reasons, Spafarii was unpalatable to a large number of Russian politicians. The reason 
was Spafarii’s friendship with A. A. Matveev. 121
Artemon Matveev maintained a unique position in the Russian government. In 
addition to his influential position as head of the foreign affairs department, Matveev was 
closely related to the Tsar’s family. As the favored uncle of Tsar Aleksei’s second wife, 
Natalia Narishkin, Matveev enjoyed influence unnatural to his post. The Tsar usually 
sanctioned Matveev’s recommendations despite protests from the remainder o f his 
government and Spafarii was readily approved as the ambassador to China despite the
outcry from the Miloslavskaia faction of the government. 122
Matveev’s relationship with Spafarii began shortly after he arrived in Moscow. 
Interested in developing a new policy that would allow for the formation o f natural allies 
against a common enemy, Matveev required an assistant with information on the recent 
state o f European affairs. He recruited the young translator and utilized his foreign 
background and European political ties to cement alliances against Turkey. This 
professional relationship quickly became personal. Matveev enjoyed the intellectual 
stimulation offered by Spafarii, and often invited him to socialize and discuss religious or 
historical texts. Spafarii eventually became a tutor for Matveev’s son, Andrei. Naturally, *
121 Ibid., 207
*22 The faction that controlled the government during the reign of Aleksei’s first wife, Maria 
Miloslavskaia. Sergei M. Soloviev, Rebellion and Reform: Fedor and Sophia 1682-1689. vol. 25, History' 
of Russia, translated and edited by Lindsey A. J. Hughes (Guff Breeze, Fla: Academic International Press, 
1989), 10.
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when the lucrative position of Russian ambassador to China became available, Matveev 
strongly suggested the young Moldavian to the Tsar. 123
Matveev’s influential support certainly assisted Spafarii in receiving the assignment 
but this aid should not overshadow Spafarii’s natural and unique qualifications. Perhaps 
o f all the other Russian diplomats of the period, Spafarii alone commanded the diverse 
skills necessary to complete the mission. First, Spafarii was highly educated. As a young 
man, his family managed to send him to the prestigious Greek Patriarchal School in 
Constantinople. Under the tutelage of Gabriel Vlasi, who would become the metropolitan 
o f Naupaktu and Arta, Spafarii absorbed several languages, including ancient and modem 
Greek, Turkish and Arabic. His studies included a rigorous exploration o f literature, 
history, and philosophy. Theology, Spafarii’s passion, became deeply ingrained and he 
would spend much of his professional career addressing the heady issues o f church dogma. 
When Spafarii completed the difficult program at Constantinople, he traveled to Italy to 
explore more mundane subjects that included natural science, mathematics, Italian and
Latin. 124
Spafarii’s amazing academic abilities brought hirn praise both from fellow students 
and instructors. Terms including “oti vir Poliglotus,” “instruit aux iangues,” “vsem 
yazikam,” “vir ac pius” and “in urbe imperatoria” were used to describe him. The 
patriarch, Dositheus, was so impressed by Spafarii’s linguistic ability and his expertise in *
*23 Mancall, 74.
124 Probably Padua. Baddclcy, 205.
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theology that he exclaimed, "He is, as it were, a grancgraph, replete with universal 
knowledge.” 125
Spafarii proved his command of religious theory' and linguistical ability in his first 
few professional works. One of the Spafarii’s earliest works was the difficult translation 
o f the bibie from Greek into Rumanian/ Moldavian. This enormous work became widely
used during the seventeenth century before disappearing during the nineteenth. 126 
Spafarii’s second ambitious and most famous work centered upon the Calvinist movement 
o f Europe. In an extensive document entitled Enchiridion. Sive Stella Orientalis 
Occidentali Splendens, hoc est Sensus Ecclesiae Orientalis. Scilicet Graecae. de 
Transubstantiatione Corporis Domini AJiisque Controversiss. 1 27 Spafarii examined the 
Calvinist treatise against Transubstantiation in great detail. In his work, he explained that 
the fundamental basis of the Calvinist movement was based upon the “Catechesis o f 
Cyril.” a religious address supposedly delivered by Cyril, patriarch o f Constantinople. 
Spafarii’s intensive examination proved decisively that the Catechesis was a forgery and 
the basis for the Calvinist movement heresy. *28
Spafarii’s extensive years at European courts also provided him with the 
experience necessary to become the Russian ambassador. In 1653, when Spafarii was 12567*
125 ibid.
126 jb e  work was never published. Mancall, 71.
127 The title is translated as Manual if the Eastern Star Singing on the West...being the Perception of the 
Eastern (Greek) Church Concerning the Transubstantiation of the Body of the Lord and other 
Controversies. Baddeley, 206.
128 Ibid.
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only eighteen,^29 he returned to Moldavia to work for the court. During the next eight
years, Spafarii worked for several princes, including George S t e p h a n ( u n t i l  his 
banishme it in 1658 for attempting to seize the throne) and George Ghica. During the two 
years Spafarii assisted Ghica, he was assigned as the commander o f the cavalry. During 
this fateful appointment, Spafarii was entrusted with a thousand men and sent to settle 
several local quarrels between rival regions in Transylvania. His successfi.il campaign 
resulted in his adoption of the name Spafarii, a military title referring to a horseman or
sword-bearer. *31
Following this successful military appointment, Spafarii became George Ghica’s 
personal secretary, and then carried on his duties for his son Gregory. Between the years 
1664 and 1668, Spafarii traveled to Brandenburg and accepted a position with Frederick
Wilhelm, the Kurfurst o f Brandenburg. 132 \  few satisfying years later, Spafarii departed 
to rejoin George Stephan, his first employer, and to accept a respected position as 
Stephan’s official diplomatic representative throughout Europe. The untimely death o f 
Stephen in 1669 left Spafarii again searching for employment. 133
The opening at Moscow in 1671 for an educated religious man was tailor-made for 
Spafarii. After receiving a recommendation from the church at Constantinople, Spafarii 129*
129 Or twenty-eight, depending upon the correctness of Spafarii’s birth date.
DO Mancall indicates his name was Stefan Georgits. Mancall, 324.
D 1 The name itself is derived from his official title Spatharios, a word meaning sword bearer and applied 
to the bodyguard of the Danubian Hospodars. Baddcley, 205.
D 2  jyue (o contradictions in his biographical information, the exact date is unknown. Mancall, 324.
D 3 Baddcley, 206.
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was accepted by the Posolski Prikaz, or foreign office. In Moscow, Spafarii’s linguistical 
abilities shone. Despite arriving with no understanding of Russian, Spafarii was soon 
elevated to the position of First Interpreter to the Posolski Prikaz o f die Moscow 
Razriad. This position, which had never before been granted to a foreigner, 
acknowledged Spafarii’s remarkable expertise in Greek, Latin, and several other 
languages. In addition, Spafarii was also the youngest interpreter ever employed by the 
Prikaz. Spafarii’s natural abilities were astounding. As a reward for his excellence during 
his initial employment, the grateful office granted Spafarii a lifetime appointment o f  100
rubles the day he was officially appointed to the department, December 14th, 1671. ^ 5  
Along with Spafarii’s linguistic ability, educational qualifications and extensive 
political experience, Spafarii also possessed an esoteric, ethereal quality that made him 
especially well-suited to represent the Tsar on this important mission. Throughout 
Spafarii’s unusual political career, his mannerisms and bearing were often remarked upon 
by the surrounding officials. For example, French ambassador extraordinary, Amauld de 
Pomponne (the nephew of the celebrated port royalist), mentioned Spafarii favorably after 
meeting him in Stockholm. He exhalted Spafarii with noble titles including “Seigneur,
moldave baron and gentilhomme."^^ Spafarii’s unusual demeanor was a unique 
combination of brash assurance and noble mannerisms that immediately impressed all who 1345*
134 Ibid., 207.
135 Mancall, 73.
l 3  ^Baddeley, 205.
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viewed him. His educated speech provided an aura of knowledge and his self-assurance 
quickly allowed Spafarii to control the flow of conversation. These factors, embellished 
with the immaculate dress and impeccable refinement of the aristocracy, projected the 
impression of elegance and regal bearing. These three qualities—education, experience 
and posture, made Spafarii an excellent choice to represent the Russian tsar in China.
Like all humans, this skillful and ingenious scholar hid several character flaws that 
stained the brilliance of his accomplishments. An opportunist, Spafarii eagerly grasped 
every occasion to advance his own career. Unfortunr.Hy, he cared little for those around 
him. He routinely betrayed his friends, attempted to overthrow local governments, and 
lied whenever it was necessary to elevate his success, position, or political standing. 
Evidence even exists that Spafarii was a plagiarist and copied some o f his best known
works, including the world-renowned Rumanian bible, from other scholars. ^ 7  Qne 
particular work, Spafarii’? Atlas of China, proves conclusively Spafarii’s tendency to 
plagiarize. Included with a sheaf of documents that chronicled his China mission, 
Spafarii’s atlas was a conspicuously informative document. It gave detailed accounts of 
the southern Chinese terrain (a region Spafarii never visited) and the inner working o f the 
Chinese government. In fact, Spafarii’s atlas was nearly a word for word copy o f a 1655 
document o f the same name. This early summary, written by a Jesuit priest named Jesuit
Martini, was simply translated into Russian by Spafarii and claimed as his own work. 138 *138
137 Ibid.
138 Spafarii, “Description of China,” in Baddcley, 209-11.
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Unfortunately, Spafarii was not simply a plagiarist. Behind the impressive 
education and political reputation, Spafarii concealed a darker, depraved ambition that 
often resulted in duplicity. During Spafarii’s earliest political years, his criminal activities 
were limited to untraceable clandestine operations. Although no evidence exists, 
Spafarii’s uncanny ability to maintain his high governmental position when first Stephan, 
then Ghika, were removed from authority in the Moldavian leadership, smacks o f
conspiracy. 1^9 This insinuation receives a great deal o f strength in light o f Spafarii’s 
efforts to depose his third employer, Stephaitz. 140
Initially Spafarii was employed as Stepanitz’s private secretary. However, after a 
short time, it quickly became apparent their relationship would be one o f deep trust and 
friendship. Stepanitz was a kind master and held Spafarii’s thoughts and opinions in high 
esteem. He continuously consulted Spafarii on matters o f state and personal difficulties. 
Spafarii was regularly invited dine at Stephanitz’s table and spent a considerable number 
o f evenings in the prince's company drinking and playing cards. It was clear that Spafarii 
was a valued and trusted member of Stepanitz’s household. 141
Spafarii, however, was displeased with his subservient role. He gradually grew 
tired o f Stepanitz and organized a movement to overthrow the kindly ruler. In his search 139*4
139 [f Spafarii was able to play an active role in the disposition of Stephen, he must have o f been 
extremely cunning and clever to completely cover his tracks. Later he goes to rejoin Stephen and resumes 
a close relationship. It is questionable how Spafarii could maintain a excellent working relationship with 
the Ghikas while he was so friendly with Stephen. Baddclcy, 205-06.
140 Mancall refers to Stcphaitz as Prince Ilias Alcxandru. Mancall, 72.
141 Baddclcy, 206.
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for support, Spafarii sent letters, disguised in hollow sticks, to his friends in neighboring 
areas. One of these letters was intercepted by a loyal Besarabian administrator who 
immediately returned the damning document to Stephanitz’s hands. * 42 There was no 
question of Spafarii’s intent. His entire treasonist plan was outlined in his dispatch. 
Angrily, Stephanitz sent for the executioner, but relented at the last minute, canceling 
Spafarii’s death sentence. Instead, Stephanitz instructed that Spafarii was to be disfigured.
His nose was to be cut off to forever mark him as an untrustworthy traiior. *43
Fortunately for “chicken nose,” as Spafarii became known, his former employers 
still looked favorably upon him. Immediately following his disfigurement, Spafarii found 
refuge with Gregory Ghika in Wullachia, who employed him as an agent in Constantinople 
during his initial recovery period. This kindness was cruelly repaided. During the turmoil 
created by the war between the pope and Poland, Spafarii betrayed Ghioa’s trust. By 
willingly following the d'abolica! instructions of Shcherbak Xantakuzan, an ambitious 
schemer who eyed Ghica’s position, Spafarii became an instrumental player in Ghica’s 
displacement. With Ghika eliminated, Spafarii hoped to receive his reward from 
Kantakuzan. But he failed to receive the vacated position. As a result Spafarii was left
without a job, patron or recommendation. *44
142 Ibid. 
143Mancall. 72.
*44 Baddclcy, 206.
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Another member of the nobility, Frederick Wilhelm, Kurfiirst of Brandenburg, 
heard o f Spaf'arii’s credentials and offered to sponsor the intellectual. Under Wilhelm’s 
watchful eye, Spafarii devoted himself to his studies and completed the Rumanian 
translation o f the bible. He also underwent an unusual and experimental procedure to heal 
his disfigured face. German doctors removed quantities of blood and flesh from his cheek 
(presumably his rear cheek) and grafted the matter onto Spafarii’s injured nose. Spafarii 
seemed content to remain for a time—at least until his nose became fully healed—before
deserting Wilhelm’s generous service. ^
Next Spafarii traveled to Stettin to work as Stephan’s diplomatic agent to 
Stockholm. Here, he delivered his brilliant response to Calvin which redeemed his name 
and revived his sagging career prospects. It was simple bad luck that Stephan died in 
1669. With few options left, Spafarii traveled to his home in Moldavia, and then to 
Wallachia before appearing in Constantinople before the patriarch.
For the Orthodox church, Spafarii must have presented a dilemma. On one hand 
the man was brilliant scholar, and a stout defender o f the faith. On the other, he was an 
embarrassment. Caught several times undermining his employers and too untrustworthy 
to be tasked with mediating church business, Spafarii was too controversial to be absorbed 
into the church administration. The Russian request for a learned orthodox man was 
clearly the church’s best solution to rid itself of Spafarii. The relatively isolated Russians 
would have heard little of Spafarii’s exploits and the man was superbly qualified to fill this 145
145 Ibid.
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distant position. The church wholeheartedly recommended Spafarii to the Russian 
government and illustrated his linguistical and educational merits in a glowing 
reference. 146
It seemed that in Russia Spafarii finally found the life he so desperately sought. In 
Moscow he was highly respected because of his exceptional education. Immediately, his 
work was brought to the attention of the Tsar, and as the single most productive member 
o f the Prikaz, Spafarii received an increase in salary to 132 rubles. In a few short months,
Spafarii was entrusted with translating all of Russian’s secret correspondence. 147 In 
1673, Spafarii’s ecclesiastic experience put him in high regard. He was assigned to 
assume responsibility for the manuscripts and library of Greek Bishop Paissios Ligarides, 
who had recently fallen out of favor. Additionally, Spafarii translated for many of the
official embassies, including during the Danish visit in 1674.148 ft seemed that his 
immediate cultivation of important and powerful friends, the Russians’ appreciation o f his 
linguistic skills, and their ability to trust him with important documents and diplomatic 
assignments stroked Spafarii’s ego and encouraged him to fully embrace Russia as an 
adopted home. 14678
146 Ibid.
147 Man.. :i, 74.
148 Ibid.
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Having chosen an ambassador, Russian officials turned their attention to the 
development of the mission’s instructions. Tailored to compensate for Spafarii’s 
shortcomings, the instructions were designed to be primarily a reference document. The 
document explained in amazing detail the ambassador's tasks, Russia’s goals, and even 
attempted to anticipate the content of the upcoming meeting with the Emperor. It even 
provided properly worded speeches o f greeting, and described proper etiquette while 
trying to anticipate difficulties and provide solutions for them to ease the negotiations. The 
instructions were, in fact, too complete. In the course o f protecting Russian dignity and 
honor, the instructions removed the flexibility, judgment, and creativity o f the Russian 
ambassador.
From the onset, the instructions written by the Posolskii Prikaz provided the basic 
structure o f the mission. From men to supplies and gifts, this office decided the proper 
foundation necessary to make the mission a success. The Prikaz assigned two natives, 
Fedor Pavlov and Konstiatin Grechanin, to act as guides. Two writers, Nikifor Veniukov 
and Ivan Favorov, were assigned to remove the drudgery o f daily records from the
ambassador. 149 Jan Han, one of Moscow preemir.ate physicians and alchemist, was 
selected to discover new medicines and procedures used in the distant empire. One 
hundred twelve men were chosen in this way and fully outfitted with the stoutest pack 
mules, horses and camels Moscow could procure. 1 50 14950
149 Chin, 63.
150 “February 28, 1675 Instructions from the Posoloskii [sic] Prikaz to Nikolai G. Spafarii (Milescu) for 
his embassy to the Chinese Empire” in Dmytryshyn, Russia’s Conquest of Siberia. 398.
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The Prikaz also prepared an enormous pile of goods to be taken to China as trade 
goods and gifts. Fifteen hundred rubles of sable pelts were provided to exchange for a 
sampling of Chinese wares. A large number of goods, strings o f pearls, sables, ermine, 
amber and other Russian wares were provided to be presented to the Chinese emperor as 
gifts o f goodwill and friendship. The Prikaz even included an additional two hundred 
rubles o f sable pelts and twenty pods of tobacco to be freely given the Chinese people at
large in the Tsar’s name. 1 ^  1
With the general logistics of the mission decided, the Prikaz officials turned their 
attention to formulating a comprehensive document for Spafarii’s use. By attempting to 
foresee the pace, tempo, and direction of the upcoming negotiations, they provided 
Spafarii with the script and procedures he was to follow to achieve that vision. The 
officials recorded that upon reaching the first Chinese village, Spafarii was to seek out the 
officials or administrator and inform the man that he represents “the Great Sovereign Tsar 
and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Great, Little and White Russia, 
Heir through Father and Grandfather, and Lord and master of many realms and lands in
the East, West and North.” ^ 2  After relaying that his expedition was to discuss affairs c f  
state with the Emperor, the town official was then required to immediately provide an 
escort, food, transportation and guides to assist his journey to Peking. 152
151 Ibid., 399.
152 ibid.
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As Spafarii traveled further into China, he was instructed to travel quickly, making 
inquires on the state of Chinese politics. He should discover if other countries send 
ambassadors to China and note the reply. He was also to inquire about the customary 
procedures performed by ambassadors, and determine if personal audiences with the 
Emperor were commonplace or if official credentials were normally delivered in person. 
Above all Spafarii was to ensure that he was granted the same procedures as visiting
ambassadors from other countries. '^3
Upon reaching the capital city, Spafarii’s first duty was to present his letter of 
credence to the Emperor. Naturally, the Russian officials preferred that he pr*, „ent it 
without the representatives of other countries b . ng present, but if that could not be 
arranged he was to visit the Emperor’s residence and ow before him on behalf o f the 
great sovereign. Then he was to greet the Emperor using a carefully worded speech the 
Prikaz officials had prepared.
By the Grace of God, the Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei 
Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Great, Little, and White Russia, Tsar of 
Moscow, Kiev, Vladimir and Novgorod, Tsar o f Kazan, Tsar of Astrakhan,
Tsar of Siberia, Sovereign of Pskov, Grand Prince of Smolensk, Tver,
Iugra, Perm, Viatka, Bulgaria and Sovereign o f others, Grand Prince of 
Nizhnii Novgorod, Chernigov, Riazan, Rostov, Iaroslav, Beloozero,
Udorsk, Obdorsk, Kondinsk, Master o f all northern lands, Sovereign of the 
Iversk lands o f the Kartalin and Gruzin Tsars, Sovereign of the Kabardinsk 
lands of the Cherkass and mountain princes, Heir through Father and 
Grandfather and Lord and Master of many other realms and lands in the 
East, West and North, has commanded me to bow to you, Greatly 
Esteemed Bugdykhan, Master of the city of Kanbalyk and o f the entire 153
153 Ibid., 400.
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Chinese Empire, and he has commanded me to inform you of His Tsarist 
Majesty’s health, and to inquire about your health, the Khan. 154
Spafarii was to supplement this introductory speech with the Emperor’s proper titles and 
official names. He was to have discovered them prior to his audience. When the Emperor 
responded to Spafani’s inquiry and asked after the Tsar’s well-being Spafarii was to recite 
the following carefully worded passage.
When we left our Great Sovereign, His Tsarest Majesty, by the grace o f 
God, our Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, 
Autocrat o f all Great, Little and White Russia, and Heir through Father and 
Grandfather and Lord and Master of many realms and lands, East, West 
and North, was in good health, thanks to God’s Grace, and was reigning 
over his great and illustrious lands of the great and renowned Russian
Tsardom. 155
Following this brief exchange, Spafarii would present his letter indicating his 
authority to represent Russia. Spafarii would actually carry six letters to the Chinese 
empire. Three documents in Russian, Latin and Turkish proclaimed that the ambassador 
was a full ambassador and endowed with the full authority of the Tsar. The seconf set of 
three documents proclaimed him as a simple envoy. If received directly by the Chi ise 
Emperor, Spafarii was instructed to present the letter proclaiming him ambassador in the 154
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid., 401.
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Russian language. During a second lengthy speech that reiterated the Tsar’s lofty position 
and expounded on his virtues of foresight, Spafarii was to present and explain that he had 
brought duplicates of his ciocumentation in Latin and Turkish to assist the Emperor’s 
officials in translating the Tsar’s communication. The ambassador’s final duty after the 
letter was duly presented and translated was to present the Tsar’s gifts. They were to be 
delivered to the Emperor “with due observation of ceremony” and accompanied by yet 
another prewritten speech. 156
The Russian instructions were, however, geared toward the perfect encounter with 
the Chinese. If China responded as anticipated, this carefully planned scene ensured 
positive and friendly relations would sprout from this most auspicious and favorable of 
beginnings. But the Russian officials were not completely idealistic. They understood that 
the likelihood o f the ambassadorial mission occurring as their utopian view projected was 
extremely unlikely. A contingency plan was prepared to address the difficulties Russian 
representatives had encountered in the past. First, the Russian officials felt that the 
Emperor would refuse to receive the ambassador’s letter in person. He would probably 
insist on carrying out official business through his government councilors. In such an 
event, Spafarii was instructed to inform the Chinese officials that he emphatically refused 
to deliver either the Tsar’s letter or the royal gifts to anyone but the Emperor.156 57
156 Ibid., 401-02.
157 Ibid., 402.
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After ensuring that the Emperor would be informed of his protests, Spafarii was to 
stress that the persona of the Tsar would be offended if his letter and gifts were not 
accepted by the Emperor’s own hand. He was to clearly explain that all civilized countries 
maintained this practice and that Chinese envoys wou'u receive similar honors when they 
journeyed to Russia. Spafarii v/as to continue this argument until her an honorable 
compromise that would not jeopardize the dignity and honor of the Tsar was reached or
Spauuii s mission was in serious jeopardy.
In the event that Spafar:;’s efforts to adhere to European custom threatened the 
mission’s success, Spafarii was instructed to tactfully retract his protests. He was 
instructed to relate that
he has been sent from the Great Sovereign, His Tsarest Majesty, to their 
sovereign Bugdykhan with His Tsarest Majesty’s gramota [letter] o f amity 
for the purpose o f discussing matters urgent and vital to both sovereigns 
and that he must obey the will and instructions o f his own sovereign, His 
Tsarist Majesty, but that in this matter he will conduct himself in 
accordance with the will of Bugdykhan, and whatever he decrees will be 
done. 159
After making this announcement, Spafarii was instructed to work closely with the 
Chinese officials. He was to present them the three letters that indicated his envoy status, 
explaining that the language difference would assist them in making a Chinese 
translation. 160 Spafarii was also allowed to deliver his gifts to these officials (if 158960
158 Ibid., 402-03.
159 Ibid., 403.
160 Ibid., 403-04.
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specifically requested to do so), but he should protest venomously and reiterate that this 
action was not in accordance with his mission’s friendship and goodwill. Warned not to 
bow or discuss any of his ambassadorial business with the Emperor’s councilors, Spafarii 
was permitted to address the business that was considered below the Emperor’s station. 
These tasks primarily consisted of translating four letters that Russia had received during
the last century and establishing official forms of reference between the two empires. 1^1 
Spafarii carried four documents to China. The first two predated the manchu 
dynasty while the last two were the remnants of the Baikov mission and the Chinese
communication o f 1670.162 The Tsar, unfamiliar with Chinese and Manchu, desired the 
letters to be translated into a readily understood language, preferably Latin, and returned 
to Moscow for analysis and deliberation. Spafarii was to request an explanation o f the 
documents’ contents and ascertain what actions the Emperor wished the Tsar to consider. 
The Prikaz officials recognized that several issues in the documents must refer to highly 
sensitive events, but they allowed Spafarii to respond, if circumstances allowed, on all 
controversial topics as long as he insured that there would be no injury to the name,
honor, and dignity of the Tsar (or loss to his treasury). *63
Spafarii was also instructed to attempt to translate these documents privately, 
without the Chinese officials’ assistance. If he succeeded, he was to request that the
161 Ibid., 404.
162 §ee chapter two for text of the letters from the 1618 mission and (he 1649 communication collected 
during the mission to the Atlin Khan. Ibid. Chin. 68.
163 Ibid.
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Chinese officials translate the documents while he was present, to ensure that they were 
not altered. The letters were also to be corrected, and all phrases that contained 
derogatory statements or utilized the Tsar’s titles erroneously were to be corrected. ^  
Finally, after resolving the letter issue, Spafarii was to address the mechanics of 
future communication. He was to suggest the declaration of an official communication 
language that both side could readily understand. The Prikaz officials indicated that they 
preferred either Latin or Turkish, and suggested that one o f these widely known languages 
by used as the basis for future communications. They also provided a list o f the Tsar’s 
official titles for use in future correspondence to alleviate uncertainty and confusion. 
Spafarii was to request the same from the Chinese officials and carefully examine it to 
ensure that the Emperor did not claim titles that were owned by the rulers o f other
neighboring countries. *65
Spafarii was also assigned an enormous list of minor tasks which included 
determining other more traversable routes between the two empires, compiling a list of 
Chinese goods available for Russian trade and numerous other small details related to the
cost and requirements of establishing a caravan route.  ^66  these issue were o f 
importance only in the instance of a successful meeting. The Prikaz officials assumed that 
regardless o f the intensity of the early disagreements over protocol, Spafarii’s retraction of
164 Ibid., 404-05
165 Ibid., 4C5.
166 Ibid., 407.
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his position and willingness to accept the Emperor’s customs would eliminate all forms of 
tension from the negotiation. They did not consider that one ramification o f this strategy 
might be that Spafarii would seem discourteous and presumptuous and that his retraction, 
no matter how humbly it was presented, would alter the first impression that Spafarii’s 
intractability created. Instead, Russian officials seemed to assume that once Spafarii 
agreed to work within the confines of Chinese customs, the incident would be forgotten 
and Spafarii would continue his negotiations unhampered by ill-feeling.
A second and more vital issue, the Amur basin dispute, would also create 
numerous difficulties for Spafarii. Completely ignored by the Prikaz officials, The Amur 
basin issue was a sensitive Chinese concern, but Spafarii’s instructions made only a single 
reference to the explosive topic. He was instructed to attempt to negotiate for the release
or exchange of any Russian prisoners that the Chinese were currently holding. 167 It is 
tempting to suggest that Russia was unaware of the Chinese interest in settling the Amur 
basin dispute due to their inability to translate Chinese communications on the subject, but 
this assumption is undoubtedly false. The Russian government was clearly aware o f the 
Chinese concern over the Amur basin. As early as 1654, during the Baikov mission, 
Aleksei Mikhailovich demonstrated his understanding of the Amur basin problem. When 
Baikov failed to return promptly from his assignment in China, the Tsar feared that he may
Spafarii was expected to negotiate a set po'icy on release of prisoners held within the Chinese empire. 
He was to request that the Chinese empire should release all Russian prisoners held within the Chinese 
emphe without charging ransom and that the Russian government would do the same and ensure they 
would not be harassed in their journey homeward. Spafarii was, however, authorized to negotiate with the 
Chinese and pay a ransom of up to thirty rubles a piece if the Chinese government demanded payment. 
Ibid., 405-06.
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have been taken prisoner as retribution for the continuing violence in the Amur. With 
AHin’s assistance a document was hastily drafted to address the situation. But before the 
letter could depart Moscow, news of Baikov’s safe return to Russian territory preempted
the letter’s d ispatchers
In 16 70, Russia was again made aware o f China’s concerns. The letter delivered 
to Nerchinsk by an armed group of Chinese soldiers attested to the fact that China was 
still keenly h t crested in halting the violence and atrocities committed on the Amur. 
Spafarii’s interception of the 1670 Chinese dispatch at Toposk certainly was accompanied 
by an account o f how it arrived at the Russian border station, but Spafarii fails to mention 
the significance of the document in his letter to the Tsar. This indicates that the Tsar 
either already was aware of the letter’s contents from an earlier message posted from 
Nerchinsk or the information Spafarii gathered did not alter his briefing regarding the 
conflict. 170
Perhaps the reason the issue remains unaddressed in Spafarii’s instructions is that 
Russia was incapable of controlling the Amur basin. The violent zeal with which the 
natives were ruthlessly controlled ensured maximum profits from the region and both *•
168 Chin, 56.
169 The letter arrived with sixty armed Chinese who remained until the letter’s significance and contents 
were explained in full to Arshinsky. Spafarii docs not even mention the prominent topic the letter 
addresses in his explanation to the Tsar. Ibid., 61. Spafarii, “Spathary’s Letter to the Tsar, dated 15th 
April 1675,” in Baddeley, 244.
•70 Moscow knew of the letter’s existence before Spafarii was sent to China. Spafarii had been instructed 
to have four letters translated by the Chinese, not three. Spafarii certainly must have received at least an 
oral briefing regarding the Amur basin. If he had not, this letter, which directly impacted the scope and 
direction of his mission, would have required further instruction from Moscow.
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Russia and their authorities were unmotivated to enforce restrictions. The frontier 
Voevodas lacked sufficient forces and the inclination to demand the end of excessive 
exploitation. In addition, the region was inhabited by Cossack hunters and explorers who 
were nearly lawless and they barely tolerated the few restrictions the Tsar had placed on 
their freedom. Finally, none of the frontier dwellers would volui..arily give up their 
profitable and enjoyable lifestyle. Without the ability or inclination to solve the Amur 
issue, Russia chose to ignore it. Spafarii was instructed to claim that the Emperor’s letters 
could not be translated and since the contents were unknown, Spafarii could not be
expected to negotiate a settlement. 171
Finally, the instructions themselves would present difficulties for Spafarii. The 
rigidly explained procedures and traditional Russian political procedures itemized in the 
document would be nearly impossible to obtain in the ancient Chinese culture. To make 
matters worse, Spafarii would interpret the document literally, ignoring the intention of 
the Russian officials to establish trade and friendly relations. His decision to adhere to the 
tenets o f the instructions, ignoring the clause that allowed him to deviate from the 
document if his mission were threatened, assured conflict and limited his effectiveness as a 
negotiator.
171 “February 28, 1675 Instructions from the Posoloskii [sic] Prikaz to Nikolai G. Spafarii (Milcscu) for 
his embassy to the Chinese Empire,” in Cmytryshyn, 404. This is an idiotic strategy. The Chinese 
instmeted that the letter be fully translated upon delivery and since the Milovanov letter was sent in reply, 
Russia obviously understood the Chinese complaint. Nonetheless, the Russians hoped that by stalling this 
issue they could establish a trade treaty before the Chinese discovered Russia’s lack of control in the 
Amur.
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Spafarii’s mission was destined to travel the path of conflict Hampered by a 
limited interpretation of his instructions, lack of information about key issues, and plagued 
by miscommunication and cultural discourse, Spafarii’s mission was exceptionally difficult 
to complete. But the most difficult factor, Spafarii’s argumentative and insulting 
approach, would prove to be the most damaging factor to the mission’s success.
CHAPTER 4: SPAFARII IN ACTION
Spafarii’s journey began on March 3rd, 1675.' 22 Departing from Moscow with 
his instructions, an impressive array of gifts, and an exorbitant number o f guards, guides, 
translators, and advisors, Spafarii began to traverse the forty-seven hundred miles of 
wilderness to Peking. The majority of this vast distance was extremely tedious, especially 
travel through the Urals, and the flat plains of Siberia, but Spafarii used the time wisely.
He mulled over the political situation, carefully examining previous Russian encounters
with the Chinese and read accounts o f European political experiences. * 23 Although 
Spafarii contacted Moscow frequently, his letters and reports expressed only the hope of a 
successful mission and vague rumors gathered from the local population.
At Tobolsk, 1150 miles east of Moscow, Spafarii’s mission gradually began to 
gain velocity. He decided to abandon the poorly developed frontier roads in favor o f river 
travel. Spafarii choose to travel along the Irtish river, then the Ob, the Yeneseisk, and 
finally the Selenga, near Lake Baikal. His decision to use water as his primary means o f 
transportation would save his men months of bone-aching hours on horseback and quite
'22  The story of Spafarii’s journey to China is contained in Nikolai Gavrilovich Milescu Spafarii 
“Statenii spisok posolstva N. Spafariia v Kitai,” and is the primary document for this chapter.
Clarification of events and translations were taken from John. F. Baddclcy’s which translated two 
chapters from the original work and sections of Spafarii’s Description of China.
'23 Spafarii, “Descriptions of China,” in Baddclcly, 245.
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possibly place his mission ahead of schedule.  ^74 with the route chosen, Spafarii began 
to fill out his retinue. He selected six boyar sons, as allowed by his instructions, to 
accompany him. Six falconers along with their assistants were chosen to care for the
Russian hunting falcons that would be presented as gifts to the Chinese emperor. *75 
Fina'ly, Spafarii designated several native guides, fluent in local dialects, to assist him in 
gathering rumors and information along the route. The natives, hunters and traders o f the 
frontier regions would be better ina rmed than the Russian government and Spafarii 
desired a realistic and current image of the Manchu dynasty.
Spafarii’s reconnaissance information provided a wealth o f accurate and useful 
data. However, since much of the information was hearsay or biased, Spafarii found it 
extremely difficult to form an accurate image of the Chinese situation. For example, one 
o f his men, a dragonman, war ■ ifted enough to speak both Chinese and Nikan. He 
informed Spafarii that the local Nikantsi tribe members claimed that the Manchu habitually 
lied. They explained that the Nikantsi were not willing members o f the Manchu empire 
but had been conquered and were slaves.  ^76 j w0 disastrous battles with the Manchu had
*74 The actual route Spafarii would use was left undecided until he reached Tobolsk. His instructions 
stated that “Nikolai is to travel from Moscow to the Siberian town of Tobolsk, and from Tobolsk to the 
Chinese Empire through the Kalmyk uluses, having ascertained carefully which route are the most direct 
and the most suitable.” In addition, Spafarii was entrusted to flesh out his entourage at Tobolsk. This 
was due to practical considerations. Since the official route had not yet been chosen and native speakers 
and guides for the area were scarce in Moscow, Spafarii was allowed to select several additions to his 
entourage. “February 28, 1675 Instructions from the Posoloskii [sic] Prikaz to Nikolai G. Spafarii 
(Milescu) for his embassy to the Chinese Empire,” in Dmytryshyn, 399.
17  ^The falcons were sent as a response to a request of a Chinese lord, Ochurta who requested two 
Russian falcons. Spafarii choose eleven white birds and eight red for the journey. Spafarii, “Spafarii’s 
Letter to the Tsar, dated 15th April, 1675,” in Baddelcy, 245.
*7  ^Spafarii, “Description of China,” in Baddelcy, 226.
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shattered their people and resulted in widespread slavery. The Nikantsi also reported that 
only women and children remained in Peking. Aii me men had disappeared, and were 
fighting dissenters elsewhere in the empire. Based upon the Nikantsi complaints, Spafarii 
was unable to trust the information these men provided. In his official report, he indicated
“God knows whom to believe, until He brings us to the capital.” ^ ”7
Although Spafarii seemed to be carefully weighing his reconnaissance information, 
the rumors and stories he gathered in Siberia and the Far East colored his judgment and 
biased his opinion o f the Chinese. During the weeks that followed, Spafarii would write in
his journal that the Chinese are “desperately greedy, no better than Turks”. 178 He is 
convinced that the Chinese are poor, weak individuals who are easily cowed and subdued. 
He states that “when I reach the frontier I shall see what sort o f country it is, and what
population and armaments they have—the latter I hear very poor.” 179 jn this same letter, 
Spafarii recorded that the Chinese emperor had fled to Dahuria in terror, and that the 
present would be a favorable time
to gain honor, for they and the Chinese Tatar are the worst o f people and 
not warlike. And the Mongols are mightily afraid of the Cossacks. And I 
seem to see if providence but wills it, the fear o f God (and of) the great 
Tsar fall upon the heathen of these countries so that they shall flee when no
man p u rs u e th .^  *
177 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddeley, 290.
178 Ibid.
*79 Spafarii, “Letter to MayvcycITfrom Yenscisk,” in Baddeley, 259. 
l 8  ^ Ibid.
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As the available information grew so did Spafarii’s confidence. Natives and 
Cossacks alike informed Spafarii that a major revolt was underway within China. In early 
July, 1675, Spafarii learned that several bands of rebellious Ming had successfully rallied 
against the Manchu and that the Manchu had failed to subdue the rebels not once but
several times. 181 Spafarii informed Matveyev on July 12th, that “the old Chinese have 
been gathering strength and beaten the Emperor’s tartars several times.” He also indicated
that it was clear “the old Chinese will prevail as they have done in the past.” 182
From Yeneseisk on July 18th, Spafarii wrote a letter to inform the Tsar o f China’s 
precarious position. He reported that groups of Cossack traders were held at Kalgin for 
three weeks while the Manchu searched for armed troops. Trade in the region had been 
exceptionally poor with little profit. 1 83 The reason, Spafarii concluded,' ;as open war 
with the Nikansh kingdom (the old Chinese Ming supporters). Spafarii had heard that 
there had been two major battles utilizing forty thousand men. The Manchu had lost both 
o f these enormous conflicts and searched for more troops to strengthen their sagging 
armies. 1 84 With the Manchu fully occupied, Spafarii estimated that only two thousand 
troops would be required to conquer the Dahur territory, the Amur region, and southward 
up to the Chinese wall. Spafarii stressed that now was the time to strike because the *18234
ibid.
182 ibid.
183 Spafarii, “Letter to the Tsar, From Yeneseisk, July 18th,” in Baddclcy, 257.
184 ibid.
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“Emperor being at present extremely weak, was mightily afraid o f the Cossacks and
greatly upset by the war with the Nikansh.” ^ ^
On the thirteenth of January, 1676, Spafarii reached the Chinese frontier, thrilled
and elated at his mission’s progress. Despite the narshness of the Siberian winter, 
Spafarii and his men had traveled safely to the Chinese border and were well ahead of 
schedule. The long, difficult trip from Moscow had been accomplished in only nine 
months and the entourage was nearly intact. A few men had deserted, but despite the 
hardship and length of the mission, the majority were eager and willing to continue 
traveling on to Peking. Unfortunately, the rapid pace set so far on the journey was not 
sustainable. The difficulty of protracted winter travel showed plainly on the faces of 
Spafarii’s men. Thin and exhausted, the men could not continue without a lengthy rest. 
The pack animals fared even worst. Spafarii’s prolonged march had killed many o f the
mimals and the remaining beasts were overburdened and overtaxed. I87 But Spafarii did 
not regret his decision. He had reached China four months ahead o f schedule!!
As Spafarii and his men passed over the summit o f the Targachin mountain chain 
that marked the Russian-Chinese border, they were greeted by a large group o f heavily 
armed Chinese. Sixty of the stout men confronting them were clearly Chinese troops sent 
to protect the border from invading enemies. However, off to one side stood a smaller *187
1^ 5 ibid.
186spafarii, “Description of Dalai{-nor} and the River Argun,” in Baddclcy, 283-84.
187 Ibid., 282.
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group of eight men, one clearly a Cossack from his dress. The Cossack was one of 
Spafarii’s own men, Milovanov, sent forward several months ago to announce Spafarii’s
imminent arrival. The other seven were Kargachln Sotniks, minor Chinese officials. * ^8 
Upon recognizing Milovanov, Spafarii boldly stepped forward and impatiently gestured 
for Milovanov to translate the Sotniks’ speech.
The Sotniks’ announcement was distressing. They explained that they were 
unprepared for Spafarii’s arrival. Since he had not been expected for several more months, 
they were unable to equip his entourage immediately. Milovanov, the Sotniks explained, 
had arrived by the Albazin road and informed them that Spafarii would not arrive until 
spring. Naturally, knowing this information, the Sotniks logically believed that this large 
group, arriving by the Nerchinsk road and nearly four months before Spafarii’s expected 
arrival, simply could not be the Russian ambassador and was most likely a hostile invasion 
force. In apology, they promised Spafarii’s delay would be short and sufficient horses, 
oxen and carts would arrive during the next few days to fully equip Spafarii’s large and 
unwieldy entourage.1
Spafarii consoled himself during the unexpected delay by reexamining the 
promising future of his political mission. During his travels, Spafarii had learned from 
Cossacks and Amur natives that China was having serious internal difficulties. An 189
*88 Karagachin Sotniks are actually Torgachin border officials. Spafarii mistakenly called the nomadic 
people living in the outskirts of the Chinese empire Karagachin. Nikolai Gavrilovich Milcscu Spafarii, 
“Spafarii’s Letter to the Tsar of April 17th, 1676 taken from the Naun Villages by MilovanofT,” in 
“Statenii spisok,” 172.
189 Ibid.
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extensive military operation was in progress near the southern border. Rebellious 
supporters of the Ming dynasty, who were overthrown in 1644, had not yet been 
completely suppressed by the Manchu and a full-scale confrontation was underway. 
Spafarh was certain that with such a draw on the economy, China would surely welcome 
prospective traders from Russia and do so on Russia’s terms. Spafarii anticipated the 
coming egotiations would be simple leaving him rich and well-regarded in Russia 
because of the lavish and huge concessions he would extract from China for the pleasure 
o f trading with the mighty Russian empire.
Unfortunately, from the first day on Chinese territory Spafarii’s mission began to 
diverge from this pleasant delusion. The few days the Sotniks requested to properly outfit 
Spafarii’s ungainly entourage stretched into eight. The entire region was searched for 
enough horses, oxen, and carts to properly transport the Russian visitor. One hundred ten 
saddle horses and 246 carts, each with horses or a brace of oxen, supplemented the weary
Russian riding and pack animals. ^ 0  five more days of hard travel (until January twenty- 
third) were required before reaching the first sizable Chinese settlement, Naun—a location
at which Spafarii would be delayed for three full months before continuing to Peking. *9*
The Chinese village of Naun was named for the nearby river. Although small, the 
city boasted reasonable facilities for visitors and provided Spafarii and his men with a large
190 A large number of the camels Spafarii had brought as pack animals had died en route from lack of 
food and exposure to the chilly climate. Spafarii, “Description of Dalai{-nor} and the River Argun,” in 
Baddeley, 282.
191 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddeley, 287.
9 6
clearing near the main village to establish camp. As Spafarii’s first official encounter with 
the Chinese, he was granted the opportunity to carefully confirm the reconnaissance 
information he had gathered along his route. But Spafarii failed to take this cautious step. 
Instead o f examining the village’s political staicture and determining their role in overall 
Chinese politics, Spafarii decided the village officials were beneath his notice. Adopting a 
haughty air, Spafarii refused to respond to the questions o f the lesser village officials and 
was barely civil to the village Voevoda. He responded contemptuously to the man’s 
request for identification and ignored the official’s questions regarding the purpose o f his 
visit. Finally, Spafarii pointedly exclaimed “the Tsar’s letters or your own sovereign’s
gifts and other affairs of state, no one of these things is any business o f yours.” 192
Spafarii’s only effort to quell the population’s questions was to indicate the Tsar 
was friendly and peaceful. When further questioned by the officials o f Naun for proof o f 
Spafarii’s position, he flippantly replied “were I not authorized by Your Majesty, I should 
not show so bold and confident a front, nor should I be accompanied by so many people 
o f varying ranks and positions. 193
Spafarii steadfastly refused to present a single piece o f evidence confirming his 
lofty position, and in return was categorically denied the customary honors o f food, 
transportation, and lodging. The Naun officials insisted that proof o f Spafarii’s *
*92 Spafarii, “Spafarii’s Letter to the Tsar of April 17th, 1676 taken from the Naun Villages by 
MilovanofT,” “Statcnii spisok,” 172-73.
193 Ibid., 174. This attitude and bniskness of speech is apparent throughout the journal whenever he is 
speaking to the Chinese.
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ambassadorial status be rendered before Spafarii was provided with additional
resources. When both sides refused to retreat, the Chinese tried a different tactic. 
Approaching the problem diplomatically, the Naun officials explained that the Emperor 
had instructed that all visitors must present their credentials before receiving 
ambassadorial honors. They then tactfully reminded Spafarii o f the many miles remaining 
between Naun and Peking, and stressed the numerous hardships and delays he would
experience without ambassadorial status. 195 Eventually, Spafarii reluctantly yielded to 
this pressure, and cited in his official report the obstinate nature o f the Chinese population 
and the fact that he would not be forwarded to Peking without yielding to the Chinese 
request. *96
Perhaps most surprising was the fact that the Naun officials had no interest in 
reading Spafarii’s official correspondence. When Spafarii finally produced the Emperor’s 
letter, all the Chinese present fell immediately to their knees, bowing before the letter and 
touching the document to their heads as a sacred object. Afterwards, Spafarii was 
awarded full ambassadorial honors without another question. 197 Unfortunately, Spafarii 
could not have foreseen this unusual Chinese reaction to the letter. He could not have 
known that the mere sight of the document was sufficient to ensure the security o f his
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid., 174-75.
197 Ibid., 175.
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mission. However, Spafarii also made no effort to understand the Chinese position and 
clarify their requests for proof of his authority.
This bungling first impression created resentment and coolness from the I .urn 
officials and they flatly assured him that they could do little for him to further his mission 
to Peking. Instead, they informed Spafarii that an extremely important man of high rank 
was traveling hastily to Naun to escort him to the capital. Since this high official was 
arranging food, lodging and additional transportation along the route, Spafarii could
expect no more difficulties or delays to obtain supplies or transportation. 198 since the 
Naun officials could no longer assist him, Spafarii had no choice but to wait for the high 
official to arrive.
As Spafarii waited, he was able to closely examine the everyday lives of Naun’s 
population. He recorded in his journal that they were much like the Turks. They even 
celebrated hamina, “the celebrating, in the month of March, according to the moon, as the 
Turks... all their customs were Asiatic and Turkish—houses, food, drink, and clothes, all
but their hats—saving that they do not hide away their women.” *99 Spafarii made one 
astute observation during this period that could have greatly assisted his mission. He 
recorded that the Chinese “are humble in speech, simple in attire yet in that seeming 
humility is concealed a vast pride, for they believe that there are no better people in the
198 Ibid.
199 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddclcy. 290.
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world than they and that their manners and customs are superior to those o f others.”200 
Unfortunately, Spafarii failed to apply this observation to his negotiating approach. He 
continued to assume that the Chinese were inferior and eventually they would be forced to 
accept his position and requirements because of the internal difficulties the government
faced.
Because of Spafarii’s insulting mannerisms, the Naun officials maintained their 
distance from the Russian ambassador. They occasionally visited, but their visits were far 
from friendly. They complained of Albazin Cossacks and their demands for tribute on 
Tungus natives, and hinted that Spafarii should present them with valuable presents as 
when the Emperor sent his official correspondence tc 1 irchinsk. But Spafarii’s haughty 
responses, continuous refusals to submit to the s nallest request, and lack o f understanding 
and compassion for the position of the Naun officials resulted in his alienation. Few 
individuals were willing to approach the Russian ambassador and as a result Spafarii lost 
the opportunity to learn Chinese protocol and customs and test the Chinese interest in 
establishing trade without the official repercussions that would result from a faux pas in 
Peking.
Spafarii did make one useful connection during his initial stay in Naun. Through 
liberal use o f presents, Spafarii enlisted the assistance o f an official secretary to translate 
the 1670 Milovanov letter. Spafarii wrote to the Tsar that the letter’s primary request was 
the return o f the Chinese traitor Gantimur and was troubling only in the sense that its’
Ib id .
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address lacked the Tsar’s full array of tities. It had simply stated from “the Bogdikhan to
the White Tsar, greeting!”^ ’* Spafarii went on to explain the Gantimur ::sue in great 
detail. He remarked that since Gantimur was the best of all the tributary Tunguses, being 
remarkably brave and leading a clan of three hundred men, it was unwise to return the 
man. Spafarii also insisted that Gantimur was opposed to being returned to China and 
would commit suicide if the Tsar insisted that he be returned. 202 Spafarii’s analysis o f the 
situation rationalized that the Chinese request was based on fear. He believed the Manchu 
were concerned because of the warlike nature of the Tungus tribes and they anticipated 
that since Gantimur and his clan lived very close to the frontier (at Nerchinsk) and because 
Gantimur held intimate knowledge of the region, he would persuade the Russian Cossacks 
to attack the Chinese.^03
On February 26th, one full month after Spafarii’s arrival in Naun, the Chinese 
representative arrived. Mala, or Askaniama, the official title used when addressing him, 
was greeted with great ceremony at the Naun village. This powerfiil man held the position 
o f Shin-Lang, one o f four vice presidents of the 3rd board, Li Pu, which governed official
201 Ibid.
202 Spafarii had met with the man and assured him that he would never be returned to China. Ibid., 290-
91.
203 Fortunately for Spafarii and Russo-Chincsc relations, Spafarii’s entourage was not afflicted with 
Spafarii’s bigotry and sense of superiority. They continuously talked to the native populations of the land 
they traveled through and gathered information. This included translating the letters Spafarii carried and 
discovering the proper titles for the Emperor and other useful information on the land, people, trade 
goods, and history of China. Ibid.
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ceremonies.204 ft js doubtful that Spafarii recognized the influential position of the 
Askaniama. In fact, in Opisanie Kitaiskavo Gosudararsiva, Spafarii defines Mala’s rank 
as a lowly clerk and plainly views him as a minor character on the political stage. He 
records that Askaniama is of the fourth rank of Chinese nobleman '‘who attend in both 
greater and lesser offices, one or two of them; and they in. those offices or Boards, are as 
our Dumni Diaks inasmuch as the junior clerks write and the seniors correct after which 
the work is revised by the diaks and dumnis.”205
Spafarii was warned of Mala’s importance prior to his arrival. Several Naun 
officials suggested that he should go out to greet this important mandarin. They informed 
Spafarii that the Askaniama was one of the Emperor’s nearest advisors and received all of
the Emperor’s orders directly.206 But Spafarii chose to ignore this advice and remained 
within his residence while Mala entered Naun. He reasoned that in all other countries, 
ambassadors, as representatives of kings, emperors and other omnipotent rulers, were 
visited by lesser men. They were allowed to defer only to the ruler they had com • to see
^ M a y e r ’s Chinese Government indicates that there are a total of six boards from the following 
categories Civil Office, revenue, war, punishment, works and ceremonies. Mala’s rank of Askaniama was 
one of four underlings that served the head of the board and thus held the power to influence the head of 
the department. Mayer also indicates that in the Chinese hierarchy, Mala’s rank was equivalent to lower 
second class-roughly equal to uie Russian Statski Sovietnik (state councilor). Ibid., ix.
205 Ibid.
206j would assume that the phrasing “received all of the Khan’s orders” indicate that Maia is privileged 
with personal audiences with the Emperor and often reports directly to him without reporting to the head, 
of the board of ceremonies. This suspicion is also supported by the appearance of the Emperor’s private 
assistant who visits Mala several times while he is visiting with Spafarii in Peking. Spafarii, “Statcnii 
spisok,” 179.
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and not lowly government officials. Spafarii did, however, acknowledge Mala’s arrival.
He sent a messenger to Mala’s nearby compound to inquire of the health of the two boyar- 
sons he had sent to Peking to announce his impending arrival. Mala graciously responded 
to this request and reciprocated the ill-mannered gesture with his own messenger and 
police inquiry o f Spafarii’s health and well being.207
Shortly following this brief exchange, two Naun officials called upon Spafarii in his 
compound. The oldest of the Naun officials (unnamed), and the youngest, Mangutei, had 
brought further greetings from Mala. Mangutei, who had joined Spafarii in Nerchinsk, 
had traveled to Peking with Milovanov and had recently returned with Mala from the 
capital city, was well known by Spafarii and had been extremely helpful earlier in the 
mission. These two men, on Mala’s behalf, requested that Spafarii visit Mala in his nearby 
compound to exchange welcoming statements. Mangutei carefully explained that while 
hastening to Naun to greet him, Maia had been thrown from his horse, seriously injuring
his leg, and was unable to walk.208
Spafarii distrusted this innocent sounding invitation and refused. He indicated that 
he had witnessed Mala’s arrival and had personally noted that the official was incapable of 
walking. However, since Mala had arrived at Naun in a cart and the Chinese had a custom *2
207 Ibid., 179-80.
2^8 Actually he had fallen from his horse while chasing a hare during a rest break. Ibid.
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of being carried in chairs, Spafarii indicated that Mala could easily be carried to his
compound for a visit.209 Mala refused.
The next day, the two officials returned with another message from Mala. He 
again requested that Spafarii come and visit him in his tent. The reason, Mala stressed, 
was that he had been given strict orders not to visit the Russian ambassador. Therefore, 
since several issues needed to be addressed before Spafarii could continue to Peking, the 
Russian ambassador must come to the Chinese com pound.210 Spafarii again refused and 
explained his rationale in great detail. Not only did such a suggestion breach established
European custom, but the act itself would heap dishonor upon the Tsar.211
Later that same day, the Naun officials returned to Spafarii to deliver a consoling 
statement from Mala. Askaniama, they relayed, understood Spafarii’s position clearly for 
he too faced the same difficulty. He could sympathize with Spafarii’s fear o f disobeying 
his Tsar’s orders. Personally, he faced beheading if he disobeyed the Emperor.
Therefore, Mala proposed a reasonable solution that would not violate either 
representative’s instructions. He suggested that they use his secretary as an intermediary. 
Mala’s secretary could pose his questions and carefully record Spafarii’s responses for
later exam inational 2 jn this manner, the difficult preliminary discussions could be 
achieved. But Spafarii was not satisfied with this solution. He believed Askaniama had
209 Ibid., 180.
210 Ibid.
2 * 1 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddcley, 293-94.
2 *2 2Spafarii, “Statenii spisok,” 179.
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been sent by the Emperor to welcome and address the preliminary issues with the Tsar’s 
representative. To speak to a lesser individual would counter this intention and demean 
the Tsar’s authority and position. Spafarii proclaimed that if he must meet with Mala 
before traveling to Peking, he had to do so face to f a c e ! ^
This reply prompted Mala to action. Spafarii had refused a logical and diplomatic 
solution to both of their problems. He immediately fired back an ultimatum. Spafarii was 
instructed to visit him in a nearby empty house, midway between the two camps. Mala 
named the building an office, to remove the stigma of personal property and assure that 
neither ruler’s dignity was affronted. At this location, Mala would pose his required 
questions. If Spafarii refused this reasonable solution, Mala warned, he would write a 
scathing report to the Emperor indicating that Spafarii was as intractable and obstinate as 
Baikov - 14 Unfortunately, this attempt to cow the Russian ambassador failed. Spafarii 
stubbornly declared that he would not be ordered about like a commoner and refused to 
go near the convenient building.
By February twenty-eighth, both sides recognized the need to cool off heated 
tempers. Each offered the other substantial gifts in an attempt to salvage their mission. 
Mala offered the Russians cheese, vegetables, tea, and pears to supplement the bland 2134
213 Ibid., 181.
214 Ibid., 183.
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Russian supplies. Spafarii contributed a generous gift of liqueurs and medication for
Mala’s injured leg to illustrate his desire to avoid future hostilities.^ 15
Beginning the next day, March first, 1675, discussions began in earnest to resolve 
the location o f the first meeting. Mala offered several solutions. He suggested that the 
Russian ambassador should pitch one of his own tents in an adjacent field where the two
dignitaries could m eet.216 Qr, if this proved unacceptable, the Chinese could prepare an 
area with their own tent, chairs, and table, all scrupulously equivalent. The two dignitaries 
could then approach along two paths and arrive at the same instant, thus assuring neither 
would gain advantage over the other.217 A third proposal v/as to travel to a distant 
village where there were several buildings, all with very wide doors. The two dignitaries 
could dismount before one of these dwellings and enter the building s im u ltan eo u sly .^ ^  
Spafarii refused each of these proposals in turn. He indicated that no Chinese 
suggestion would be acceptable until he personally had delivered the Czar’s letter to the 
E m peror.219 Later after serious consideration, Spafarii preferred his own solution to the 
situation. He suggested that they forget the entire issue and simply begin traveling to 2156*9
215 Ibid., 181.
216 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
2 ^  Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddclcy, 295.
219 Ibid.
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Peking. The required discussions could be accomplished at the first halt along the 
road .220 This way no more time would be lost in Naun.
Unfortunately, this suggestion violated Mala’s instructions. He had been tasked to 
discover Russia’s true intentions in China. Had Russia come to discuss peaceful relations 
or did they conceal a darker, more sinister interest? Was Spafarii’s purpose to scout 
China’s military strength in preparation for a military invasion? Mala’s objective was to 
discover the answers to these difficult questions by carefully interviewing Spafarii. Then, 
after receiving satisfactory answers he was to examine Spafarii’s letter o f introduction and 
official gifts. If Mala found Spafarii’s gifts lacking or suspected Spafarii o f duplicity,
Mala was to turn the Russian diplomat back, hairing his progress eastward, and insuring
he traveled no further into China than Naun.221
This assignment was endangered by Spafarii’s steadfast refusals. Precious time 
was passing and Mala had disci ered only Spafarii’s intractable nature. He began to subtly 
threaten the Russian ambassadi . indicating that he was required to make a full report to 
the Emperor. He warned that his account would detail every Chinese effort to 
accommodate Spafarii and describe the gracious goodwill heaped upon the foreign 
dignitary since his arrival at Nai n. The narration would also record Spafarii’s brazen 201
220 Spafarii, “Statenii spisok,” 182.
221 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddclcy, 295.
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refusals and disagreeable behavior. Mala indicated that this report would be utilized by the
Emperor to decide if Spafarii would be allowed to continue to Peking.222
Mala’s threat was a genuine one. Spafarii had not acquitted himself favorably in 
Naun. He had been unrealistic and difficult. In addition, he had spurned the Chinese 
requests for meeting out of hand, despite the fact that several o f their suggestions were 
completely acceptable by the provisions recorded in his instructions. In a letter to 
Matveev, Spafarii relayed the tribulations of his mission and cited the problems o f dealing 
with the stubborn Chinese officials. He vaguely refers to several other occasions besides 
meeting Mala where similar difficulties were experienced. Spafarii indicates, “there were 
many other arguments between us (the Naun officials), too numerous to write in this 
letter.”223
Spafarii’s response to Mala’s threat was immediate. Panicked, he promptly 
indicated that he was now prepared to meet with Mala. He stipulated that a Russian tent 
would be erected in the open ground between the Russian and Chinese compounds. He
would enter the dwelling and make the final preparations for Mala’s arrival.224 jn this 
manner, Spafarii attempted to maintain the illusion that Mala was visiting him and 
deferring to his stronger position. Furthermore, Spafarii dictated that Mala would have to 234
222 Spafarii, “Stalenii spisok,” 183.
223 Although Spafarii’s journal, official reports and letters do not describe the difficulties Spafarii 
experienced and the confrontation he caused, it is clear from this statement that he understood how 
difficult he was being and how upset he was making the Chinese. Ibid., 182.
224 Ibid., 182-83.
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wait until Spafarii was fully j vcpared to greet him and thus must wait nearby until invited 
to enter.225 This action insured that Spafarii would be viewed as having the superior 
hand and proclaimed his victory in the first clash of political negotiations.
In his journal, Spafarii rationalized his decision, not as fear but rather as a carefully 
planned decision to eliminate growing frustration and dissonance. He indicated that the 
Chinese had become extremely suspicious over his refusal to relinquish his letter of 
introduction. They had claimed the document must bear threats or other unfriendly 
messages. Under increasing pressure from his men to continue the mission and to quell 
the growing mistrust of the Chinese, Spafarii finally agreed to meet Mala. The fact that his 
requirements for this meeting exactly correspond with an earlier Chinese suggestion, 
indicates that he was actually capitulating to the Chinese threat despite his carefully 
worded explanation. 226
With the initial argument decided, the two negotiators settled down to discuss the 
real issues. Unfortunately, the atmosphere had not lost its hostility. Both sides were 
suspicious and extremely wary of the other’s motives. After several minutes o f quiet,
Mala bluntly announced that he was required to open the Tsar’s letter and read it. He 25*
225 Ibid., 183.
22fi Ibid. Spafarii’s instructions provide Spafarii no guidance on political meetings before he reaches the 
capital city. They only explain his response if his efforts to see the Emperor is thwarted. In this case, the 
most applicable information provided by Spafarii’s instructions arc to protect the Tsar’s honor, and to 
capitulate to the desires of the Chinese emperor if the mission is threatened, because Spafarii was 
required to meet with Mala before continuing to Peking, Spafarii could accept a political meeting without 
violating his instructions. All three ofM ala’s final suggestions were based upon equality and ensured 
that the Tsar’s sense of dignity would not be maned. Spafarii needed only to accept the most 
advantageous suggestion and avoid a lengthy and distasteful argument.
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claimed the Emperor had instructed him to ensure that the letter was peaceful and 
contained no hostile threats or disrespectful passages. He informed Spafarii that if he was 
refused, he had no choice but to dismiss Spafarii and send him back to Russia in
disgrace.^27
Spafarii recognized this warning as a empty threat and flippantly replied that Mala 
had not shown Spafarii documentation to prove his authority. Spafarii did not believe that 
Mala had the authority to dismiss a full ambassador of the Russian tsar. In addition, 
Spafarii indicated that Mala’s distrustful and hostile treatment of a personal representative 
of a foreign ruler was disgraceful, and severely questioned the wisdom of proposing
peaceful relations with such a hostile country.228
Five days later, on March 6th, Mala introduced a new topic o f discussion, the 
Amur Basin. Several times, Mala requested to know the Tsar’s response to the Emperor’s 
1670 letter. That addressed the tribute problems created by the Russian Cossacks, and the 
disposition of the Chinese traitor, Gantimur. He wished to discover Russia’s intentions 278
227 Spafarii, “Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddelcy, 295.
228 o f  course Spafarii was unable to provide Mala with his documentation. Since he had been given two 
different sets of letters he would not be able to determine if he should had over the ones proclaiming his 
authority as ambassador or messenger. His instructions did not anticipate that the political discussions 
would begin when Spafarii was several hundred miles from the Emperor. Because Spafarii had not yet had 
the opportunity to present his documentation directly to the Emperor, a direct interpretation of the 
instructions required that no one else would be able to view them. “February 28, 1675 Instructions from 
the Posoloskii [sic] Prikaz to Nikolai G. Spafarii (Milescu) for his embassy to the Chinese Empire,” in 
Dmytryshin, 399. Spafarii often becomes melodramatic in the course of writing to the Tsar. Several 
passages are clearly emphasized in the journal, almost always passages that exalt the Tsar and seem to be 
added into the writing as a precautionary measure to ensure the Tsar would not feel sighted by the manner 
and topic of the discussion. Since Spafarii penned this portion of his journal at least a week, following the 
events, He easily could fabricate the flowery complements to the Tsar within the discussions. Spafarii, 
“Chinese Frontier to River Naun,” in Baddelcy, 296.
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toward this region and discuss preliminary guidelines for negotiating peace. Spafarii, 
however, refused to discuss the Amur. He remarked that he knew nothing of the Amur 
situation and had received no instructions or authority to conduct peace negotiations.229
Spafarii freely admitted that he carried the Milovanov letter which outlined the 
Chinese grievances in the Amur. But, although he held the document, the letter was 
untranslated and its contents were unknown. He explained that one of his many tasks in 
China was to have the document, (and three other official documents from the last 
century) translated and establish a common language for future discourse. Because o f this 
problem, he knew nothing of the Amur problem and could not address the issue 
officially.230 Naturally, Mala did not believe Spafarii’s explanation, but he continued with 
his other tasks, leaving the issue for future debate.
Mala returned to the previous problem, Spafarii’s credentials, and began to discuss 
his requirement to examine the Tsar’s letter and the official gifts for suitability. Spafarii 
was again difficult. He refused to hand over the Tsar’s letter, claiming he was instructed 
to deliver it directly to the Emperor. Spafarii did confide to Mala that he personally knew 
of the letter’s contents and would stake his creditation on the fact that it contained no 
offending passages nor hostilities of any type. It simply indicated Russia’s intent to foster 
peace and friendship. Mala requested that Spafarii put this assurance in writing. But 2930
229 This seems to be a truthful argument. Spafarii was not given any official written instructions 
regarding the Amur basin problem. But since he managed to have a Naun secretary translate the 1670 
letter, and discussed Gantimur’s situation with the man during his voyage, Spafarii was well informed.
230 ibid., 296-97.
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Spafarii refused, indicating that he knew no Chinese and an assurance in Russian that the
Emperor could not read would be worthless.231 Spafarii then allowed Mala to examine 
the falcons, the only presents he carried that could not be easily hidden from view. He 
recorded that Mala seemed taken with the exceptional birds (they are very 1 are in China) 
and was particularly impressed with the white pair.232 The remainder o f his gifts he kept 
hidden and refused to display them to Askaniama.
The next day (March seventh), Mala returned to present his dilemma to Spafarii. 
He had been instructed to report to the Emperor, but he had little positive information to 
report. He had not read the Tsar’s letter, and could not offer any assurances on the 
document’s contents. He had not viewed the official gifts Spafarii carried, except for the 
falcons, and they alone were an insubstantial offering. Additionally, Spafarii had refused 
to provide information on any issue Mala proposed. Even Spafarii’s verbal assurance o f 
the letter’s contents was unsatisfactory because he refused to make an official record. 
Mala stated the ambiguity o f Spafarii’s intentions left him without alternatives. Since, 
Spafarii had not complied with any of his requests, Mala did not have authorization to 
allow him to travel toward Peking. In addition, his orders did not permit him to dismiss 231
2 3 1 He indicated in his letter to the Tsar that the traitorous Russians in China would mistranslate his 
words to the Chinese and thus poison Russia’s attempt to establish relations. Spafarii clearly did not 
desire to have an official written record. At this point, Spafarii knew for certain that Latin priests were in 
Peking and he could have easily complied with Mala’s request by using Latin. Spafarii, “Statcnii spisok,” 
191.
232 Apparently only two of the white falcons remained by the time Spafarii reached China. Spafarii, 
“Tobolsk to Chinese Frontier.” in Baddclcy, 703.
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the Russian ambassador.233 He was required to petition Peking for authorization to 
begin traveling toward the capital. When Spafarii failed to clarify his remarks o f the 
previous day or offer more information for Mala’s report, Mala dispatched a full 
explanation \o  the E m p e r o r . S p a f a r i i ,  Mala declared, would simply have to hope for 
the best.
During the next month, Spafarii and Mala became better aquatinted while they 
waited for a response from Peking. Gifts were freely exchanged and the two diplomats 
developed a grudging respect for each other. Mala was particularly interested in the 
celebration of Easter, which the Russians observed by giving small gifts to the villagers. 
Spafarii personally presented several gilt eggs to the Chinese diplomat as special presents 
from the Russian entourage.235
Shortly following the Easter ceremony, Mala indicated that he had a matter of 
great secrecy to discuss with Spafarii. Mala provided undeniable proof that one of 
Spafarii’s men, a translator originally born in China, was spreading lies ? out the 
Ambassador’s assembly.236 Mala explained that the man, after trying several times to 
receive an audience with him, resorted to telling the townsmen and the Chinese clerks that 
Spafarii’s group was little more than a front. The translator claimed that one hundred 23456
233 Spafarii, “Statcnii spisok,” 191-93.
234 Ibid., 192.
235 Ibid., 193, 194-95.
236 Ibid., 195-97.
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thousand men stood ready in nearby regions for the signal to descend upon the Chinese to 
slaughter and pillage.23 7 Spafarii replied that this same man had come to him earlier in 
the week with a similar story. According to this individual, Mala’s report had been a 
request for Chinese troops to descend upon Spafarii’s group and kill every member o f the 
entourage. Spafarii had ignored this tale and treated the man with contempt. Since no 
country would unnecessarily kill an official ambassador, the man was obviously
mistaken.238
When confronted by Spafarii and Mala, the interpreter explained that he was 
interested in how thv Chinese would respond to such a threat. Spafarii was furious and 
ordered the man to be tortured and executed, but Mala intervened. He asked Spafarii to 
spare the man, at least until he could be returned to Russia. Mala explained that China did 
not want Russian blood spilled on Chinese soil. Spafarii willingly complied with this 
request, but supervised several torture sessions before releasing the man to Milovanov's 
custody for transport to Albazin/39
For the prisoner the issue was over, but Spafarii had to quell the ugly gossip o f an 
impending Russian attack. By April second, it was clear many of the Chinese in Naun 
believed the rumor. Mangutei, the young Voevoda, requested an audience with Spafarii 
and asked if he was expecting anyone from Russia. Spafarii indicated he was not 237*9
237 Ibid., 196.
23  ^ Ibid.
239 Ibid., 197.
114
anticipating anyone, but during the days that followed the question was repeated :t:verai 
times and became more and more insistent.240 Finally on the tenth of April, Spafarii 
suggested that perhaps the Tsar had sent a dispatch to him, or possibly the small group he 
had assigned to travel to Yakustsk to retrieve large walrus tusks had finally completed 
their assignments and returned to the entourage. Spafarii explained that both of these 
groups could not seriously be considered an invasion force, and were barely large enough 
to ensure safety.241
On April twelfth, the mystery was solved. Three men were escorted into Naun to 
meet with Spafarii. One was an official courier from Moscow' carrying a box of carefully 
protected medicines from the Tsar. He was accompanied by a boyar-son from Lena—his 
companion since Moscow—and a Tungus guide from Nerchinsk. After an hour detainment 
with the Voevodas of Naun to determine their motive, the three were allowed to speak to
Spafarii 242 These men indicated that the border Chinese were extremely agitated and 
afraid o f their small group. Despite the fact that their entire group numbered less than 
twenty, the Chinese believed that this band was the promised invasion force and was bent
upon destruction.243 instead, the Oroup proved to be a peaceful courtier detachment 
hurrying to catch Ambassador Spafarii to deliver medicines and prized walrus tusks. 24013
240 Ibid., 198-99.
241 Ibid., 199.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid., 200.
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The next day word arrived from Peking indicating that Spafarii and 150 men would 
be allowed to continue to Peking. Mala personally presented the good news to Spafarii. 
Because arrangements had been made for lodging and transportation all the way to 
Peking, the actual journey should be swift and effortless. Mala indicated they would begin 
traveling during the early morning of April seventeenth and both the Russian and Chinese
camps should begin immediately preparing for the jo u rn e y e d
With great haste, Spafarii’s entourage and Mala’s detachment departed Naun on 
the seventeenth. Traveling swiftly, the group made excellent time for nearly a week. Then 
minor problems began to plague the group. The group’s original pace was too rapid for 
many of the horses, especially Spafarii’s original pack animals which had not fully 
recovered from the stress of winter travel. A large number o f cattie and horses died and 
the group was forced to stop often and rest the exhausted livestock.245 On the morning 
of April twenty-eighth, the group awoke to find that ten of Mala’s horses had spooked 
during the night and were scattered throughout the countryside. The group was forced to 
wait the entire morning while the renegades were rounded up.246
The most eventful incident occurred as the group neared the great city itself. Mala 
halted the group and anxiously explained that an official van was approaching. Proper 2456
244 Ibid., 204.
245 Ibid., 208-09.
246 Ibid., 209.
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protocol demanded that Spafarii, his men, and his Chinese escorts dismount and bow as 
the van passed. But Spafarii had no intention of dismounting. Exhibiting his customary 
stubbornness, he refused to follow Mala’s instructions—especially when he learned that the 
van contained only the Emperor’s letter instead of an important personage. Spafarii did , 
however, make a concession. After arguing the point for several minutes, Spafarii agreed 
to ride off main road, down a short turnoff. This way he was not on the same road as the
official otter and was exempted from performing the customary homage. 247
During the tedious journey from Naun, Mala and Spafarii became better 
acquainted and spent many long hours in idle discussion. Mala used the opportunity to 
educate Spafarii on Chinese customs, proper protocol, and the Chinese viewpoint. He 
informed Spafarii that he must give up the Tsar’s letter to the “officer o f State” as soon as 
he reached the capital. The letter needed to be translated and its information analyzed 
before the document could be offered to the Emperor. Only after the Emperor had 
accepted the Tsar’s letter could Spafarii be presented to him and the other tasks
addressed.248 Spafarii disputed this custom with Mala for many miles, claiming that it 
was contrary to established European protocol and completely unacceptable. He ignored 
Mala’s warning that without following Chinese customs he would be dismissed like Fedor 
Baikov and his mission would fail.249 24789
247 Ibid., 217-18.
248 Ibid., 218.
249 Ibid.
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Mala and Spafarii finally reached Peking on May fifteenth, 1675. As a foreign 
dignitary, Spafarii was assigned to a wide courtyard near the palace in which to establish 
his camp. This particular courtyard had been used previously by representatives from 
Holland and the Netherlands and most recently by the Portuguese. Although the grounds 
themselves were run-down and dilapidated, Spafarii was not overly dismayed with the 
state of his accommodations. The courtyard provided ample room to pitch the 
entourage’s tents and Spafarii and his men were well used to their spartan 
accommodations after fourteen and a half months on the road from Moscow.250 Spafarii 
was however, extremely upset by the contingent of armed guards that ringed the Russian’s 
enclosure. Although thr Chinese indicated the guards were there to protect the Russians 
and ensure thieves and cutthroats did not prey upon the visiting group, Spafarii concluded 
the guards were really to keep a close watch upon his men and their activities, and to
ensure that all contact with the Chinese was officially sanctioned.251
Once Spafarii and his men were settled into their compound, Mala and his assistant 
visited the Russian ambassador to reopen the issue of the Tsar’s letter. Mala explained 
that Spafarii should not be surprised that official correspondence was presented to the Li 
Fan Yuan before ambassadors were granted audiences with the Emperor. He carefully 
asserted that the official documents needed to be preexamined before being handled by the 
Emperor. It was necessary to ensure errors in greeting and impolite wording was 2501
250 Ibid., 222.
251 Ibid., 231.
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removed before being viewed by the most powerful person in the Chinese civilization. He 
revealed that the custom of surrendering the letter was established centuries ago when the
Emperor received a discourteous and insulting document.252 Mala maintained that the 
custom could not be revoked and to alter it after all these years would not only insult the 
rulers and ambassadors of other countries—primarily the Portuguese and the Dutch— but 
would compromise the honor and respect of the Emperor in the eyes o f neighboring
sta tes.253 Mala concluded his explanation by comparing the present situation with a 
pervious visit by Baikov twenty years before. He insinuated that like Baikov, Spafarii 
could easily be dismissed unless he willingly presented the document to the proper 
officials. In addition, Mala informed Spafarii that tentative arrangements were being made 
for a personal audience with the Emperor, but unless Spafarii immediately relinquished the 
letter, the audience would be canceled.254
Spafarii, ever obstinate, refused to accept Mala’s prudent rendition o f the current 
situation. Ignoring Mala’s narration, Spafarii steadfastly reiterated his position. He felt 
that because accepting both the ambassador and the letter together was a world-accepted 
custom, to ignore the practice would greatly insult the Tsar and indicate that he was 
inferior to the Chinese ruler. To Spafarii, altering the Chinese custom could not be 
interpreted as dishonorable, because as he maintained, the Tsar was a greater ruler than all 2534
252 Ibid., 223.
253 Ibid., 224.
254 Ibid., 225.
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the others who had visited China. Since the other countries realized Russia’s superior 
position in the world’s hierarchy, they would not be insulted if the Chinese granted 
Russia’s small request. Even more importantly, Spafarii argued, Russia was more 
important to China than the lesser European countries. Russia was a good deal closer 
than the Roman Caesar and the Turkish Sultan and could offer China economic as well as 
military benefits.255
In conclusion, Spafarii suggested that since the Tsar was invited to be friends by 
the Chinese emperor’s 1654 message, the acceptance of the Tsar’s letter according to 
European custom would intensify the Emperor’s glory and strength. Friendship with so 
powerful a neighbor, Spafarii explained, would make China’s allies rejoice and her 
enemies trem ble.256 Unfortunately for Russia, Spafarii’s desire was clearly exposed. If 
the Chinese revamped their customary protocol to suit the Russian entourage, Russia 
would gain a great deal of power and prestige in the negotiations to come 3nd in their 
relative place in the European world.
The decided reluctance on the Chinese pan to alter their customs and accept this 
logic infuriated Spafarii. Angrily, he outlined an ultimatum The Chinese could either 
allow him to deliver his letter as he was instructed or dismiss him as they had threatened 
earlier. There was o f course a third option. The Chinese could take the letter by force, *256
^ S p a fa r ii certainly must have realized that Russia docs not rank ahead of the rest of Europe at this point 
in history. He was either embellishing the truth to reach his goal or he was embellishing his account of 
the argument to impress the Tsar and further bolster the Tsar’s opinion of him. Ibid., 222-23.
256 Ibid., 223.
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but Spafarii was violently opposed to this alternative and, as he informed Mala, an
altercation would result in certain bloodshed. ^ 57 Mala chose none o f these options. 
Instead, he decided to introduce the President of his board, Alikhamba, to the negotiations
and patiently readdress points of difficulty with a higher authority.258
Mala also introduced a second man to the negotiations, a Jesuit priest named 
Ferdinand Verbiest.259 During the previous discussions, communications had been 
extremely poor. Spafarii spoke no Mandarin or Manchu and the few translators that 
accompanied him were largely illiterate and limited in vocabulary and understanding. 
Likewise the Chinese translators spoke different dialects than the Tungus guides and often 
faced serious difficulties exchanging the simplest ideas. Conversations had to be repeated 
three or four times to ensure the gist of the dialogue was understood. To solve this 
difficulty and introduce a more convincing negotiator into the argument, Mala brought 
Verbiest to Spafarii’s compound.
Ferdinand Verbiest occupied an unusual position in the Chinese government.
Acting as a confidential adviser, translator and honored guest, Verbiest was extremely well 
respected and fairly powerful for a foreigner. He had arrived in China in 1659 and had 
traveled extensively through the southern region as he converted the Chinese to 
Christianity. In 1660, the elderly Jesuit priest, Adam Schall, recommended the youngster 257*9
257 Ibid., 224-25.
2^8 Spafarii apparently did not know his name. The proper title is Alikha Amba. Ibid., 225.
259 Ibid., 226.
121
to replace him as the head of the Mathematics board, a body that studied astrology, 
mathematics and other issues of science. 260 jn a short time, Verbiest became an 
indispensable and valued member of the young Emperor’s inner council. He assisted the
Emperor in learning Manchu261 and instnicted him in the inner-workings o f the 
Mathematics board. As a valued confidant, the Emperor had personally confirmed 
Verbiest’s rank and position in the Chinese court and he was clearly a privileged court
favorite. 26^
Verbiest’s arrival simplified the negotiations. With his assistance, discussions
could be concluded in Latin without fear of misunderstanding or insult. 263 Exact 
translations o f official titles and documents were possible and the current dispute could be 
resolved without further language frustration. However, Verbiest’s entry into the
negotiations did not guarantee a solution.264 Mala discovered that even if Spafarii could 
be convinced to relinquish his letter, it was unclear whether he would be willing to 260*
260 Ibid.
2^ ! Although the Emperor was Manchu by birth, he had been fostered in the capital and had undoubtedly 
been educated in the language of the Chinese govcmmcnt-Chinesc instead of his native tongue. Ibid., 
226-27.
262 Ibid.
2°-hn fact this is what the government hoped for when they appointed Spafarii. His Latin skills were of 
the utmost importance because of the probabilities of meeting the Jesuits in China. Ibid.
2^4 in addition to his language ability', Verbiest brought his knowledge of the Chinese government into 
the discussion and provided invaluable information to Spafarii during the course of the negotiation. He 
informed Spafarii that Mala had lied when he indicated that the Emperor did not know of the difficulty' of 
presenting the letter at the board. In fact, he informed Spafarii that three separate times he had witnessed 
Mala and the Alikhamba reporting the lack of progress. The Emperor had commanded that all the 
ancient records should be reviewed to see if a precedent existed for him to receive Spafarii’s credentials 
himself. Ibid., 236-37.
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kowtow. He desired assurances that if an agreement on the letter was reached, Spafari* 
would accede to the ancient act of homage. Spafarii classified the kowtow as a separate 
argument, and refused to discuss the topic until the disposition of the letter was 
settled. 265
After fourteen days of heated debate, Mala presented the following solution.
The great Emperor, honoring the Tsar’s majesty above all other sovereigns, 
his embassy beyond all other that have ever been here, has commanded to 
have a place prepared; and at that place will be gathered mandarins and 
most intimate counselors and to-marrow, at the first hour, horses will be 
sent and all the Tsar’s gifts will be put on little tables which will be carried 
before you, either by your own people, or ours, as you may prefer. After 
that all three versions of the Tsar’s letter will be carried in your fashion , 
whatever that may be, and when you reach the {forbidden} city , a place 
will be ready, facing the Emperor’s throne; and there you will set down the
letters; and the gifts will be set close by. The first Kolai266wju be there, he 
who rules the Chinese empire, who is moreover a relative o f the Emperor, 
when you have handed over the Tsar’s letter and gifts without a word, you 
will go back to your lodging; but be it known that in front o f the Emperor’s 
palace there is a stone column, on which is written the Emperor’s name and 
when the Emperor’s brother, or any other Mandarin comes to that column 
he has to dismount.2^7
Spafarii disliked the condition that he dismount at the pillar but agreed on the 
stipulation that it was “their inveterate custom, and they were not merely inventing it for 265*
265 Spafarii, “Slatenii spisok,” 248.
266 A Kolia is the E.nperor's immediate administrators-councilors of the first rank--and were the true
administrators of the realm
262 S p a fa r ii , “ S p a th a r y  in  P e k in g ,” in  B a c d c lc y ,  3 5 0 .
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his benefit, to make him go on foot.“268 He insisted that he and his men be provided 
with horses in order to ride to that point. Finally., after confirming that the Koiai offered a 
higher honor than the Emperor’s brother, Spafarii agreed to nearly all of Mala’s 
conditions. The one remaining area of contention was the presentation o f the gifts. In the 
end, Spafarii decided to allow the gifts tc be carried before his procession on small tables 
so they were immediately at hand during the audience, but he accepted that no formal
presentation would be allowed.269
This agreement left several items ambiguous. For example, the description implied 
that the Emperor would be present. For Spafarii to make his formal presentation facing 
the throne would seem sensible only if the chair were occupied. Secondly, the Chinese’s 
presentation of the arrangements indicated that this procession would be a special 
consideration. Spafarii was being allowed to act in a manner different from other visiting 
dignitaries. In reality, the arrangements were identical-including Spafarii’s location—to 
the practice established for lesser princes delivering tribute and offering fidelity to the 
Emperor.270 Third and finally, the agreement implied that although the Koiai would 
receive the letter, he would then immediately deliver it into the Emperor’s own hand. The 
implication was that it would be handed to the Emperor during the same ceremony. 2689*
268 Spafarii, “Stalcnii spisck,” 249.
269 Spafarii’s agreement is unusually meek. He failed to provide an explanation of his reasoning. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese provided him with an ultimatum and he concluded 
that unless he agreed his mission would end disastrously. Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking," in Baddcley,
350.
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On June fifth, Spafarii delivered the Tsar’s letter to the Kolai. According to 
Spafarii’s account of the event in Statenii Spisok, he and a small number of men rode to 
the Emperor’s pillar and dismounted. With the official gifts and letter proudly displayed 
before them, the group traveled to the assembly. Spafarii ceremoniously presented the
document and returned to his compound without a single comment.271 Unfortunately 
this account of the events is extremely suspect.
In Spafarii’s official journal, the page that describe the events o f June fifth is 
missing. Chin suggests the page was tom out perhaps to protect the size o f Spafarii’s 
misunderstanding.272 The j esuit priest, Grimaldi, recorded the incident and indicated 
that the Tsar’s letter was opened and read aloud during the assembly.273 To make matters 
worse, the Emperor was not present, and so the entire court heard the Tsar’s greeting and 
message o f goodwill before the Emperor had glimpsed the document. Despite these 
problems, Spafarii seemed pleased with the procession. His position seemed to be 
honored above other visiting ambassadors and Mala had promised an audience with the 
Emperor for the following day.274 271*
271 Ibid., 249.
272During Spafarii’s homeward journey, his men brought charges against him for his behavior in Peking.
Because Aleksei died while Spafarii was abroad, Spafarii had lost his main supporter and the men could 
safely claim Spafarii was a traitor and blame him for the mission’s failure. The tme events of the meeting 
could be incriminating to an unsympathetic council. Chin, 102.
27  ^Philippo Maria Grimaldi. Spafarii, “Spathaiy in Peking,” in Baddclcy. 352.
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Now that the disposition of the Tsar’s letter was finished, Spafarii turned his 
attention to the upcoming audience. As his first opportunity to greet and speak openly 
with the Chinese emperor, Spafarii wanted to ensure that this ceremony would follow 
closer along 'nv e..n lines. He asked Mala if the Emperor would request the status of 
the Tsar’s health during the audience. Mala indicated that he felt the Emperor would ask 
after the Tsar’s heath during the audience, but if not, the Emperor would most likely take 
Spafarii aside for a private audience and inquire after the Tsar’s health and several other
things that had sparked his interest.775 Spafarii responded positively to Mala’s reassuring 
statement. He commented that it would be acceptable if the Emperor asked about the 
Tsar’s health after the audience, but it would be preferable if he did so during the event 
“when I see his eyes for the first time.”276 He asked Mala if he could request for the 
Emperor to address the issue during the audience instead o f afterwards.
Mala indicated that it would be unwise to make such a presumptuous request. He 
explained that it was urgent not to “damage the Khan’s friendly inclination toward the
Tsar.”277 The j esujt also confirmed this sentiment. He mentioned that formal requests 
were viewed suspiciously. It would be much better if the request were made informally 
through the Emperor’s valet. Verbiest explained that the young man who had often 
entered Spafarii’s compound to deliver messages to Mala and himself was the Emperor’s 2756
275 Ibid., 252.
276 Ibid., 253.
277 ibid.
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personal valet and messenger. He could be relied upon to present Spafarii’s position fairly 
for the Emperor’s consideration.278 27980* Using this method, Verbiest explained, the young 
boy had requested and received permission for him to freely visit the Russian compound
without restriction.2^9
The next day (June sixteenth), Spafarii and twenty men were taken to the 
enormous courtyard where the Emperor held audiences. In the Pavilion o f Purple Light, 
while Spafarii waited for the Emperor to appear, Verbiest joined his party. He explained 
that he was assigned to assist Spafarii in understanding the required rituals and to instruct 
him on performing the kowtow. (Spafarii had refused to practice the maneuver whenever 
the Chinese attempted to instruct him on the proper form.) Spafarii and Verbiest watched 
as a large group of nearly fifty Chinese repetitively performed the kowtow. Verbiest 
explained that these men had just been made Mandarins by the Emperor and their 
ceremony had been scheduled to offer Spafarii the opportunity to observe the ritual 
kowtow before performing it in front of the Emperor.280
When Spafarii’s audience began, he approached the Emperor with Verbiest and his 
twenty men arranged behind him.281 Court attendants struck the ground three times with 
triple strokes. A bell rang, music played, drums sounded, and the order “bow down” rang
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
280 Spafarii, “Spalhary in Peking,” in Baddclcy, I'io-CO.
28 * This location was located 980 feel from the Emperor’s position. Neither Spafarii nor his men could 
see the Emperor or even the location of his throne because of the overall height of the dais and the 
enclosure of the Pavilion of Purple Light. Ibid., 360.
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across the courtyard. Instead of performing the slow, stately ritual the Mandarins had 
executed earlier, Spafarii bowed rapidly, refusing to touch the ground or slow his action. 
The surrounding officials were outraged and chastised the Russian ambassador. They 
implored him to honor the dignity of the Emperor, but Spafarii stubbornly declined.282 2834 He 
venomously refused to alter his method, indicating that the Mandaiins are “the servants 
and slaves of the Emperor and are able to worship in this way—but we are not his servants 
and bow in our own fashion”. 283
Spafarii and Verbiest then proceeded forward, walking slowly and deliberately 
across the courtyard despite the continuous urgings by the Chinese officials to run. When 
finally they reached the receiving room, they were seated approximately fifty-six feet from 
the throne, where they could easily view the Emperor and the royal court. Mala joined 
Spafarii and quietly pointed out the Emperor’s brothers and other high officials. Tea was 
shared and music played in the background but no official words were exchanged.284 
The audience was clearly a formal event and Spafarii was supposed to be honored simply 
by sharing the Emperor’s presence.
The discussions on the seventeenth of June began with heated complaints o f the 
previous day’s audience. Both Spafarii and Verbiest protested loudly to Mala, indicating 
that the treatment of the Tsar’s embassy was beneath the dignity of the Emperor. They
282 Spafarii, “Statcnii spisok,” 259-60.
283 Ibid., 259.
284 Ibid., 261.
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argued that the Dutch envoy had been better treated than Spafarii and was granted an 
immediate personal audience with the Emperor. The Tsar’s stature and position required
at least equivalent treatment.285 Mala responded that the previous day’s audience was 
formal and primarily for appearances. Soon the Emperor would grant a personal audience 
and this grievance would be forgotten. In the meantime, Mala had arranged trading rights
for Spafarii.286 Chinese traders would be allowed to enter the Russian’s compound to 
negotiate and trade with the visiting Russians. The compound guards were responsible for 
maintaining comprehensive lists chronicling all goods taken in or out of the enclosure.
Mala explained that the lists must be maintained to ensure that the Chinese traders did not
attempt to cheat the Emperor’s honored guests.287
At this point, Spafarii allowed Mala to examine the four official correspondences 
that Russia had collected over the last fifty years.288 He had attempted several times to 
receive an unofficial translation of these documents as he traveled to Peking, but the 
Chinese officials (save for the Naun secretary) recognized the documents as letters o f the 
Emperor and refused. A partial translation Spafarii acquired from a semi-literate soldier 
was unreliable. Without a dependable translation, Spafarii’s instructions indicated he was *
785 Spafarii Led brought :he records of the previous Dutch and Portuguse embassies with him to review. 
Mala responded to his accusations by claiming the Dutch had lied in their account. Spafarii, “Spatharv in 
Peking,” in Pr-fdelcy, 361.
786 ibid. Upon Spafarii’s initial entry into Peking, he began an intensive argument over trading rights. 
The Chinese custom was to allow traders and caravans to trade openly. But official ambassadorial 
missions were denied this privilege. As political representives, the Chinese argued, Spafarii and men were 
here to discuss affairs of state, not haggle prices and amass goods.
787 Spafarii, “Statenii spisok,” 262.
788 ibid., 263.
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to acquire one from the Chinese officials. However, Spafarii also felt to documents were 
the personal property c f  the Tsar and he refused to allow them to leave his possession. 
Mala was forced to cal! in an old Chinese scribe to cope and translate the documents. The 
two oldest documents were immediately translated and presented to Spafarii, but. the 
newer more pertinent documents were simply copied. Their contents were not made clear 
to Spafarii until several weeks later.289
Despite these thorny issues and the suspicion it heaped on the Russian ambassador, 
the next few weeks passed quietly and without difficulty. Verbiest visited nearly every 
day, merchants were allowed into the compound to trade, and discuss goods, but they 
were searched upon their departure. Mala reported the Emperor was now deliberating and
preparing his written response to the Tsar’s letter.290 Arid as the days passed, he 
continuously made small requests to satisfy the Emperor’s curiosity about the Russians. 
For example, the Emperor had seen one of Spafarii’s paintings o f Christian saints and 
asked if Spafarii had a painter with him who could paint the likeness o f Chinese 
personages. 291 On another occasion, he asked if a Russian could demonstrate how to 
make slippers.292 Several times, he requested that Spafaiii’s men be allowed to perform 
swimming demonstrations for the Emperor’s amusement.293 28901
289 ibid
290 Ibid., 266-67.
291 Ibid., 267.
292 He wanted a pair made from soft glazed leather (Moroccan leather) that was normally made into red 
or yellow Turkish style slippers. Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddclcy, 365.
292 Spafarii, “Statcnii spisok,” 291.
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On July nineteenth, Spafarii was finally allowed to dine with the Emperor. He 
asked after the Emperor’s health exactly as the Prikaz officials had planned. When the 
Emperor returned the question, Spafarii responded with the boastful speech his 
instructions required. The events that followed this official exchange are unfortunately 
lost. The Chinese viewed the occasion as minor and made no official records o f the 
encounter. Spafarii, on the other hand, wrote several pages in his journal. But these 
enlightening pages are missing and details of the dinner are unknown.294
After this dinner, however, Spafarii rapidly lost favor with both the Emperor and 
the Chinese officials. Although this decision was not sudden, Spafarii was never well- 
liked in Peking. He was only tolerated as the Russian official ambassador. From the very 
beginning, Spafarii required coercion, flattery, wheedling, and excessive amounts o f 
arguing to provided the simplest information or to agree to the smallest ritual. For 
example, it required Mala tv/enty-six days of pleading and arguing to view Spafarii’s 
credentials and ensure that he was in fact an official Russian representative. Even during 
the period that Spafarii held the Emperor’s curiosity, he was impossible. To the 
Emperor’s request that Spafarii have a portrait made of himself, Spafarii replied that he
was too tired and the Emperor would have to wait for the painting.295
294it is easy to anticipate that a conflict or confrontation must have occurred to account for the Chinese 
response, but it is entirely possible that Spafarii was well mannered and submissive. The pages could 
have teen removed to ensure that he could not be accused of demeaning the Tsar’s dignity. The issue of 
the nussing pages has never been fully examined and the reason for their absence remains a mystery. 
Spaft.rii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddelcy, 388. Spafarii, 296.
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As each day of Spafarii’s six-month stay in China passed, Spafarii discovered new 
arguments to present to the Chinese officials or chose to flaunt a time-honored Chinese 
custom. The disrespectful and callous mannerisms Spafarii displayed at the formal 
audience were typical of his actions, and the Chinese officials gradually stopped hiding 
these petty arguments from the Emperor.
Spafarii’s Cossacks did little to assist the situation. Numerous quarrels broke out 
between Spafarii’s men and several of the guards and gatemen. Although initially not 
violent, the disagreeable actions of the Cossacks were mentioned to Spafarii as 
unnecessary and vulgar. Several men apparently escaped from the compound and 
wandered throughout the city without guard or escort. Spafarii blamed the incident on 
the restrictive provision that kept his men with the compound.296 To solve this difficulty, 
Mala arranged for Spafarii’s men to be escorted into Peking in groups o f twenty to trade 
and look at the vast city.297 But these supervised excursions were not enough for the 
riotous, barbarous Cossacks. They returned complaining that they had only been allowed 
to trade in one store and were denied the opportunity to visit entertainment
776 Ambassadors and other dignitaries were housed in compounds that enclosed their entire entourage. 
This ensured the diplomats’ safety and ensured their isolation. Traders from neighboring countries, 
however, were allowed to trade freely and travel throughout the city at will. It was Chinese custom that 
traders be allowed free trade in the streets of Peking, but ambassadors, entrusted with official business, 
were carefully guarded and isolated. Spafarii concluded that the Chinese real motivation was to inflate 
the prices of their own goods while forcing the Russians to accept relatively low prices for theirs. The 
Chinese obviously resold the goods on the general market and lined their pockets with the profits. 
Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddcley, 381.
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establishments. As a result, the Cossacks continued to escape through the compound’s 
fence at night and create drunker, disturbances in the streets.298
On the twenty-sixth, Mala requested that Spafarii address his men. It was
becoming extremely difficult to hide the Cossacks’ activities from the Emperor.299 j w0 
days later, after no progress was made, Mala’s supervisor, the president o f the 
Ceremonies Board, informed Spafarii that his men were attacking the Chinese guards that 
ringed the compound and were beating them. These men then departed into the city to 
cause mischief. Spafarii openly lied to this official and implied that he had not heard of 
this problem before. He promised that in the future, his Cossacks would remain within the
compound and not travel outside of it without their guards.30°
By the thirteenth of August, the Chinese officials began to make departure 
preparations for Spafarii. He was instructed to travel to the palace to receive the 
Emperor’s gifts to the Tsar. True to form, Spafarii flaunted traditional Chinese custom.
He refused to fall upon his knees to accept the presents. He claimed that slaves and 
subjects accepted gratuities from their sovereigns in that manner and that it was
unacceptable for him to accede to this custom.301 No amount o f reasoning, pleading or 
intimidation could alter his position. Spafarii was sent back to his compound while Mala 
and the other officials discussed Spafarii’s latest departure from customs. Two days later, 298301
298 Chin, 42.
299 Spafarii, “Statenii spisok,” 300.
300 Ibid., 301.
301 Ibid., 307-08.
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Spafarii was again brought to the palace and allowed to accept the gifts without kneeling. 
However, the Chinese’s disgust and displeasure was clearly evident. The official gifts 
were piled at one side of the room and there was no ritual or ceremony involved. The 
Chinese did not hand the gifts to Spafarii and required his men to lift and carry each item 
back to the compound.302
Within two weeks of this occurrence, Spafarii was dismissed from Peking. On 
August twenty-ninth, Spafarii returned to the palace to receive the Emperor’s letter for the 
Tsar and to hear the parting farewell. The Chinese implored him to kneel to hear the 
Emperor’s written message, but Spafarii refused. The angry uproar o f the Chinese 
officials at this refusal stunned Spafarii and he dropped to his knees in sh ock .303 The 
Kolai delivered the Emperor’s message and Mala translated the dreadful news for Spafarii.
The Emperor does not choose to write any answer the Tsar for two 
reasons. First because you have been disobedient, refusing to accept the 
gifts for your sovereign lord on your knees, as do the other envoys of 
neighboring monarchs; nor indeed does anyone dare to impugn that 
custom; Secondly, even if the Emperor chose to write to the Tsar, his only 
real object is to have Gantimur sent here, and that was stated in his former 
letter...More that that~in future, we will have neither letter, nor
ambassadors, nor envoys, nor merchants from the land o f the Tzar. 304
302 Ibid., 311.
3^* 3 Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddeley, 403.
3®4 Spafarii, “Statcnii spisok,” 315. Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddeley, 385.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND REALITIES
Spafarii’s mission can only be labeled a failure. Since he was originally sent to 
China to accomplish two primary goals, establishing friendly relations to facilitate further 
communication and negotiating a trade agreement, his inability to accomplish either issue 
confirms that the entire mission failed to meet its objective. Spafarii’s attempts to impose 
European protocol and procedures on the Chinese resulted in widespread animosity and 
resulted in his unceremonious dismissal from Peking. His efforts to lay the foundation for 
trade faired little better. Hindered by the Chinese dictum that political ambassadors were 
forbidden to trade, Spafarii’s efforts to develop a dialogue on the subject were ineffective 
and he was unable to engage Mala in meaningful negotiation. But why was Spafarii 
unable to complete his mission? Was it due to an inherent incompatibility o f two distinct 
cultures and political systems, or factors aligned more closely to the mission itself— 
Spafarii’s inflexible instructions and the lack of information on the Amur basin issue? Or 
could it have been the insensible, intractable, insulting nature of the Russian ambassador? 
While all o f these factors heavily influenced the mission’s outcome, it was Spafarii’s 
conscious decision to spurn the Chinese, their customs, and the entire negotiation process 
that ultimately resulted in his removal from Peking.
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In every international political confrontation, cultural differences play a major 
role. Incorporating small items, such as words without parallel meanings, or giant issues 
like opposing religious views, cultural differences account for the majority of difficulties 
experienced by political negotiators. But cultural confrontations are a daily challenge for a 
skilled ambassador, and a talented individual can compensate for nearly any extreme in 
viewpoint. Spafarii’s mission should have been no different. Although the Chinese 
culture that Spafarii faced was radically different than his own, room did exist for 
compromise. On several occasions when it seemed that no agreement could be reached, 
the Chinese negotiator attempted to discover a solution that was acceptable to both 
parties. For example, at Naun, Spafarii refused to hand Mala his official correspondence 
so he could determine if unintentional offenses were made. Mala was willing to accept 
Spafarii’s written assurance of the contents of the Tsar’s co rresp o n d e n c e .-^  On another 
occasion, Spafarii refused to kneel, explaining that the action was beneath the Tsar’s 
stature. (He also claimed that it was raining and the area where the Chinese officials 
desired him to kneel was extremely muddy.) The next day, Mala arranged for Spafarii to
carry out his business without kneeling. ^06
Although some allowances were made to accommodate Spafarii, other customs 
were inviolate. The kowtow and the receipt of the official correspondence by the Chinese 
court were two events that could not be avoided. Despite Spafarii’s lengthy arguments 3056
305 Ibid., 187-88.
306 Ibid., 306-07.
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against them, he was required to perforin these actions to accomplish his mission.^07
Some question does remain about the malleability of these customs. If Spafarii had 
been more accommodating and willing to negotiate compromise earlier in his mission, 
what creative middle ground could Mala have arranged in the interest o f peace and 
political harmony? The evidence indicates that China was extremely interested in ensuring 
that Russia’s peaceful mission was successful. Since China desired peace in the Amur 
basin, Mala was obviously instructed to be as accommodating as possible to the Russian 
ambassador. In Naun, Mala’s tremendous efforts to arrange first a meeting location and 
then means to accomplish his mission without violating Spafarii’s instructions demonstrate 
the Chinese interest in concluding an agreement.3 08
In addition, two separate events support the conclusion that without Spafarii’s 
demanding and insulting approach, the Chinese were interested in negotiating with the 
Russians. The first item developed from the Chinese actions immediately following the 
Emperor’s declaration that all contact be severed. Recognizing that the Russian 
ambassador was the primary problem, the Chinese officials stripped Spafarii of authority 
and asked his men directly if they would accept the Emperor’s letter and follow all 
Chinese customs. Ignoring Spafarii’s warnings that to accept the document on their knees 
would bring dishonor to the Tsar, the men agreed to carry the Emperor’s message.3*^ 30789
307Ibid„ 249-50, 258-61.
308 Ibid., 179-84.
309 Spafarii, “Spathary in Peking,” in Baddelcy, 389. Th next day Spafarii atter <ted to explain his 
actions of the past several months to his men by showing them his instructions. Unlortunatcly for
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The Chinese officials’ willingness to continue communications with Russia and their 
inventive idea o f presenting the Rusrian Cossacks with official communications indicate 
that the primary stumbling block was not the Chinese, or the issues, but raiher the Russian 
ambassador.
The issues themselves present the second incident. The pressing nature o f the 
Russian desire to trade, and the continuing interest in the Amur basin conflict, prompted a 
second ambassadorial mission to China. This mission, occurring jusi fourteen years after 
the first, was tasked with a comparable assignment—establish trade and negotiate an end to 
conflict in the Amur basin. From the beginning, it was obvious that this mission would be 
very different from the first. Peter Golovin, Russia’s chosen ambassador, adopted a less 
abrasive approach and attempted to be extremely reasonable when dealing with the 
Chinese. He was instructed to be eloquent and utilize friendly persuasion to accomplish 
his mission. The result was success. Golovin was able to negotiate a fledgling trade 
agreement and a peaceful settlement of the Amur basing 10
Golovin’s success however, indicated only that the Chinese had no reservations 
about negotiating with the Russians. It does not guarantee that if Golovin had been 
assigned the 1675 mission, he would have been as successful. Although the cultural 
climate changed very little in fourteen short years, the political atmosphere had become 310
Spafarii, the men believed that Spafarii had acted in.properly during his mission and were no longer 
interested in following his leadership. They would bring formal charges of dishonorable conduct against 
him as soon as they reached Russian soil. Baddclcy, 389.
310Mancall, 141.
138
pressing. Russia was being steadily drawn into a European effort to eliminate the power 
of the Tatars and could not afford to continue her armed occupation of the Amur. The 
Amur basin dispute, not even considered an issue during Spafarii’s mission, had become 
Russia’s central concern in Far Eastern Politics. There were other differences cs well. 
Golovin was not exposed to the rigid protocol and customs of the Chinese capital. 
Instead, he met Chinese negotiators at Nerchinsk and avoided the difficulties o f an official
presentation to the Emperor.311 In addition, the Chinese negotiators were not Chinese. 
They were Jesuit priests chosen especially by the Chinese officials to ensure that the
cultural misunderstandings and difficulties experienced by Spafarii were avoided.3 12
Many historians would argue that the rigid instructions, or the Russian’s failure to 
address the Amur basin issue, played a vital role in Spafarii’s failure. But despite 
Spafarii’s rigid interpretation of the instructions and his failure to address the Amur basin 
issue, Spafarii seemed to be well accepted in China during the early portion o f his mission. 
In spite of his insistence on maintaining Russian protocol, Spafarii did manage to receive 
an audience with the Emperor and establish a dialogue with high ranking officials. He 
received translated copies o f the four official documents received during the last half 
century from China and established Latin as the official language for future 
communication. Spafarii even collected an impressive array of Chinese goods and 
gathered a great deal of information about the country for use in future contacts. 312
311 Ibid., 143-45.
312 Chin, 91-92.
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Conceivably, Spafarii could have accomplished a trade agreement despite the absence of
the Amur basin discussion and his adherence to his instructions.3 ^
True, Spafarii’s instructions in their original form were limiting, strict and 
dogmatic. They presented little leeway and flexibility for negotiations, and could easily 
become an enormous barrier to a successful mission. But these instructions also contained 
room for interpretation. By taking certain liberties with the wording and paying dose 
attention to Russia’s intention, Spafarii’s straight-laced instructions become extremely 
workable. Although little could be done regarding the lack o f direction on the Amur basin 
topic, the customary demands and rituals of Russian protocol and customs could be neatly 
sidestepped. By libera.ly applying the clause regarding mission failure, Spafarii could 
have interpreted the increasing hostility over, for example, the decision o f a meeting 
location in Naun cr the argument over the early review of the Tsar’s letter as threatening 
the mission’s success and ignored the stringent requirements written in his instructions.
Unfortunately Spafarii was not the type to take liberties with interpretation. While 
the instructors were clearly written to maintain Russian custom and thus the Tsar’s 
honor, the intention of the document indicated that the successful conclusion o f the trade 
agreement and establishing positive relations were the higher priority. Spafari’s refusal to 
liberally interpret his instructions, and his determination to follow the exact letter o f the 
document, eliminated his flexibility and destroyed his opportunity to carry on negotiation. 
But Spafarii’s interpretation of the instructions were not the worst aspect o f his mission. 31
313 Ibid.,74-75.
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Even a steadfast, yet uncooperative individual could have successfully opened a dialogue 
between the two empires, and although it may have not established a trade agreement, a 
greater understanding of both countries’ customs could have eventually been established. 
But Spafarii’s mission was destined to travel the path of conflict. His insolent and superior 
manner created conflict beyond the disagreements caused by culture, and 
misinterpretation.
Spafarii’s primary difficulty resulted when he became intractable, flaunting Chinese 
customs and refusing to listen to the arguments presented by Chinese officials. His 
behavior at the formal audience, for example, when he refused to kowtow properly or 
slow his substituted bow to a stately and dignified pace, not only demonstrated his insolent 
behavior, but insulted and disgraced the Chinese officials responsible for his actions.314 
His continuous refusals to accept reasonable compromises like the arrangement o f the 
meeting place in Naun, or alternative measures to ascertain the contents of his official 
documents infuriated and frustrated the Chinese. Similarly, his lies denying knowledge of 
his mens’ actions in Peking, and information regarding the contents o f the 1670 
Milovanov letter, created animosity and distrust. By mid-August, it had become clear to 
the Chinese officials that Spafarii was unwilling to compromise and his demeanor ensured 
that every issue would result in an argument. Even the most inn :ent requests had to be 
accomplished by veiled threats. For example, when the Emperor desired that Spafarii be *
314 Spafarii, “Statcnii spisok,” 260.
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painted by a talented painter, Spafarii replied that he was too tired and was unable to 
accede to the Emperor’s request.
Although the immediate results of Spafarii’s failure was the loss of trading right 
and economic gain, Spafarii’s mission had a much greater impact on the continuing 
Russo-Chinese relationship. Spafarii’s mission had made a lasting impression with the 
Chinese. As Russia’s first official ambassador, he had portrayed himself as an arrogant, 
demanding individual. His contempt for the Chinese and their culture was evident in every 
ritual he refused to perform. Those he did perform were completed in such a rude and 
^suiting manner that the Chinese were shocked and horrified at his audacity. The visions 
o f Spafarii performing the stately kowtow in three quick half bows would remain in the 
minds o f the Chinese officials for decades.
Spafarii’s negative impression was so great that nearly thirty years later, in 1712, 
the Emperor recalled Spafarii immediately when his ambassador was expected to 
rendezvous with a Russian envoy. He informed his representatives that "You will 
p„rticularly mention to the messenger of the Emperor (i.e. o f Peter the Great, whose 
envoy was expected to meet the Chinese embassy to the Ayaka Emperor of Turguts) that 
formerly when Mi-ko-lai of his kingdom came to China, his conduct was very perverse 
and reprehensible, but that you are far from intending to follow his example.”315 
Obviously, Spafarii’s actions remained an influencing factor on Chinese politics for several 
years. Although it is unlikely that Spafarii’s mission alone could be held responsible for
315 Baddelcy, 102.
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more than three hundred years of Chinese animosity and distrust, it is clear that his 
mission set the precedent for modern political attitudes.
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